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Theocratic Constitutionalism:
An Introduction to a New Global Legal Ordering
LARRY CATA BACKER*
ABSTRACT
The twentieth century has seen afundamental shift in the ways in which constitu-
tions are understood. By the middle of the twentieth century, a new sort of constitu-
tionalism emerged, rejecting the idea of the legitimacy of every form of political
selfconstitution. The central assumptions of this new constitutionalism were grounded
in the belief that not all constitutions were legitimate, and that legitimate constitutions
shared a number of universal common characteristics. These common characteristics
were both procedural (against arbitrary use of state power) and substantive (limiting
the sorts ofpolicy choices states could make in constituting its government and exercis-
ing governance power). These procedural and substantive norms were, in turn, an ar-
ticulation ofa "higher law" of the community of nations, reflecting a global communal
consensus evidenced in common practice or international agreements. The authority
and legitimacy of this global secular transnational constitutionalism has not gone un-
challenged. On the one hand, state power traditionalists reject the notion of extra-na-
tional normative constraints on constitution making. On the other hand, there has
been an intensification of challenges from universalists of different schools, from natu-
ral law theorists to pluralist constitutionalists. Among the most potent of these groups
have been religious transnational constitutionalists who have argued that one or an-
other of the current crop of universalist religions ought to serve as the foundation of
normative disciplining of constitution making. But do these movements represent con-
stitutionalism? If they do, then what are their characteristics?
This article examines these questions from the context of the most developedform of
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theocratic transnational constitutionalism-that of Islam. The object will be to examine
the great variation of Islamic and Islamic-influenced constitutions to see if these represent
the emergence of a constitutionalism with characteristics that can be clearly articulated,
if it is possible within this system to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate con-
stitutions, and if there are characteristics of this constitutionalism that clearly distinguish
it from secular transnational constitutionalism. Part I critically reviews the main cur-
rents of twenty-first century notions of constitutionalism and focuses on theocracy as a
principle of governance. Part II suggests the possibility offusing the legitimating struc-
tures of modern constitutionalism with the substantive framework of theocracy to pro-
duceapossibleset ofcharacteristics that wouldmarka legitimate Islamic constitutionalism,
distinguishing Islamic constitutions from Islamic constitutionalism. Part III then applies
this understanding of theocratic constitutionalism to the constitutional "families" of reli-
gious constitutions in which Islamic law has become part of the structural architecture of
the constitution itself, suggesting points of convergence and divergence with the values
and norms ofsecular transnational constitutionalism.
INTRODUCTION
The twentieth century saw a fundamental shift in the ways in which constitu-
tions are understood.' The century saw a movement away from a consensus, how-
ever tenuous, that constitutions were necessarily expressions of the internal social,
political, and economic choices of a unique, territorially-bounded, political commu-
nity.2 Constitutionalism, then, was internally directed and focused on legality-
Rechtsstaat notions.3 The critical questions of constitutionalism were the authenticity
1. Demonstration of this shift was an object of my earlier article, Larry CatA Backer, God(s)
Over Constitutions: International and Religious Transnational Constitutionalism in the 21st Century,
27 Miss. C. L. REV. 11 (2008).
2 See WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC LAW 30 (1924). Wil-
loughby, like his contemporaries, rejected a natural law or universalist approach to constitutional
settlement and instead embraced the notion that "the State may be conceived of as itself the sole
source of legality, thefons et origo of all those laws which condition its own actions and determine
the legal relations of those subject to its authority." Id.
3. As originally understood, it focused on the lawfulness of action-that is that a governmental
action be taken strictly in accordance with law-but did not limit the range of lawful assertions of
government power. "The Rechtsstaat could provide redress against administrative action but stopped
short of providing a general sanction against governments. As a result, the Prussian government was
strictly non-responsible in both a political and legal sense." GORDON SMITH, DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN
GERMANY 9 (1979). See id. at 186-88 for a discussion on traditional Rechtsstaat. For a discussion
about its modern incarnation, see Nobushige Ukai, The Individual and the Rule of Law Under the
New Japanese Constitution, 31 IND. L.J. 733, 735-737 (1956). See also THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
THEOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM
of the polity, the formal legality of the power of the state apparatus to act, and the
conformity of the actions of the state (legislature, executive, and courts) to the re-
quirements of law (protection against arbitrary action) The results could be per-
verse, but as long as they conformed to the law, they might be considered legal.5
Those choices, however odious, were legitimate to the extent there was power to
enforce them. The loci of authority, sovereignty, elections, citizenship, and formalist
conformity to process (due process without substantive values) were the key vari-
ables.6 Verticality of authority was not a necessary prerequisite. The U.S. Constitu-
tion expressly insisted on its supremacy in writing and provided a difficult procedure
for modification.7 This was not necessarily obvious to others; in later constitutions,
the relationship between the law of the constitution and that of other acts was am-
biguous, with a power in the legislature, for example, to amend either without much
difficulty. Other states might express their agreement or disagreement with the in-
ternal constitutive choices of other states, and the local population might seek to
change the choices or rebel, but the legitimacy of the constitution itself was a func-
tion principally of the legality of its content and the integrity of the system employed
to enact and enforce it. Where the choices were sufficiently offensive to powerful
foreign states in ways that conflicted with the interests of those more powerful states,
offending states might be reduced to either secondary or colonial status.8 This con-
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 41 (1995) ("In most national communities, a law draws sup-
port from its having been made in accordance with the process established by the constitution, which
is the ultimate rule of recognition.").
4. See CARL SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 18 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., 2004). For the
softer American conventional version, see CONSTITUTIONALIsM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION 4
(Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 1988).
5. For a discussion of the perversities of these systems in extreme cases-that of Nazi Germany
and Vichy France, see Vivian Grosswald Curran, Fear of Formalism: Indications from the Fascist
Period in France and Germany of Judicial Methodology's Impact on Substantive Law, 35 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 101 (2002).
6. A lively theoretics of constitutions was produced at the end of the nineteenth century to reflect
these concerns. See, e.g., ALBERT V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION 3-35 (9th ed. 1952). But authoritarian constitutionalism also had its proponents. For an ex-
ample from an early twentieth century analysis of the Japanese Imperial Constitution, see HIROBUMI
ITO, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN (Miyoji Ito trans., 2d ed. 1906).
7. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (Cornell University Press 1974) (1928).
8. Relying on contemporary academic opinion, Willoughby, for example, understood that:
Just as, in municipal law, they are regarded as the possessors of independent wills
and as the entities in which are vested certain rights and responsibilities, so, in
international law, they are viewed as political persons having definite rights and
obligations. This status they have, however, in full effect at least, only insofar as
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sensus changed. Led by American academic and political elites9 seeking to remake
a world upended by a half-century long war in which most political and power
relationships had been affected," by the middle of the twentieth century there
emerged the notion, 2 articulated first successfully in the German 3 and Japanese 4
post-war constitutions, that not all constitutions were legitimate. 5 Constitutional-
ism required more than the enactment of a written constitution, even one concerned
with formal protection against arbitrary use of power (the use of power not other-
they are regarded as members of what is known as the "Family of Nations,"
which Family does not include all the States of the world but only those nations
which have reached a certain degree of civilization.
WILLOUGHBY, SUpra note 2, at 307 (citing PITT COBBETT, LEADING CASES AND OPINIONS ON INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 27 (3d ed. 1909)).
9. See Cati Backer, supra note 1, at 24-33; see also AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM ABROAD:
SELECTED ESSAYS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (George Athan Billias ed., 1990).
10. Some historians have begun to understand the First and Second World Wars as intimately
interrelated. See, e.g. RENE ALBRECHT-CARRIE, FRANCE, EUROPE AND THE Two WORLD WARS 10
(1961) ("The two world wars and the intervening period thus constitute a single unit.").
11. For a sense of the consciousness of those changes, although from a source contemporary
sensibilities will likely find objectionable, see OSWALD SPENGLER, THE HOUR OF DEcISIoN (Charles
F. Atkinson trans., 1934).
12. William M. Wiecek, American Jurisprudence After the War: "Reason Called Law," 37 TULSA
L. REV. 857, 861 (2002) (citing SEYMOUR M. LIPSET, THE FIRST NEW NATION: THE UNITED STATES
IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1963); FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE CONSTITU-
TION OF LIBERTY (1960)) ("Seeking to restore a moral component to political thought, political
theorists were determined to adapt the old ideal of the rule of law to the conditions of the modern
state. Eminent scholars, such as Friedrich von Hayek, Louis Hartz, and Seymour M. Lipset, ex-
tolled the virtues of constitutionalism, defining it as a commitment to the rule of law. That core
characteristic of the liberal state included limited government, protection for individual rights, and
a role for the judiciary under such protection.").
13. See Grudegesetz ffir die Budesrepublik Deutschland (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of
Germany) (1949), available at http://www.bundestag.de/interakt/infomat/fremdsprachiges-
material/downloads/ggEn-download.pdf.
14. For the Japanese post-war constitution, see Nihonkoku Kenp6 (Constitution of Japan)
(1946), available at http://www.web.japan.org/factsheet/pdf/CONSTITU.pdf.
15. "[T]he legitimation effect can be defined as the process through which systematic losers come
to understand themselves as part of the system, as self-governing, and as having willed their losses
and their subordinate status." Orly Lobel, The Paradox Of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Con-
sciousnessand Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937,958 (2007). On the meaning of legitima-
tion as a political and legal concept in the modern era for the validation of political and legal acts, see,
e.g., HERBERT L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100-10 (2d ed. 1994). For the intersection of legiti-
macy and constitutionalism in the area of environmental justice, see, e.g., Steven Bernstein, Legiti-
macy in Global Environmental Governance, I J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 139 (2005).
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wise conferred by law). 6 Legitimate constitutions shared a number of common
characteristics. 7 These common characteristics were both procedural (against arbi-
trary use of state power) and substantive (limiting the sorts of policy choices states
could make in constituting its government and exercising governance power).8
These procedural and substantive norms were, in turn, an articulation of a "higher
law" of the community of nations, reflecting a global communal consensus evi-
denced in common practice or international agreements. The notion of a higher law
suggested a necessary universalism with roots in both natural and religious law. 9
Constitutionalism in the twentieth century was tied to the construction of a collec-
tive-an international society of states2°-with the object of universalizing stan-
dards of behavior and of preserving the power relationships within and among
states from threats.2' "The system thus brought into being was thus a product of the
16. See, for example, H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflec-
tions on an African Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 65 (Douglas Green-
berg et al. eds., 1993), for a discussion of constitutionalism and how it becomes a tradition.
Constitutionalism in this vein has been understood as the memorializations of a methodology for
the protection of fundamental values. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Yet Another Constitutional
Crisis?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2093, 2139 (2002).
17. For a powerful example of this form of constitutionalism, see CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE
CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1996).
18. This substantive constitutionalism changed the nature and focus of process constitutionalism.
In Germany, for example,
[tihe result of raising the Basic Law to a pre-eminent position by making the
Rechtsstaat directly enforceable has not been simply to place the constitution
above politics but in an important way to make it a determinant of politics ....
That slant is evident in the view that the Basic Law imposes certain constitu-
tional tasks (Verfassungsauftrdge) which require fulfilment [sic], in a somewhat
programmatic sense. These "tasks" are frequently held to be embedded in the
clauses setting out individual rights ....
SMITH, supra note 3, at 55. Smith also states that "[tihe period after 1945 can be said to have wit-
nessed the 'emancipation' of the Rechtsstaat in Germany. Yet it is strange that an idea which for so
long had been central to the German legal tradition should have been made subordinate to the
dictates of arbitrary authority." Id. at 186.
19. DALE PATRICK, OLD TESTAMENT LAW 7 (1985) ("By 'higher law' is meant what is truly just
and right.... The very capacity to argue over what the law should be depends upon an existence
of a scheme of principles and values to which both parties in the argument make appeal. The
universality of this law is demonstrated by the capacity to visit foreign countries and conform
without unreasonable adjustment to the law of each...").
20. See, for example, MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS (2001), for a
discussion of the historical aspects of international law and society.
21. As R.J. Barry Jones put it, "The institutionalisation of the sovereignty of states, and the use
of power balancing mechanisms, formed the basis of what some analysts have dubbed an interna-
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character, needs and interests of its constituent parts-the member states-or,
rather, of the dominant interests within those states.... "22 It was secular.23 Late
twentieth century constitutionalism represented an attempt to systematize, institu-
tionalize, and implement as international higher law, a long-held view in Western
legal and political circles of the basis for establishing a hierarchy of states by refer-
ence to their civilization.24
The object was to both impose a deeper and substantive meaning of rule of law
constitutionalism on states and to find a mechanism for developing those substantive
principles of domestic constitutionalism that might express transnational universal
principles of right and justice rather than merely those of majorities within a particu-
lar state. This, it was thought, would provide a meta-norm for limiting the power of
states and avoiding arbitrary or immoral conduct by subjecting those notions to inter-
national development and oversight. Under this system all states participate in the
construction of universal normative constitutional standards, but none control it en-
tirely (though some have a greater authority in the process-a nod to power), and all
are technically subject to its strictures as international law (or as a means of legitimat-
ing domestic governance against internal or external threats).25 This new means of
international ordering reduces the need for the traditional means of enforcement-
military intervention or occupation-by creating a legal system for the coercive polic-
ing of the behavior and international constitution of states through "constitutionalism"
that serves both to preserve the form of state sovereignty and the normative values of
tional society: a 'society', albeit, of states (or their ruling groups) devoted to the interests and main-
tenance of those states (or rulinggroups)." R.J. BARRY JONES, GLOBALISATION AND INTERDEPENDENCE
IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 50 (1995); see also ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM,
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 245-72 (2004) (arguing that the colonial
history of international law is concealed within its reproduction, including its reproduction as the
new forms of global governance).
22. JONES, supra note 21, at 50.
23. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007).
24. "The idea that societies which do not possess certain economic systems and corresponding
political institutions should be regarded as outlaws that must be appropriately disciplined and re-
formed is a very old one." ANGHIE, supra note 21, at 269 (citing, in part, EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW
OF NATIONS: OR, PRINCIPLES OF LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS
AND SOVEREIGNS (Joseph Chitty ed., 6th ed. 1883) (1758)). "What Vattel describes is something akin
to an economic 'rogue state', a state that must be exterminated." Id. at 270.
25. For an acknowledgement and application, see Stephen J. Schnably, Emerging International
Law Constraints on Constitutional Structure and Revision: A Preliminary Appraisal, 62 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 417, 479-88 (2008) ("In the end, some internationalization of structural constitutional issues
may be both unavoidable and even desirable. The ultimate violation of a constitution is a military
coup, and one might think twice about returning to the days when coups were considered purely
internal matters.").
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dominant state powers.26 Battles over transnational constitutionalism sometimes
focus on power-the power to control or participate in the supranational contests for
the production of universalist constitutionalist norms.27
The authority and legitimacy of this global secular transnational constitution-
alism has not gone unchallenged. At its core, these contests are over the nature and
context of authority.2" On the one hand, state power traditionalists reject the notion
of extra-national normative constraints on constitution making.29 On the other
hand, a number of groups have accepted the legitimacy of transnational constitu-
tionalism as a disciplining force but have rejected the notion that such restraints can
be the product of a secular global political consensus.3" Among the most potent of
these groups have been religious transnational constitutionalists who have argued
that one or another of the current crop of universalist religions ought to serve as the
foundation of normative disciplining of constitution making.3
26. ANGHIE, supra note 21, at 270 ("Now, however, such deviant states are to be identified by all
the economic criteria formulated by the IFIs [international finance institutions]; states that are
protectionist, inefficient and encumbered by bureaucracy and government regulation must be
eliminated, as it were, through SAPs [structural adjustment programmes] that will bring about
their transformation into proper international citizens.").
27. Within the context of the meaning of human dignity and applicable human rights, the battle-
field includes not only the apparatus of the United Nations, but also the production of norms and
common understanding of right and justice from the opinions of the various human rights courts.
See, e.g., NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 3-23 (2002);
THE GLOBALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Jean-Marc Coicaud et al. eds., 2003). Thus, "in spite of the
progress of multilateralism and internationalism before and during the 1990s, the international sys-
tem remains largely nationally rooted, with state actors in competition." Jean-Marc Coicaud, Conclu-
sion: Human rights in discourse and practice, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 178,
186.
28. "The justice of law, justice as law is not justice. Laws are not justas laws. One obeys them not
because they are just but because they have authority." Jacques Derrida, Force de Loi: Le "Fonde-
ment Mystique de lAuthorite" [The Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation ofAuthority"], 11 CAR-
DOZo L. REV. 920, 939 (1990).
29. Thus, for example, "the business of the constitution is to express the polity's most basic legal and
political commitments." Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, WILSON Q., Autumn 2003, at 22, 27.
30. Derrida reminds us, quoting Pascal with a nod to Montaigne, of that ancient strain of fun-
damental understanding of law, justice, and the constitution of political society: "simple reason
tells us that nothing is just in itself; everything crumbles with time. Custom is the sole basis for
equity, for the simple reason that it is received; it is the mystical foundation of its authority. Who-
ever traces it to its source annihilates it." Derrida,supra note 28, at 939. But he then reminds us of
the moral of that insight-that "the origin of authority, the foundation or ground, the position of
law can't by definition rest on anything but themselves .... Id. at 943.
31. Consider an example from Chechnya.
As for the more radical islamist project, its supporters considered that the sole
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 16:1
Religion finds its way into the constitutional framework of states in a variety
of ways. States engage with religion, as a formal matter, in different manners.
Some states conflate legal and religious systems together. Some states sponsor or
establish a religion. Others incorporate religious law as the law of the state, much
like the American states incorporated the English Common Law. But do these
movements represent a contextual variant of conventional constitutionalism? Or
theocracy?32 Or do they represent a different and autonomous basis for the consti-
tution of states grounded in principle? Is there now arising a theocratic constitu-
tionalism in opposition to and competing with conventional constitutionalism for
a place as one set, or the supreme set, of organizing principles for states? If such a
constitutionalism exists, what are its characteristics?
This article begins an examination of these questions. The context will be the
most developed form of theocratic transnational constitutionalism-Islamic trans-
national constitutionalism.33 This is not to say that others have not sought similar
roles for different faith communities.34 The object will be to examine the great vari-
possible Chechen democracy was a constitutional theocracy, the only reasonable
alternative to western and Russian "politically and ideologically prostituted" con-
stitutionalism. This model envisaged the suppression of democratic institutions,
for instance, the substitution of a secret ballot by an open nominal referendum.
Alexei Kudriavtsev, Democratic Values and Political Reality in Chechnya, 1991-1999, in DEMOCRACY
AND PLURALISM IN MUSLIM EURASIA 359, 369 (Yaacov Ro'i ed., 2004).
32. See LUCAS SWAINE, THE LIBERAL CONSCIENCE: POLITICS AND PRINCIPLE IN A WORLD OF RELI-
GIOUS PLURALISM 2-4 (2006) (suggesting the elements of theocracy). Looking back to Josephus and
the defense of the constitution of the Jewish state of Israel at the time of its destruction by the Ro-
mans, Swaine explains "Theocracy '[places] all sovereignty and authority in the hands of God."' Id.
at 2 (quoting JOSEPHUS FLAVIUS, AGAINST APION (100 A.D.)). Swaine defines theocracy as "a mode of
governance prioritizing a religious conception of the good that is strict and comprehensive in its range of
teachings." Id. at 6-7. But Swaine considers theocracy existing with dominant liberal polities. Id.
33. But also note "[w]hat Islamic constitutionalism entails remains contested among Muslims as
well as among Western scholars who study the topic." Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Conundrums in Con-
stitutionalism: Islamic Monarchies in an Era of Transition, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 183, 183
(2002). Note also that that Islamic theocracy is not the only manifestation of this drive toward a
new constitutionalism. Hindu and Buddhist universalists are also active. See, e.g., Sheetal Parikh,
Enshrining a Secular Idol: A judicial Response to the Violent Aftermath ofAyodhya, 37 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 85 (2005) (describing Hindu theocratic nationalism); Roshan de Silva Wijeyeratne, Bud-
dhism, the Asokan Persona, and the Galactic Polity: Rethinking Sri Lanka's Constitutional Present,
Soc. ANALYSIS, Spring 2007, at 156-78, (describing Buddhist nationalist constitutionalism); Larry
Catd Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism: Buddhist Constitutionalism in Sri Lanka, Law at the
End of the Day, http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2008/06/theocratic-constitutionalism-buddhist.
html (June 1, 2008, 7:23 EST).
34. See, e.g., Larry CatA Backer, Nehru Inverted: Building a Model for Theocratic Constitutional-
ism in India, Law at the End of the Day, http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2007/12/nehru-inverted
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ation of Islamic and Islamic-influenced constitutions to determine whether one can
argue that these constitutions represent the emergence of a constitutionalism with
characteristics that can be clearly articulated, that it is possible within this system to
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate constitutions, and that there are
characteristics of this constitutionalism that clearly distinguish it from secular trans-
national constitutionalism. After this introduction, Part I critically reviews the main
currents of twenty-first century notions of constitutionalism. For that purpose it
advances an understanding ofconstitutionalism developed in earlier work: constitu-
tionalism is a system of classification, the principal object of which is to define the
characteristics of constitutions, which is used to determine the legitimacy of a consti-
tutional system either as conceived or implemented, based on the fundamental pos-
tulate of rule of law and grounded on values derived from a source beyond the
control of any individual.35 It then focuses on the relationship of constitutionalism to
theocracy as a principle of governance. Its object is to situate a classical understand-
ing of theocracy within the discourse of constitutionalism.
Part II,36 in turn, develops and situates the theocratic variant of constitution-
alism within conventional constitutionalist debates, looking primarily at its Is-
lamic constitutionalist form. It rejects the idea that the use of religion as an
ordering principle of state can be understood only as a somehow flawed or hereti-
cal constitutionalism. It posits that, at least within some polities, religion might be
emerging as the basis for ordering of a state no less principled and complete than
its conventional counterpart.37 But the difference does not so much make the ris-
ing system flawed as incompatible with conventional constitutionalism. It sug-
gests competition among legitimating constitutionalist systems for acceptance as
the basic ordering principle of states, much as free market and Marxist world-
views vied for supremacy through the 1980s. The article attempts to extract from
this examination a set of characteristics of legitimate Islamic constitutionalism,
distinguishing Islamic constitutions from Islamic constitutionalism.
-building-model-for.html (Dec. 23,2007,21:32 EST); Cati Backer,supra note 33.
35. See Larry Catd Backer, From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Framework for Analysis of Na-
tionalist and Transnational Constitutionalism, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRNtD1311397_code259226.pdf?abstractid = 1272264
&mirid=l
36. See infra Part I.
37. In this respect, I suggest the possibilities of the rise of an alternative framework for state or-
ganizations along principled lines that contrasts with the suggestion of the difficulty of that project
expressed by others. See Abdullahi A An-Naim, Shari'a and Positive Legislation: Is an Islamic State
Possible or Viable, in 5 YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE EASTERN LAW 29, 37 (2000).
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Part III" then applies this understanding of theocratic constitutionalism to
the constitutional "families" of religious constitutions in which Islamic law has
become part of the structural architecture of the constitution itself. The focus,
again, is principally on Islam and Muslim majority states. However, there will be
a nod to states comprised of majorities of other religious communities. For my
purpose here, the article adopts a formalist and institutionalist approach to reli-
gion.39 The object is to interrogate the connection between fully developed and
institutionalized communities-political and religious. For that purpose, religion
will refer to those faith communities collectively constituted through an institu-
tional framework.4" The article suggests the ways in which constitutionalist dis-
course can provide a means for distinguishing between principled theocratic
constitutionalism, however alien to the constitutionalist framework of secular
states, from unprincipled (and perhaps less legitimate) forms of constitutions that
provide a formal role for religion within its ordering framework.
The implications are significant for advocates of this or that form of constitu-
tionalism as a privileged framework for legitimating state organization, or where
illegitimate, for organizing internal or external resistance to the government consti-
tuted thereunder. Constitutionalism is a commodity-an important one, serving as
an operating system for the organization of life within its operational scope. Like
other commodities, it has gone global. As a proxy for a network of organizing rela-
tionships, it provides service and value to its consumers that vary with its character-
38. See infra Part III.
39. There may well be significant differences between constitutions in theory and in practice. Con-
stitutions can be a sham. See Molly Warner Lien, Red Star Trek: Seeking a Rolefor Constitutional Law
in Soviet Disunion, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 41, 63-64 (1994) (stating with respect to late Tsarist constitu-
tionalism that "[alt most the period could be described as sham constitutionalism, because there was
no obligation on the part of the executive to work with the legislature, and no mechanism for ensur-
ing government adherence to 'constitutional' norms."). This has certainly been the case even where
the constitution is neither a sham nor a nominal constitution. See, e.g., Nathan J. Brown, Islamic
Constitutionalism in Theory and Practice, in DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW, AND ISLAM 491, 496-97
(Eugene Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1999) (on the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court
and its engagement with Egyptian constitutional commands). Still, a study of the formal exposition
of constitutional arrangements can serve us well in distinguishing between constitutions and consti-
tutionalism and among the varieties ofconstitutionalism developed.
40. For a discussion of this limitation and its importance in the construction of constitutional
approaches to religion, see Larry CatS1 Backer, Religion as Object and the Grammar of Law, 81
MARQ. L. REv. 229, 237-42 (1998). "Consequently, I do not believe that one can divorce Religion
from the context in which it has existed in the world. Religion is not merely a series of conduct
codes and precepts. Religion is not merely a moral philosophy, nor a naked spirituality. It is a world
view..." Id. at 249. This worldview has its own law and institutions for its perpetuation.
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istics. We are quickly moving into an age where constitutionalism must be marketed
to consumers, who increasingly have a power of choice among alternatives.4' It will
no longer be sufficient to suggest that a competitor system ought to be avoided be-
cause it is a flawed version of the competitor. Each system will now compete on the
basis of what it offers individuals within organized communities. Dialogue will
center on convergence, separation, translation, and subversion of competing systems
as each vies for dominance in the world market. To some extent, this will represent
a return to a medievalism in which accommodation may be required because no
system is strong enough to overwhelm the others, and all compete for supremacy
within the peoples of the community of nations.42
I. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THEOCRACY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
I have described the variety of ways in which institutional religion serves as a
critical political actor within constitutional systems. 3 But is this evidence of a
place for religion (like other subnational communities-factions) within constitu-
tions, or does it suggest the emergence of something new-a theocratic constitu-
tionalism-or a religiously based tyranny?
In order to understand the character of theocracy and the means for determin-
ing whether such systems may be judged legitimate or illegitimate, in accordance
with the general framework evolving for that purpose, it is useful to examine the
conventional system of constitutional taxonomy (and the judgments it fosters). The
inquiry embraces the irony in taxonomy-both classification and application of the
normative structure on which classificatory choice is made. For the application of
this insight to the important issue of democracy and judicial review as a component
of constitutionalism, conventionally understood, Miguel Schor suggests,
[m]aps, after all, are used to conceptualize the world. Similarly, schol-
ars believe that order can be brought to the profusion of laws that
populate the world by classifying and organizing them into families.
Taxonomies, it is thought, facilitate the task of transferring laws be-
41. Cf. Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REv. 4, 35-40 (1983) (on the competition between constitutionalist models within the antebel-
lum United States).
42. See Larry CatA Backer, On Israel's 60th Anniversary of Statehood: Views From the Empire
and the Caliphate, Law at the End of the Day, http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2008/05/on-israels
-60th-anniversary-of.html (May 16, 2008, 16:38 EST).
43. See generally Catd Backer, supra note 1.
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tween nations. The problem with taxonomic approaches to compara-
tive law, however, is that they obscure the tension between representing
reality and orienting the user that maps ineluctably present.44
The basis of that taxonomy is the system of judgment we now understand
as constitutionalism. Constitutions memorialize organization of state power.
45
Constitutionalism serves as the metric by which such organization can be
judged, legitimated, and modified. This judgment, when made by a substan-
tially strong segment of the community of nations, now serves as a basis for
political action against and within non-conforming states-justifying a variety
of political action from sanctions and embargoes46 to military intervention,
47
44. Miguel Schor, Mapping Comparative Judicial Review, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 257,
257-58 (2008).
45. Power might be usefully understood in Weberian terms, and as such, tied to notions of domina-
tion. See MAX WEBER, BASIC CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY 117 (H.P. Secher trans., 4th ed. 1966) (indicating
that "[blypower is meant that opportunity existing within a social relationship which permits one to
carry out one's own will even against resistance and regardless of the basis on which this opportunity
rests. By domination is meant the opportunity to have a command of a given specified content obeyed.
."). Alternatively, a more amorphous and governance oriented approach to power is also useful. See
e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans.,
Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1975); Larry Cati Backer, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations, and the
Governance Effects of Monitoring Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101 (2008).
46. The classic modern example is the isolation of the constitutionally sanctioned apartheid gov-
ernment of South Africa. Referencing the South African experience, Steven Wheatley notes,
[a]s Michael Matheson has observed, there may be circumstances where the Se-
curity Council is justified in requiring a change in some aspect of the political
structure of a state, where it determines that "doing so is necessary to restore and
maintain international peace and security." The question is whether the right of
peoples to political self-determination should be overridden by the "public inter-
est in the maintenance of international peace and security," the pursuit of which
is considered more compelling in the particular circumstances of the case.
Steven Wheatley, The Security Council, Democratic Legitimacy and Regime Change in Iraq, 17 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 531, 543 (2006) (citing Michael Matheson, United Nations Governance of Postconflict
Societies, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 76, 85 (2001)); see also S.C. Res. 554, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/554 (Aug.
17, 1984) (where the Security Council declared the "new constitution" of Apartheid South Africa
to be "contrary to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.").
47. See Philipp Dann & Zaid AI-Ali, The Internationalized Pouvoir Constituant: Constitution-
making Under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor, in 10 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF
UNITED NATIONS LAW 423 (Armin von Bogdandy et al. eds., 2006); Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign
Constitution-making and its Pathology in Iraq, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 535 (2006).
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revolution,48 and civil war.49 Legitimation of this sort is sometimes understood
in the American literature in economic terms appropriate to contracts.
50
For all of its bluster in the literature, constitutionalism is quite protean in
form. Like a piece of high quality spandex, it can be stretched over the body seek-
ing to clothe itself in it. "At one end are views of constitutionalism that see the role
of the constitution as delineating a national identity.... At the other end are views
of constitutionalism that see the role of the constitution as imposing constraints,
in the name of universalist conceptions of humanity ....""
The elasticity of constitutionalism is easy enough to describe.52 Many discus-
48. Iran provides a modern example.
Iran's clerics had been deeply divided about the legitimacy of the first Iranian
constitution, which was promulgated in 1906. In order to conciliate the 'ulama,
article 2 provided that no laws would be enacted that violated Islamic principles,
and article 2 of the 1907 Supplement to the Fundamental Law provided that a
tribunal of clerics would review proposed legislation to ensure that it did not
conflict with the shari'a. However, under the Pahlavi Shahs, the clerics discov-
ered to their chagrin that they would not in practice have any way of blocking
laws from being enacted where they deemed them in violation of the shari'a.
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1015, 1038 (1991).
49. The classic modern example is East Timor.
The explicit entry of global institutions, such as the U.N. in East Timor and
other such places, into constitution making is simply a more explicit form of the
global nature of all local constitution making. It could not be done if there were
no principles of global constitutionalism. If the local population insisted on a
theocracy there would be no way to engage the U.N.
Karol Edward So Tan, Constitution Making at the Edges of the Constitutional Order, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1409, 1419 (2008).
50. Zachary Elkins et al., Baghdad, Tokyo, Kabul. . .: Constitution Making in Occupied States, 49
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1139, 1143-44 (2008) ("Unlike ordinary contracts, however, constitutional
agreements have no external guarantor to enforce the terms, independent of the parties. To en-
dure, constitutions must be self-enforcing, meaning they must give rise to an equilibrium from
which no party has an incentive to deviate. Even though constitutions may produce relative win-
ners and relative losers, they will endure to the extent that the losers believe they are better off
within the constitutional bargain than in taking a chance on negotiating a new one.").
51. Robin West, Human Capabilities and Human Authorities: A Comment on Martha Nussbaum's
Women And Human Development, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 757, 771 (2003) ("[E]ither pole of this
axis, as well as any number of mid-way points along it, are plausible enough accounts of the way
the idea of constitutionalism has been bandied about in theory and used in practice, at least in the
United States.").
52. For a focused review, see generally Cati Backer, supra note 35. Much of the discussion of
constitutionalism and its elasticity is drawn from that work.
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sions of constitutionalism seek to situate their discussion somewhere along this con-
tinuum and in the service of a particular purpose. All constitutionalism is
justificatory-justifying a particular perspective or objective in the normative con-
struction of the rules for understanding the character of systems of governance. It is
deployed to justify the current reality-an apologist approach to constitutionalism.
Alternatively, it is used as a repository of constitutional principles extracted from a
reading of the "innards" of one or more constitutions out of which principles of
constitution making might be extracted and then applied to all constitutions.53
For some, constitutionalism can be most usefully approached from the nar-
rowing confines of the field of international law. They might suggest, for example,
"as the defining feature of international constitutionalism-both erga omnes
norms and jus cogens presuppose and refer to a sphere of common matters of
mankind which have a higher normative rank than rules regulating interstate
relations."54 The object of constitutionalism is thus tied to a project of suprana-
tional elaboration. That elaboration of constitutionalist theory is focused on the
creation of an institutional supranational apparatus for the construction and en-
forcement of a set of universal principles of constitution making," or in the elabo-
ration of a supranational system of customary constitutional law principles.56 The
idea is sometimes reduced to a complex networking society of judges and courts
on a global scale who relate to each other the way common law judges used to
53. This sort of structuralist/textualist approach to constitutionalism has a strong parallel to
some methods of constitutional interpretation. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 249-75 (2d ed. 2006).
54. Ulrich K. PreuB, Equality of States-Its Meaning in a Constitutionalized Global Order, 9 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 17, 39 (2008) ("Obviously the former rules include the principles laid down in the UN
Charter, such as prohibition of the use of force (except the case of self-defense), respect for the
political independence and territorial integrity of any state, and, most importantly, the protection
of human rights as laid down in several international compacts.").
55. This is a subset of a movement that seeks in globalization of governance institutions a solu-
tion to the problems posed by the current state system. "For universalists, true universalization of
international law requires the harnessing of participants, constituencies, stakeholders, sources, and
influences into modern international legal processes." Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateral-
ism, and the Architecture of International Law, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 323, 324 (2008).
56. This would both mimic and supplement the construction of customary international law as
"law." See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, Customary International Law in the 21st
Century, in PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 197 (Russell A. Miller & Rebecca M. Bratspies eds.,
2008). The domestic dimensions of the domestication of customary international law have been a
favorite of American law discourse for the last quarter century. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary Inter-
national Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 91, 101-08 (2004); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land:
Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 393 (1997).
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function in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England.57 "In this con-
text the internationalization effectively represents a blending and generalization
of the consensus positions of appropriate or basic norms drawn from the evolving
constitutional traditions of the member states of the supranational system."58
Constitutionalism is sometimes tied to both cosmopolitanism and to conver-
gence theories. It can be tied to pluralism within a looser framework of shared ideals.
It can sometimes be advanced as a reflection of "the abiding hope that from the
shared culture, history, and ethos of these consanguineous states, [where] a homoge-
neous legal order can emerge."59 In its natural law formulation, it suggests
certain principles of right and justice which are entitled to prevail
of their own intrinsic excellence, altogether regardless of the atti-
tude of those who wield the physical resources of the commu-
nity.... In relation to such principles, human laws are, when
entitled to obedience save as to matters indifferent, merely a record
or transcript, and their enactment an act not of will or power but
one of discovery and declaration."
In any of these guises, the focus is on consensus on values within a frame-
work through which such consensus can be legitimately formulated. Thus, con-
stitutionalism suggests both institution building and a values system around
which such institutions operate and for whose advancement they exist.
But the principal project of convergence-oriented, supranational constitution-
alism is the search for consensus on values. It is, after all, hard to construct a sys-
tem for evaluating the higher law of states without a framework of values against
which constitutions can be assessed. It is in this project that one runs across both a
great convergence of values and a resistance to such convergence. Consensus val-
ues "require[] imposing limits on the powers of government, adherence to the
57. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Vicki C. Jackson, Consti-
tutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); David S.
Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652 (2005).
58. Catdi Backer, supra note 35, at 112.
59. Margaret A. Burnham, Indigenous Constitutionalism and the Death Penalty: The Case of the
Commonwealth Caribbean, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 582, 614 (2005) (on the institution of the Caribbean
Court of Justice).
60. CoRwIN, supra note 7, at 4-5 (emphasis omitted). For a classic critical discussion, see Roscoe
Pound, The Ideal Element in American Judicial Decision, 45 HARV. L. REV. 136, 148 (1931) ("Today
we should be employing philosophical method in jurisprudence to set off and criticize the ideal
element in systems of developed law .... ).
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 16:1
rule of law, and the protection of fundamental rights."61 Or, as understood outside
the United States, the values that inform constitutionalism, at its core, include
the ideas of "popular sovereignty" and a social contract as the source
of the government; the principles of republicanism, federalism,
separation of powers, and government limited by law; respect for
the rights and liberties of citizens and the protection of private
property; the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution;
and independence of the judiciary and judicial review.62
Sometimes the shorthand for these values/judgment frameworks is "rule of
law" understood either as process rights (limitations of individual discretion in
assertions of government power)63 or substantive values (limitations on the sorts of
assertions of power a government might undertake).
First, rule of law is understood as embedded in mandatory systems
for maintaining firm limits on the arbitrary use of state power by the
individual. This is the idea of rule of law in its process aspect, limiting
the use of state power only when grounded in legitimately enacted
law. Second, rule of law is understood in its substantive aspect as vest-
ing the state with the critical role as guardian of a set of foundational
communally embraced substantive norms that are to be protected and
furthered through the use of state power grounded in law. 64
But rule of law is also conflated with certain governmental systems, perhaps
because they might serve as proxies for the values which are meant to serve as the
61. Michel Rosenfeld, Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay Between Identity and Diversity, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (Mi-
chel Rosenfeld ed., 1994).
62. Vasiliy A. Vlasihin, Political Rights and Freedoms in the Context of American Constitutional-
ism:A View ofa Concerned Soviet Scholar, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 257, 258 (1989).
63. "Today, the most common form of legitimacy is the belief in legality, i.e., the compliance with
enactments which are formally correct and which have been imposed by an accustomed proce-
dure." WEBER, supra note 45, at 82.
64. Larry Catd Backer, The Rule of Law, The Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Cam-
paigns: Sange Daibiao (the "Three Represents"), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitu-
tionalism, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 39 (2006); see also RANDALL PERRENBOOM,
CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 126-88 (2002).
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foundations of judgment. Among the most important are notions of democracy,65
citizenship, 66 and human rights.67 There is a self-referencing quality to these no-
tions. Thus, one starts from the notion that the "fundamental value that constitu-
tionalism protects is human dignity. '68 Human dignity is then bound up with
forms of governance. It is common to note that in "the context of the human
rights revolution, the main focus of the moral redefinition of the new democracies
in contrast to the totalitarian regimes they replace is the latter's violation of human
rights."'69 This insight bends constitutionalist values discourse back to democratic
principles. "In contrast to the presumed moral worth of nativism against the colo-
nial rulers, the task in the era of new constitutionalism is the moral definition of
democratic political community."7  Others approach constitutionalism as
grounded in an implicit ordering of substantive constitutional values in which
democracy and self-determination are privileged and other notions of substantive
norms-particularly that cluster of behavior norms limiting the power of states
against individuals-are subordinated.7'
But all these values require both an authoritative source and a mechanism for
elaboration, institutionalization, and enforcement. It is to those functions that
65. See, e.g., BORIS DEWIEL, DEMOCRACY: A HISTORY OF IDEAS (2000); Samuel Issacharoff, Con-
stitutonalizing Democracy in Fractured Societies, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1861, 1861 (2004) (addressing "the
role of constitutionalism in stabilizing democratic governance in ... fractured societies.. .because
of the limitations it imposes on democratic choice.").
66. See, e.g., RIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF MULTICUL-
TURALISM (2002); SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS
(THE SEELEY LECTURES) (2004) (on citizenship and moral personhood).
67. "The fundamental value that constitutionalism protects is human dignity." Walter F. Murphy,
An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 758 (1980). "In the context of the human
rights revolution, the main focus of the moral redefinition of the new democracies in contrast to the
totalitarian regimes they replace is the latter's violation of human rights." James T. Richardson, Reli-
gion, Constitutional Courts, and Democracy in Former Communist Countries, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. Sc., Jan. 2006, at 129, 135-36. The human rights focus is also tied to democratic principles.
"In contrast to the presumed moral worth of nativism against the colonial rulers, the task in the era
of new constitutionalism is the moral definition of democratic political community." Id. at 135.
68. Murphy, supra note 67, at 758.
69. Richardson, supra note 67, at 135-36.
70. Id. at 135.
71. See e.g., Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REv. 857 (2005). For a critical
discussion, see Catd Backer, supra note 35. This is, of course, hardly new to Feldman. See, e.g., Welsh-
man Ncube, Constitutionalism and Human Rights: Challenges of Democracy, in THE INSTITUTIONALI-
SATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 1 (Pearson Nherere & Marina d'Engelbronner-Kolff
eds., 1993) ("Representative government is at the heart of democracy and constitutionalism. Without
it is idle to speak of the constitutional protection of human rights."). Id. at 14.
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constitutionalism also devotes itself. It is in the search for sources of authority and
legitimacy, as well as for the institutional framework within which these values
may be embraced legitimately, that much of constitutionalism is devoted. It is here
that the great schism between nationalist and international (or transnational) con-
stitutionalism is most apparent." This schism is of particular interest to American
constitutionalists.
For Americans, the question of constitutionalism, especially in its
form of judicial interpretive power, reduces itself to three questions,
all relating to power. The first focuses on the legitimacy of inter-
pretive methods. The object is to avoid judicial despotism by forc-
ing judicial discourse to privilege forms of analysis that reduce the
ability of judges to substitute their personal predilections for that of
the community reflected in the constitution.... The second targets
the use of foreign sources-now understood in its larger context as
a battle over control of the essence of the character of the state and
its relationship to other states and the community of nations. The
other targets the constitutional power of the legislature, the popu-
lar in popular constitutionalism.74
On the one hand, traditionalists continue to adhere to the view that constitutions
are creatures of their context. "Although law is by no means static, legal evolution in
each country is distinct and will produce vastly different outcomes. Far from con-
verging over time, legal institutions remain different."75 On the other hand, interna-
tionalists and universalists suggest that though context is to be respected, universal
principles are to be privileged.76 Much constitutionalist discourse, though, sits some-
72. See Catd Backer, supra note 35.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 142.
75. KATHARINA PISTOR ET AL., THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN Eco-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1960-1995, at 35 (1999) (noting that "law and legal evolution are part of the
idiosyncratic historical development of a country, and that they are determined by multiple factors,
including culture, geography, climate, and religion.").
76. The key lies in the post-1945 efforts at globalizing constitutions.
The focus of this constitutionalism was transnational and secular. It was
grounded on the rules of behavior derived from the understandings and sensi-
bilities of the community of states. In this sense it was self-referencing and meta
sovereign-the system essentially moved ultimate discretion up from any indi-
vidual state to the community of states.
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where in the middle. Examples of this include Asian or Asian values7, constitutional-
ist discourse. But some discourse is constitutionalist only in a post facto sort of way.78
Despite this great elasticity, it is possible to sketch out the contours of consti-
tutionalism as a framework for judging constitutional legitimacy.79 Constitution-
alism is, in its broadest conception, a Weltanschauung, a system of beliefs relating
to power in the world, and specifically to that power that is asserted to organize
and run a political organization, and its expression through law.8" Constitutional-
ism invokes both evocative symbolism as well as instrumentalism-an ordered
system or systematization of belief.
Catdi Backer, supra note 1, at 37-38.
77. Thus, for example, "The Bangkok Declaration was the high tide of the 'Asian values' argu-
ment, at least at the formal policy level. Whatever the niceties of its phrasing, the instrument was
widely understood as based on the argument that Asians shared distinct values that were incompat-
ible with values shared by Westerners and that therefore the West should not rely on its construction
of human rights to intervene in affairs of Asian states." Tim Lindsey, Indonesia: Devaluing Asian
Values, Rewriting Rule of Law, in THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN
COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. 286 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004); see also Tu Weiming, Impli-
cations of the Rise of "Confucian" East Asia, DAEDALUS, Winter 2000, at 195 ("The Confucian insis-
tence on the importance of equality rather than freedom, sympathy rather than rationality, civility
rather than law, duty rather than rights, and human-relatedness rather than individualism may ap-
pear to be diametrically opposed to the value-orientation of the Enlightenment. It is unsurprising
that the "Asian values" advocated by political leaders such as Lee Kwang Yew and Mahatir often
provoke strong cynical reactions in the West."); Jeffrey Usman, Non-Justiciable Directive Principles: A
Constitutional Design Defect, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L 643 (2007) (on the Indian Constitution).
78. Or better put, constitutionalism tends to provide substantial evidence to support Nietzsche's
old observation about the miscausation of politics and political theory. See generally Larry Cat5
Backer, The Fuihrer Principle of International Law: Individual Responsibility and Collective Punish-
ment, 21 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 509 (2003). Thus, I have suggested elsewhere that:
Much that passes for constitutionalism and constitutionalist discourse are veiled
attempts to justify particular political settlements-and to justify them usually
within a targeted group of states. Alternatively, constitutionalism serves as a mask
over state building efforts at an international level, either as part of efforts to over-
throw the secular state system or to federalize that system by the creation of a global
federal state. In any case, the object is to move the locus of authoritative pronounce-
ments over legitimacy of state organization-and its relationship with the people
within a state-from individual political states to supra-national or international
organizations. Constitutionalist discourse, then, tends to serve as post facto justifi-
cation for political or legal conclusions that require legitimization.
Cati Backer, supra note 35, at 148.
79. See Cat. Backer, supra note 35, at 148.
80. "Constitutions, like all creations of the human mind and the human will, have an existence in
men's imagination and men's emotions quite apart from their actual use in ordering men's affairs."
Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1293-94 (1937).
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As an ordering system, constitutionalism focuses on classification. Constitu-
tionalism provides a taxonomy of state organization, serving to distinguish those
clusters of contextualized features that are consonant with the ideological ends of
constitutionalism from those others which must be deemed illegitimate. "Consti-
tutionalism is a political ideology that consists of various principles and assump-
tions about the dual nature of the individual as private person and public citizen,
the nature of the state, and the nature of the complex set of relationships between
the individual and the state."'"
Taxonomy leads to an underlying normative structure that has crystallized
along now familiar Rechtsstaat and Sozialstaat lines. It is at this level of constitu-
tionalism that most of the academic, political, and ideological debate occurs. That
debate has two principal parts. First, what principles are to be included in the
ideological construct, and second, from where are these principles to be derived.
The parts are interrelated. Constitutionalism's easy answers to its substantive
component garner consensus when stated at a very broad level of generality: pro-
tection of the higher law status of the constitution in both black letter and by an
appropriate mechanism (an independent judiciary or constitutional court system),
rule of law, democracy, consent, limited government, interdiction of arbitrary acts,
actions taken in accordance with law, and respect for human rights and dignity as
such notions are commonly understood by the community of nations. But be-
neath this consensus-based listing lies substantial discord.
Constitutionalism is thus most dynamic at the level of implementation. Tra-
ditional nationalist constitutionalism looks inward for its ideology as well as its
yardstick for measuring others. Transnational constitutionalism looks to the com-
mon constitutional traditions of the community of states buttressed by interna-
tional norms and organizations. "It concedes the possibility that the desires of a
majority of its population may be checked by an ideology in the development of
which it may participate but which it does not control."82
Transnational constitutionalism suggests that a global system of constitutional
values regulation is not only possible but also legitimate. Adherents of this constitu-
tionalist perspective accept the customs, traditions, and understandings of the com-
munity of nations as the only legitimate source of ultimate authority for the
elaboration of substantive constitutional values. "All states have a stake in the con-
81. Edward A. Harris, Living With the Enemy: Terrorism and the Limits of Constitutionalism, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 984, 986 (1992) (reviewing JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL
VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1991)).
82. Cati Backer, supra note 35, at 154.
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struction of constitutionalist values, but none control its development. Like states in
a federal system, all are bound by the higher law of global constitutional values
which serve as a limit on contextualist variation."83 Within this universally applica-
ble set of values, privileged above other values, the extent of mandatory harmoniza-
tion is defined as well as the scope of permissible contextual variation. Beyond the
boundaries of those values, the local, expressed as institutionalized government
power, is legitimately subject to attack. Constitutionalism in its transnational form,
then, provides a substantive values framework that is transcendent, at least in the
sense that no state can singularly control its content. It can be understood as a bot-
tom-up transcendence-universal values are the product of consensus from the
practice of those who would be bound. Domestic courts would be expected to inter-
nalize the consensus values of the constitutional traditions of the community of na-
tions, with margins of appreciation where consensus has not yet developed.84 It does
not derive principally from values received from above. International constitutional-
ism proceeds from a similar position but also embraces the notion of the need to
construct supranational institutions to serve as the authoritative sources of constitu-
tional law values to be inscribed in all domestic constitutions.
But might other values frameworks also comport with constitutionalism? Is
constitutionalism inseparable from the specific values that are currently privileged
among states and in the academic discourse? The answer, one would suspect, is yes.
Thus, from worldview to implementation, constitutionalism has systematized think-
ing about constitutions. It serves as a powerful framework for theorizing and evalu-
ating constitutions and, perhaps most important, as the metric for evaluating the
scope and depth of necessary constitutional modification within any polity. The ba-
sics of constitutionalism are now stable and universally embraced. They are grounded
in the need to distinguish government from despotism, tyranny from communal self-
constitution. All constitutionalism, if it means to be understood as such, elaborates
(1) a system of classification, (2) the core object of which is to define
the characteristics of constitutions (those documents organizing
political power within an institutional apparatus), (3) to be used to
determine the legitimacy of the constitutional system as conceived
or as implemented, (4) based on rule of law as the fundamental
83. Id. at 155.
84. See Larry Cat6 Backer, Inscribing Judicial Preferences into Our Fundamental Law: On the
European Principle of Margins ofAppreciation as Constitutional Jurisprudence in the U.S., 7 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 327 (2000) (discussing margins of appreciation in the context of supranational
values limits on constitutional authority).
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postulate of government (that government be established and oper-
ated in a way that limits the ability of individuals to use govern-
ment power for personal welfare maximizing ends), and (5)
grounded on a metric of substantive values derived from a source
beyond the control of any individual.85
But each of those characteristics is understood and applied through a prism of
fundamental ordering substantive values.86
Constitutionalism is thus exquisitely values-based, but it is in the search for
those values that modern political communities-modern constitutionalist politi-
cal communities in particular-clash most fiercely. The current competition be-
tween national and transnational constitutionalism for primacy is evidence of that
possibility. Can the substantive values frameworks of universalist religion, for ex-
ample, serve as a basis for transnational constitutionalism to legitimate constitu-
tional forms inconsistent with the values represented by secular transnational
constitutionalism? Would its proponents even stop to ask?
The simple answer ought to be that governments grounded on religion, even
on religion written into a constitution, would be hard-pressed to pass for legiti-
mate constitutional systems. That certainly has been the consensus on the rela-
tionship between theocracy and constitutionalism. Theocracy has been associated
with despotism. In the absence of a controlling authority from outside the reli-
gious community, religion tends to subordinate those communities of unbelievers
over which it might assert political authority. In an earlier work, I explained the
role of religion within emerging secular transnational constitutionalism: "Reli-
gion divides and does not compromise. It tolerates but cannot accept equality
among those of different faiths.... Within the hierarchy of norms, the religious
was treated as subordinate to universal secular and political norms." 7 This hier-
archy makes sense in a system in which customary norms developed among a
heterogeneous community of nations. Among all the values identified as founda-
tional to transnational constitutionalism, the primacy of religion or religious val-
ues is not among them. But what if the hierarchy of values was inverted? What if
the foundational organizing norm of a constitutional system was religion, or spe-
cifically a religion? Would a constitutionalist system still be possible?
Over a century ago, Europeans were skeptical of such an inversion. There was
85. Cat6 Backer, supra note 35, at 108.
86. Id.; see also Cati Backer, supra note 1, at 16-37.
87. Cati Backer, supra note 1, at 37.
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a sense of theocracy tied to old regime despotism in Europe.88 That notion carried
over to Islamic governance from the nineteenth century. Jacob Burkhardt suggested
an inverse relationship between religion and constitutionalism, focusing on the state
of Islam in his time and from his perspective in Central Europe. 9 "And now we
must again turn to Islam, with its stranglehold on national feeling and its miserable
constitutional and legal system grafted onto religion, beyond which its peoples never
advanced."9 But others have noted the possibilities of an ordering of a legal state
grounded in religious legal institutions.9' The issue was the conflation of faith and
state, "for Islamic law was an integral part of the Islamic faith, and a threat to it
could be seen as a step toward forced conversion."92 Thus, legitimacy could be tied as
effectively to fidelity to faith as it might be tied to fidelity to other sources of com-
munal norms in the constitution of a legal order. In the United States, certain Prot-
estants viewed these ideas as both tied to what they called the old (and now
superseded) Hebrew theocracy and its usurpation by the "Romish theory of the
Church."'93 Inherent in the idea was that theocracy, the resort to divine revelation as
88. See NORA E. HUDSON, ULTRA-ROYALISM AND THE FRENCH RESTORATION 17 (1936) ("[T]he
theocrats looked back to ancient times when divine power played a large part in government.").
89. JACOB BURCKHARDT, FORCE AND FREEDOM: REFLECTIONS ON HISTORY (James Hastings Nich-
ols ed., Meridian Books 1955) (1943).
90. Id. at 178. ("The state, as a political picture, is here supremely uninteresting; in the Caliphate
practically from the outset, a despotism without responsibility or heaven or earth was taken for
granted, and even, by a highly illogical twist, by its renegades."). Burckhardt was no less hard on
Christian theocracy. Referring to the Counter-Reformation Catholic institutions, he noted that the
"Church, it is true loved no State, yet inclined toward that system which was most willing and able
to carry out persecutions for it. It adjusted itself to the modern state as it had once adjusted itself to
the feudal system." Id. at 162. For more on the conflation of theocracy and despotism, see GEORG
W. F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 171-76 (John Sibree trans., P.F. Collier 1902) (1837).
91. Speaking of the colonization of Muslim majority territories, it was noted that "a colonial re-
gime could not threaten to eliminate [Islamic law] or tamper with it without running grave risks...."
ALLAN CHRISTELOW, MUSLIM LAW COURTS AND THE FRENCH COLONIAL STATE IN ALGERIA 6 (1985).
92. Id.
93. CHARLES HODGE, 3 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 543 (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publ. Co. 1981) (1871).
So soon as faith becomes nothing other than submission to an external authority,
theology is necessarily reduced to be the mere redaction of a code of canon law.
Is a discussion raised in the Church, the contesting powers soon cease to argue,
and seek to evoke a decision of the Roman court, which shall crush the adversary
and put an end to the dispute. Religious truth is then not a matter of knowledge
or of reason, but of politics and diplomacy.... In the Roman system it becomes
thenceforth impossible to find the slightest basis for a constitutional opposition to
the sovereignty of the Pope.
AUGUSTE SABATIER, THE RELIGIONS OF AUTHORITY AND THE RELIGION OF THE SPIRIT I1 (1904).
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a source of law and the resort to priests as the source of governance, was transitory.94
This was the central idea exported from out of the West to other parts of the world.
Thus, for example, Sun Yat-Sen understood this transitory notion of theocratic gov-
ernance and the religious framework for law, in a Chinese context.95
There have been a number of contemporary attempts to define theocracy,
drawing from a variety of old and new sources. But these too suggest a funda-
mental inconsistency between theocracy, as system, and constitutionalism. Lucas
Swaine, for example, draws on Josephus for his definition.96 Swaine defines theoc-
racy as "a mode of governance prioritizing a religious conception of the good that
is strict and comprehensive in its range of teachings."97 For others, "[t]he word is
often used to connote government by a specific institutional faith-Shia imams in
Iran, say, or Wahhabi clerics in Afghanistan-with the clergy writing laws and a
temple guard enforcing them."98 But not just with respect to Islam. Christian the-
ocracy, in something like a modern form, existed, if only briefly, in Europe.99 Be-
94. Thus, for example, Max Weber, in describing the validity of legitimate authority, identified
the "sacredness of tradition" as the "oldest and most universally held legitimacy of authority."
WEBER, supra note 45, at 81. "Today, the most common form of legitimacy is the belief in legality,
i.e., the compliance with enactments which are formally correct and which have been imposed by
an accustomed procedure." Id. at 82.
95. He suggested that the
[t]hings unknown to our ancestors were regarded as divine. They believed in the
divine right and power of the gods. Since men could not fight against nature
with physical force, the geniuses instituted religion, and taught the people to pray
for the coming of good things and the avoidance of calamities. Then the ancient
tribes made their chief the head priest, and so the state and religion became
identical. This is still true of Mongolia and Tibet where the Living Buddha is the
political as well as the religious head of these territories. Indeed, our ancients said
that the great affairs of the state were conquest and prayer.
SUN YAT-SEN, His POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IDEALS 267 (Leonard Shihlien Hsi! compiler, 1933).
96. SWAINE, supra note 32, at 4-7 (identifying four components of theocracy based on religious
understanding and recognition of the sovereignty of God:"(l) it is a strict way of governing; (2) a
religious understanding of the good in theocracy; (3) religious authorities direct daily affairs in a
community; and (4) all sovereignty is in God.").
97. Id. at 7.
98. Ross Douthat, Theocracy, Theocracy, Theocracy, FIRST THINGS, Aug.-Sep. 2006, at 23, 24
(book review).
99. For a discussion, see, e.g., THOMAS I. COOK, HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO
BURKE 327-37 (1936) "[Sltate and church were, through Calvin, united in one body, and government
became, in essence, theocracy, or, perhaps more accurately, bibliocracy, the direct rule of God in the
state through His ministers on earth, with the Bible as the sole source of law." Id. at 333.
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fore the collapse of Marxist universalism, it was common to understand Marxist
constitutionalism in religious terms.
Theocracy is the accepted term for absolute government conducted by
priests in the name of their deity, where the structures of state and
church merge into one and the recipients of revelation and inspiration
are in absolute control of every phase of life-in totalitarian control.
The difference between a Christian theocracy and the atheist theoc-
racy of Marxism lies, of course, in the kind of revelation received.' 0
But theocracy is inherently a nexus concept-it serves at the meeting point of
a number of other governance notions. Kenneth Cragg suggested the complexity
a generation ago.
1 1
In the bare literal sense of the word, there never has been and never
can be a theocracy in human affairs. For God is a Spirit, eternal
and Divine. He does not sit immediately in any national senate or
upon any political throne to rule. His reign is necessarily involved
in the viceregency of man. Islam has always recognized this truth.
God is in heaven; government proceeds on earth. Theocracy, then,
in any feasible sense, must mean Divine authority in and through
human institutions.'0
2
These ideas are not unique to Islam."3
100. EDUARD HEIMANN, REASON AND FAITH IN MODERN SOCIETY: LIBERALISM, MARXISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 153 (Wesleyan University Press 1961) (1955).
101. See KENNETH CRAGG, THE CALL OF THE MINARET (1956).
102. Id. at 161.
103. See, e.g., BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE AND A POLITICAL TREA-
TISE 62 (R.H.M. Elwes trans., Dover Publ. 1951) (1670). Spinoza was well known for having made
this connection in considering whether it was rationally possible to posit God as a "law giver or
potentate ordaining laws for men." He uses the biblical story of God's command to Adam to avoid
eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge, arguing that if that had been a divine command, it would
have been impossible for Adam to disobey.
But since Scripture nevertheless narrates that God did give this command to
Adam, and yet that nonetheless Adam ate of the tree, we must perforce say that
God revealed to Adam the evil which would surely follow if he should eat of the
tree, but did not disclose that such evil would necessarily come to pass. Thus it
was that Adam took the revelation to be not an eternal and necessary truth, but
a law.... From the same cause, namely from the lack of knowledge, the Deca-
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Theocracy points to the source of substantive principles and rules. But a divine
source of rules does not necessarily suggest the form of its implementation among
the community of believers and those under their control. For that purpose, there
must be a connection between divine will and divine command in a form reducible
to law. There must also be an institutional mechanism for implementing that divine
will in legal form. But they suggest no connection to constitutionalism. A govern-
ment of priests is not understood as a government of laws whose powers are re-
stricted and defined, and whose construction respects rule of law norms.
The conventional understanding of theocracy, then, is a gateway to the more
difficult question of implementation. It is here that theocracy fractures, but it does
so within its own internal logic. Questions of theocracy, for example, produce
discussion of theonomy or divine nomocracy-"government administered in ac-
cordance with a divine system of law."' 4 Theocracy, on the other hand, may sug-
gest a direct rule of the Divine through unalterable and inflexible commands. "In
a classic theocracy, God is the ruler, and the means through which he rules-
priests, judges, prophets etc.-have very minimal flexibility. In a religious nomoc-
racy the divine law does indeed exist, but the power is invested in the hands of its
interpreters."' That dialogue, rather than the modern one between secular con-
stitutionalism and religion as a governing force, has endured in modern Islamic
debates about the nature of government. Ann Elizabeth Mayer correctly sug-
gested the contours almost twenty years ago.
At the risk of overgeneralization, one could assert that in premod-
ern Islamic political thought, where the system envisaged was a di-
logue in relation to the Hebrews was a law, for since they knew not the existence
of God as an eternal truth, they must have taken that as a law that which was
revealed to them in the Decalogue.... But if God had spoken to them without
intervention of any bodily means, immediately they would have perceived it not
as a law, but as an eternal truth.
Id. at 63; see also ALLAN ARKUSH, MOSES MENDELSSOHN AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 143-45 (1994)
(discussing the philosophical synthesis between and the progressive principles of the enlightenment).
104. Brenda Oppermann, The Impact of Legal Pluralism on Women's Status: An Examination of Mar-
riage Laws in Egypt, South Africa, and the United States, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 65,67 (2006).
105. Gideon Sapir, Religion and State in Israel: The Case for Reevaluation and Constitutional En-
trenchment, 22 HAST. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 617, 640 n.83 (1999). Sapir further notes that "[a]s
Aaron Kirschenbaum has observed, 'The distinction between theocracy and religious nomocracy
is not merely semantic; its ramifications are far reaching.... Any Jurist knows that the law is not
the ruler but rather the interpreter."' Id. (citing Aaron Kirschenbaum, Teokratya Yehudit [Jewish
Theocracy], 8 DINEI ISRAEL 223, 225 (1977)).
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vine nomocracy, there was no concept of a legitimate secular political
authority, that Islamic law was the only law recognized as such, and
that there was a highly developed system of pluralism, wherein a
tolerated but subordinate status was allotted to non-Muslims. The
premodern tradition remains influential, and one still sees ambiva-
lence in Muslim milieus on questions such as whether constitution-
alism and popular sovereignty are compatible with Islam, whether
it is permissible to accord equality to non-Muslim citizens, and what
the role of religious law should be in national legal systems. °6
There is an appeal in theonomy, especially among evangelical Christians in the
United States." 7
Neither theocracy nor divine nomocracy comprehends the discourse of consti-
tutionalism. It recognizes a value system that is directly applied by that community
responsible for its elaboration. "If there is one inalienable feature of the Muslim
body politic and legal culture it is the prevalence of the rule of law, with the political
sovereign accepting without challenge the supreme authority of the divine law and
hence that of the jurists and judges-custodians of the law and its interpreters as
well as the civic leaders of the Muslim communities wherever they were present." '
Nomocracy speaks the language of law, and even of rule of law, perhaps, but not the
language of constitutionalism." 9
106. Mayer, supra note 48, at 1016.
107. For a germinal work in the field, see ROUSAS J. RUSHDOONY, THE INSTITUTES OF BIBLICAL
LAW (1973).
108. Wael B. Hallaq, "Muslim Rage" and Islamic Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1705, 1708 (2003). As
Wael Halliq noted,
The idea of giving to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's does not
wash in the Muslim world-view, for Caesar is only a man, and men, being equal,
cannot command obedience to each other. Obedience therefore must be to a su-
preme entity, one that is eternal, omnipotent, and omniscient. If modernity has
effected profound changes in Islamic culture (and no doubt it has), it has failed
in the most important respect, namely, to alter or sever this tie with the divine.
Id. at 1706.
109. See generally, Larry Cati Backer, Retaining judicial Authority: A Preliminary Inquiry on the
Dominion ofJudges, 12 Wm. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 117, 174 (2003) (demonstrating the common mis-
take ofconflating the rule of law with constitutionalism-especially when considering legal rather
than divine or religious nomocracy.).
Legal nomocracy, like its religious counterpart, can enhance democratic value,
providing a meritocratic basis of sorts for the operation of the state. In that sense,
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II. TOWARD A THEOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM
In a sense, then, theocracy, narrowly understood, points to a subset of the in-
quiry demanded within a constitutionalism framework. Implementation of a cer-
tain form does not necessarily follow from the acceptance of the supremacy of a
divinely-mandated system of behavioral norms. This appears to be the case even
within Islam-at least as understood by others.
All the current debate on actualizing the Islamic ideology in the
Islamic society revolves around these questions. What is clear to
most who attempt to answer can be stated in this way. Islamic pol-
ity must be based on Islam. The ideals of the Qur'dn and the
Prophet are sufficient to it. The business of the Islamic state is to
serve these Islamic concepts. Islam demands the entire allegiance
of the believer and the state should insure as best it may that those
demands are satisfied. Beyond that, there is division."'
More recently, some have criticized the convention of dismissing theocracy as
an anachronism."' Others have begun to see in the religious organization of con-
stitutional states the possibilities of a constitutionalism normatively different from
others and legitimately constitutionalist on its own terms. One of the more power-
ful arguments recently advanced is that of Ran Hirschl. 1"E It is worth considering
nomocracy both twists and enhances the fundamental organizing principles of
our Republic. In an ironic twist of causation, I suggest that the priest did not
usurp dominion over the herd. Instead, the herd, for its own preservation, de-
manded the overlordship of the priest.
Id.
110. CRAGG, supra note 101, at 162.
Some would have the organs of state as free as possible, developing a creative
obedience to Islam with an over-all court, somewhat like the Supreme Court in
the United States, to determine whether particular legislation was inconsistent
with the Shari'ah. Others would tie the state very firmly, in both constitution and
life, to the traditionally interpreted Shari'ah in the hands of the "Ulami."
Id.
11l. See SWAINE, supra note 32, at 3-4 (describing theocracy as outdated and without "relevance to
democratic life").
112. Ran Hirschl, The Theocratic Challenge to Constitution Drafting in Post-Conflict States, 49
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1179 (2008);see also Jason Lawrence Reimer, Comment, Finding Their Own
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in detail, both for its approach to the religious element in constitutionalism and
for highlighting the weaknesses of that approach, in light of what I have described
as the framework for constitutionalist analysis. Hirschl, in a sense, serves as a
proxy for the deficiencies of current analyses of religion within constitutionalism.
I then sketch the constitutionalist contours of states, the substantive normative
basis of which is grounded in religion."3 These reflect different perspectives from
which the identity and complexities of a legitimating theocratic constitutionalism
might be usefully extracted.
Hirschl seeks to explore "key aspects of constitutionalism in a theocratic
world.""' 4 He approaches the issue of theocratic constitutionalism not on its own
terms,"5 but from a specific normative position-constitutional theocracy poses a
threat to the established transnational constitutionalist order and must be dealt
with accordingly. It must either be tamed so that it becomes nothing more than a
more colorful variant of transnational constitutionalism, or it must be reworked
and secularized."6 Identifying "challenges posed by the theocratic surge to ca-
nonical power-sharing, consociational models for mitigating tensions in multi-
ethnic polities,""7 he offers a definition of what he calls "constitutional theocracy."" 8
He then proffers "constitutional responses to the problem of 'religion and state'
and examines a few innovative legal developments employed by countries in the
Islamic world to hedge the challenge of constitutional theocracy...... For the proj-
ect of secularization, as a counter to the theocratic drive, he offers examples from
"Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, Israel, Nigeria, Malaysia, and other polities facing deep
social and political tensions along the secular/religious divide. ' '2 '
For Hirschl, constitutional theocracy is a challenge, one that requires co-opt-
Voice? The Afghanistan Constitution: Influencing the Creation of a Theocratic Democracy, 25 PEN N
ST. INT'L L. REv. 343 (2006).
113. See Cat6 Backer, supra note 1.
114. Hirschl,supra note 112, at 1181.
115. For a discussion of approaching constitutionalism on its own terms, see Cati Backer, supra
note 64, at 38-52. "While grounded in neutral language, these arguments are, in reality, applied
expressions of a particular ideology that has assumed universal acceptance outside of China in the
period after the end of the Second World War." Id. at 50.
116. See Hirschl, supra note 112, at 1181. He also notes that "principles of divine authority and
theocratic governance are often at odds with international human rights regimes and principles,
perhaps most tellingly in the contexts of religious freedoms, gender equality, or reproductive lib-
erty." Id. at 1185.
117. Id. at 1181.
118. Id. at 1188-91.
119. Id. at 1181.
120. Id.
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ing and mitigation. That is, the challenges of such constitutionalism are those
very characteristics that distinguish it from classical post-war Western constitu-
tionalism. 2' The point is to subordinate these differences within the matrix of
superior normative values represented within transnational constitutionalism, so
that the populations of states that seek to politicize their religion will do so only in
a manner that retains the superiority of secular values.'22 Yet, because the differ-
ences are normative rather than procedural, it is harder to write around or con-
strain the substantive differences represented by the legal implications of religious
supremacy within a political order. Thus, Hirschl explains, "the theocratic chal-
lenge is inherently more difficult to overcome through constitution drafting than,
say, divisions along ethnic or linguistic lines. This undermines the applicability of
traditional power-sharing, 'consociational' constitutional models commonly pro-
posed as a way of mitigating tensions in troubled multi-ethnic polities."'23
The problem of theocratic constitutionalism is of a different order than the
more well-worn problems of ethnic, linguistic, or national divisions. Hirschl notes
four principal differences. The first "more than any other divisions along ascriptive
or imagined lines, the secular/religious divide cuts across nations otherwise unified
by their members' joint ethnic, religious, linguistic, and historical origins. '24 This
might have led Hirschl to the determination that religions are not so much a prob-
lem as a different and complete form of substantive constitutionalism.'25 Instead,
121. Id. at 1181-82. Thus, Hirschl is clear in pointing to his baseline for analysis.
The literature on constitutional design and engineering is voluminous. Its ca-
nonical tenor suggests that when constitutionalization is seen as a pragmatic
"second order" measure-as opposed to instances of constitutionalization in-
volving a more principled, first order "we the people" outlook-it may help insti-
tutionalize attempts to mitigate tensions in ethnically divided polities through
the adoption of federalism, secured representation, and other trust-building and
power-sharing mechanisms.
Id.
122. Id. at 1182 ("[Allthough there are many examples of discussions of the mitigating potential
of constitutional power-sharing mechanisms to ease rifts along national, ethnic, or linguistic lines,
scholars of comparative constitutional design have given little attention to the increasing divisions
along secular/religious lines.").
123. The challenge presented by this tension is highlighted by an examination of the constitu-
tional failures of Palestine and "[c]onflict settings where internal strife is high and state capacity is
low merely exacerbate these difficulties." Id. at 1186 (citing Donald L. Horowitz, Conciliatory In-
stitutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1213 (2008)).
124. Id. at 1182.
125. See CatAi Backer,supra note 1, at 57 ("In a universalist theocratic transnational constitutional-
ist context, the people must also look to their constitutional traditions informed by the precepts of
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Hirschl perhaps overly diminishes the normative importance of religion as an insti-
tution (as well as a belief and communal system) by suggesting that religion is "closer
in nature to less visible categories such as income deciles, social class, or cultural
milieu than it is to other kinds of markers such as race, gender, or ethnicity."'26 It is
not clear that is the only way to perceive religion within even a variegated polity.
The example suggests not so much the similarity of religion to class, as the way in
which social class might serve as a proxy for an intensity of religious adherence. It
does not suggest the character of the normative basis of religion as a constitutional
foundation-it merely suggests the demographics of its acceptability within a politi-
cal community that varies by class and educational level, but in which a single reli-
gion can claim a majority of adherents.
The second difference springs from the first. Because not every member of a
religious community believes the same way and with the same intensity, religion
cannot serve as a unifying framework consistent with constitutionalist notions. This
is particularly acute where the population is well-marbled. Thus, he argues, the
"territorial boundaries of the secular/religious divide are often blurred. Although
residents of certain regions within a given country may be more prone to holding
theocratic views than residents of other regions, this divide is not neatly demarcated
along territorial lines, as is often the case with ethnic or linguistic boundaries."'27
For Hirschl, the differences in religious sensibilities, even among members of the
same faith community marks a crucial challenge to traditional constitutionalism.
But it is a challenge with an odd consequence-for Hirschl implies that where reli-
gious intensity might be territorially marked, separation might be a possible solu-
tion. This suggests both that religion might well serve as a substantive basis for
constitutionalist organization (a point he developed later) and that segregation is a
legitimate device of traditional constitutionalist ordering.'28 He offers Sri Lanka as a
religion, which they might affect but only as members of the religious community and to the ex-
tent permitted under the rules of that community.").
126. E.g. Hirschl, supra note 112, at 1182. "[M]ost cosmopolitan and traditionalist Egyptians de-
fine themselves as members of the same nation, speak the same language or dialects of it, treasure
the Pharaoh dynasty, and share the same ancestral ties. Importantly, however, some Egyptians are
close adherents of religious directives, while others follow them more casually." Id. (citing U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGious FREEDOM 2001 (2001) 421-29,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/9001.pdf).
127. Hirschl,supra note 112, at 1182-83.
128. Id. at 1183 ("Territory-based power-sharing mechanisms-or any other kind of joint gover-
nance structures that are based on the allocation of powers or goods by a regional key-may not
be an efficient means for analyzing, let alone reducing, tensions along secular/religious lines.").
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contrasting example, where religious differences are territorially more marked.'29
Yet this might be an odd conclusion for a theoretics based on the subordination of
religion as a privileged source of substantive constitutional norms.
The third basis for distinction of religion as a constitutionalist problem is based
on perception. Hirschl faults the West for portraying "the spread of religious funda-
mentalism in the developing world as a near-monolithic, ever-accelerating, and all-
encompassing phenomenon."'30 Rejecting the idea that religion, as a basis for
constitutional settlement, is a threat to the substantive values of traditional secular
transnational constitutionalism, 3 ' he argues that "the picture in most predomi-
nantly religious polities-Islamic, Jewish, Roman Catholic, or Hinduist-is much
more complex and nuanced, reflecting deep divisions and strife along secular/reli-
gious lines, as well as widely divergent beliefs, interpretations, and degrees of prac-
tice within religious communities."'32 As such, there is an implicit presumption that
religion presents itself like other social variables whose internal differences and con-
tradictions can be exploited by a superior and overarching system of values.'33 Of
course, that might suggest as a counter to fractious religion some sort of superior
and monolithic alternative-the substantive norm systems of secular transnational
constitutionalism.'34 The very existence of a normative constitutionalist alternative
suggests that the differences might be both horizontal (insurmountable inconsisten-
cies) and vertical (subordination to a greater political universalism).
And that brings Hirschl to the most important distinction between religion
129. Id. But see Cati Backer, supra note 33.
130. Hirschl, supra note 112, at 1183.
131. Hirschl cites TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER
IN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 27-29 (1993) (in a chapter on religion as an anthropological category)
for this proposition. See also Hirschl, supra note 112, at 1183. Yet, ironically, Hirschl seems to em-
brace a consequence of Asad's observation, one that Asad criticizes, that religion has an autono-
mous essence, "not to be confused with the essence of science, or of politics, or of common
sense-[that] invites us to define religion (like any essence) as a transhistorical and transcultural
phenomenon." ASAD, SUpra, at 28. Asad tellingly notes that "[it may be a happy accident that this
effort of defining religion converges with the liberal demand in our time that it be kept separate
from politics, law and science-spaces in which varieties of power and reason articulate our dis-
tinctively modern life." Id. To a degree, Hirschl's perspective is one consonant with "a strategy (for
secular liberals) of the confinement and (for liberal Christians) of the defense of religion." Id.
132. Hirschl, supra note 112, at 1184.
133. Id. ("In virtually all of these countries, the very nature of the sociopolitical order has been
highly contested; civic ideology, an often relatively cosmopolitan lifestyle, and diverse policy pref-
erences are all often striving to establish or maintain their hegemony vis-A-vis embedded symbols
of tradition, religiosity, and exceptionalism.").
134. For a discussion of how theocracy may threaten economic interests, see Leslie C. Griffin, Fun-
damentalism from the Perspective of Liberal Tolerance, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1631, 1633-35 (2003).
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and other divisional challenges for a legitimate constitutional order-the "uneasy
union of constitutionalism and theocratic governance."'35 Yet where the recogni-
tion of this distinction might have led him, as it did me, to the recognition of reli-
gion as an alternative form of legitimate constitutionalist expression-legitimate
in the way in which constitutionalism is manifested-this distinction leads
Hirschl to a determination that religion, to the extent it might provide a basis in
substantive constitutionalism, is heretical, and thus illegitimate. 36 Hirschl, of
course, is right-the fundamentals of religious substantive constitutionalism and
the secular transnational constitutionalism of the developed world are incompati-
ble. 37 But he views the problem that results as pragmatic and directed to a par-
ticular end-he asks: "How can a polity therefore reconcile the principles of
accountability, separation of powers, and the notion of 'we the people' as the ulti-
mate source of sovereignty when the fundamental notion of divine authority and
holy texts make up the supreme governing norm of the state?"' 8
To view religion as a constitutionalist basis as heretical requires a recognition
of the possibility of religious constitutionalism. Hirschl recognizes that "[a]t the
uneasy intersection of two present-day trends-the tremendous increase of popu-
lar support for principles of theocratic governance and the global spread of consti-
tutionalism-a new legal order has emerged: constitutional theocracy."'39 Looking
to the Egyptian constitution, Hirschl acknowledges the similarities between
global constitutionalism and constitutional theocracy in the ways in which both
embrace process constitutionalism. 4 ' But critically, for Hirschl, these constitu-
135. Hirschl,supra note 112, at 1184.
136. Hirschl speaks of constitutional theocracy as something that defies or is unlike the norma-
tive constitutional structure of the United States and European states. See, e.g., id. at 1189 (discuss-
ing the Franco-American doctrine of strict separation between church and state). Hirschl also
emphasizes the problematic aspect of religion and its challenge to the established constitutionalist
order. Id. at 1186 (demonstrating Palestine's difficulty of establishing constitutional democracy
within Islamic religious teachings). Difference, here, is a challenge that must be dealt with. But the
character of the challenge is internal rather than external-because of the apparent assumption
that religion cannot legitimately serve as a foundation of constitutionalist political orders.
137. See Catd Backer, supra note 1, at 61 ("Within the constitutional framework, religion is no
longer an object with which a political community must deal. Instead, religion serves as the foun-
dation on which political communities are constituted.").
138. Hirschl, supra note 112, at 1185 ("All of these countries face the sources of friction inherent
in a constitutional theocracy-a potentially explosive combination by its very nature, and one that
poses new challenges to conventional constitutional ideas about secularism, religious freedom, and
the relationship between religion and the state.").
139. Id. at 1188.
140. Id.;see Cati Backer, supra note 1, at 38-42 (comparing the Iranian constitution with others).
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tional theocracies do not embrace substantive or normative values that can legiti-
mate them within the framework of existing global constitutionalism.
[Clonstitutional theocracies defy the Franco-American doctrine of
strict structural and substantive separation of religion and state.
Akin to models of "establishment" or "state religion," constitutional
theocracies both formally endorse and actively support a single reli-
gion or faith denomination. Moreover, that state religion is en-
shrined as the principal source that informs all legislation and
methods of judicial interpretation. 4 '
Hirschl is right, but he misses the point. What he calls constitutional theoc-
racy is not a defective global constitutionalism but a legitimating constitutional-
ism in its own right. By privileging the substantive values component of
constitutionalism,'42 he misses the point that the system, though inconsistent with
his preferred values-based constitutionalism may present another form of values-
based constitutionalism, which is constitutionalist, yet one whose substantive val-
ues are incompatible with that of secular transnational constitutionalism.
Still, Hirschl provides a useful starting point for defining constitutional the-
ocracy. His definition emphasizes the theocracy part, as a means of distinguishing
it from his normative constitutionalist baseline. His constitutional theocracy ad-
heres to the form of constitutional organization but privileges one religion within
the state apparatus, designating it as the supreme source of law, presided over by a
formal system of interpretation in which the institutional apparatus of the privi-
leged religion is vested with official or unofficial jurisdiction over interpretation of
governmental activity in light of religious proscriptions.'43
Despite recognizing the possibility of operating a theocracy in constitutional
form, Hirschl still applies a traditional secular constitutionalist framework to
judge the legitimacy and contours of such efforts. For Hirschl, the study of const-
141. Hirschl, supra note 112, at 1189.
142. See Cati Backer, supra note 35, at 8.
143. Hirschl,supra note 112, at 1190 (positing an ideal model of constitutional theocracy consist-
ing of four elements: 1) "[Ajdherence to some or all core elements of modern constitutionalism;"
2) The designation of a state religion; 3) "[T]he constitutional enshrining of the religion, its texts,
directives, and interpretations as a or the main source of legislation and judicial interpretation of
law-essentially, laws may not infringe upon injunctions of the state-endorsed religion;" and 4) A
sharing of interpretative function among the state and religious authorities constituted therefore,
so that the religious bodies "are also granted official jurisdictional status and operate in lieu of, or
in an uneasy tandem with, a civil court system.").
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tutional theocracy has an objective-the quest for methodologies of ameliorating
its effects in the service of a more traditional system of political subordination of
religious normative governance frameworks. To that end, he describes "constitu-
tional-institutional models for delineating the relationship between religion and
state; these models are of crucial importance for our analysis of the phenomenon
of constitutional theocracy."'44 It has another objective-the privileging of the
"cultural propensities and policy preferences of secular, cosmopolitan, moderate
elites in these countries"'45 (now to be expressed in constitutionalist terms). For
that purpose, Hirschl also offers another instrument-the constitutional court.'46
He does not hide this objective, explaining, for example, that "constitutional
courts may also be viewed as the guardians of secularism, modernism, and uni-
versalism against the increasing popularity of theocratic principles."'47 Like Feld-
man, Hirschl puts a great deal of faith in constitutional courts to undo the
theocratic elements, even those written into the black letter of constitutions.'48
As a consequence, for Hirschl, constitutional theocracy cannot overcome a
sense of illegitimacy. The fact that it is inconsistent with fundamental substantive
norms of the international political order substantially undermines its legitimacy;
that it is a fully-developed system makes it dangerous; that it is dangerous makes it
something to be dealt with and overcome.'49 While religious sensibilities must be
respected, they cannot contradict or overcome the basic normative values of global
144. Id. at 1191. "In summary, even in the least likely settings, constitutional framers have been
able to hedge or mitigate the tension between modern day needs and principles of theocratic gov-
ernance through innovative constitutional design and reconstruction." Id. at 1199.
145. Id. at 1200-03.
146. Id. at 1200-09.
147. Id. at 1200.
148. Id. at 1200-03; see also Noah Feldman & Roman Martinez, A New Constitutional Order?
Constitutional Politics and Text in the New Iraq: An Experiment in Islamic Democracy, 75 FORDHIAM
L. REV. 883 (2006).
149. See Hirschl,supra note 112, at 1210. The way Hirschl frames the issue is telling:
First, the theocratic challenge has become a significant factor in world politics as
well as constitutional law.... Second, the canonical literature concerning consti-
tutionalism as an effective means for mitigating tensions in multi-ethnic or
multi-linguistic states does not adequately address the theocratic chal-
lenge. ... Third, the emergence of a new legal order-constitutional theocracy,
which is now shared in one form or another by dozens of countries in the devel-
oping world-provides important insights into the sociopolitical role of constitu-
tionalism in predominantly religious settings.
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constitutionalism. Under the principles of this global transnational secular constitu-
tionalism, religion has a subordinate (though respected) role. 5 But whether one
adopts Hirschl's perspective or mine, it is clear that something important has
emerged within constitutionalist discourse. It is theocratic constitutionalism. 5 '
Whether one considers it threatening and illegitimate, a challenge to the established
universalizing normative constitutional order, or even a global threat to inward-
looking, traditional state-based constitutionalism, transnational or universalizing
theocratic constitutionalism has emerged in its own right as another discursive
framework for thinking about the legitimacy of the political constitutions of states.
Those deficiencies point to a different way of approaching such efforts at con-
stitutionalizing religion. I have provided an alternative framework for consider-
ing the constitutional basis of theocracy.
First, the forms of "rule of law" constitutionalism are observed. The
government constituted is in some great sense democratic. There is a
significant element of separation of powers in the construction of the
state apparatus. Second, the substantive elements of modern consti-
tutionalism are also observed. Human rights are enshrined in the
constitution and protected. The power to petition the government is
preserved. Third, the power of the state and its governance organs
are strictly limited.... The difference-and a critical one to be
sure-is the source of the norms constituting those boundaries of
governance and the mechanisms for engaging with those norms.'52
150. See Cati Backer,supra note 1, at 61. "Within post War transnational constitutionalist systems
religion was meant to be understood as just another right to protect. As against the universalizing
framework of transnational constitutionalism, with its focus on human rights, democracy, partici-
pation and non-discrimination, religion was viewed as important but parochial." Id. at 36.
151. See Farish A. Noor, Blood, Sweat and Jihad: The Radicalization of the Political Discourse of the
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) from 1982 Onwards, 25 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 200 (2003). The
Iranian revolution and constitutional settlement was decisive in its evolution.
Throughout the Islamic world, the socio-cultural and political impact of the Iranian
revolution was profound. The Iranian revolution furnished the struggle of Sunni
Islamist movements worldwide with renewed vigour and the tenor of their polemics
and campaigns were heightened considerably. Islamist movements the world over
redoubled their efforts to fight the twin world-devouring Satans (jahan-khor)-the
Eastern and Western blocs-that were crushing the Muslims between them.
Id. at 205.
152. See Cati Backer, supra note 1, at 41-42 (theorizing the general framework of a
non-American vetted Iraqi Constitution).
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The critical insight here is nexus between religion and government. Theo-
cratic constitutionalism is grounded in notions similar to those that underlie
transnational secular constitutionalism-that there is a set of universal values
under the authority of which government is both constructed and limited. The
form of that government must respect the dignity of individuals and avoid the el-
evation of any particular individual to a position in which he can use the authority
of the state for personal ends. Government is meant to give effect to the rule of
law. But the universal values which provide the framework within which govern-
mental power may be asserted, and the framework for evaluating the relation of
individual to state is provided by religion. As in transnational secular constitu-
tionalism, the key lies in an embrace of the ideas that certain substantive principles
of state construction-certain values-are both universal and mandatory, and
that such values can only be supplied by an understanding of the Divine Word.
Thus, for example, the "Universalism of Islam is an open proclamation to every-
one-Muslim and non-Muslim alike-that communalism is totally alien to the
spirit and philosophy of Islam."1"3 The concept has roots in the West as well:
God is described as a lawgiver or prince, and styled just, merciful,
etc., merely in concession to popular understanding, and the im-
perfection of popular knowledge; that in reality God acts and di-
rects all things simply by the necessity of His nature and perfection,
and that His decrees and volitions are eternal truths. ...
The effect is acute on core concepts-for example democracy.'55 "Under tra-
So what would the non-American vetted Iraq Constitution look like? It might
look like this: Islam is the source of all law. All law that contradicts Islam contra-
dicts the Constitution. Authoritative Islamic law scholars must sit on the highest
court, which merges secular and religious law. Individual, religious, democratic
and human rights are respected within the context of the Islamic identity of the
state. Group but not individual rights to conscience will be respected-a right to
change religion will be permitted only to the extent permitted by the religious
community from which the individual seeks to exit (best case) or permitted only
in favor of conversion to Islam.
Id.
153. Chandra Muzaffar, Universalism in Islam, in LIBERAL ISLAM: A SOURCE BOOK 155 (Charles
Kurzman ed., 1998).
154. DE SPINoZA, supra note 103, at 65.
155. See Cat. Backer, supra note 1, at 57 ("This formal adherence and functional rejection of
transnational constitutionalism is clearly evident in the reconstitution of democracy as a value of
state constitution.").
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ditional transnational constitutionalism democracy served as a core value of state
formation because it accorded with fundamental notions of fair governance and
gave expression to the values of human dignity and equality."'56 The source of its
legitimacy lies in the authority of the community of nations to develop and articu-
late global constitutional norms.'57 "But within Iranian theocratic constitutional-
ism, and its American variant (as written into the Iraqi and Afghani and Iraqi
[sic] constitutions), democracy serves as a sword, justifying national interventions
and peculiarities that can trump other values, including those that are held to be
fundamental by the community of nations. Thus the forms are observed by [sic]
the substance is altered and redirected.' 58
Another key difference touches on human rights. And in this respect, legitimat-
ing universalist Islamic constitutionalism has been moving forcefully to institutional-
ize its own construction of these concepts in a way that distinguishes its basis from
that developed by the community of nations through the organs of the United Na-
tions.'59 Thus, it is not that theocratic constitutionalism, or its Islamic variety, fails to
embrace human rights as a strict limit on the power of the state, it is that the under-
standing of the nature and character of those rights spring from foundationally dif-
ferent sources. Those differences can produce significant variation in application.
Transnational theocratic constitutionalism is not an illegitimate form of
transnational secular (or global) constitutionalism. It is, instead, a competing sys-
tem-and within the market for constitutional form, it is seeking to displace the
post-1945 universalist constitutionalist system, based on the normative system pre-
sided over by the community of nations, with one in which the constitutions of




159. Thus, for example, contrast the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with
the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR). See, e.g., Ebrahim Moosa, The Di-
lemma ofIslamic Rights Schemes, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 185 (2001) "[Tlhe UIDHR explicitly states that
in 'terms of our primeval covenant with God, our duties and obligations have priority over our rights.'
This statement sharply distinguishes the Islamic rights-scheme from what is generally meant by
secular 'human rights' where the term rights mean certain fundamental and unconditional entitle-
ments simply on the grounds of being human." Id. at 196. The more formal Cairo Declaration em-
phasized both the similarities and differences between the approaches. Cairo Declaration on Human
Rights in Islam, U.N. GAOR, World Conf. on Hum. Rts., 4th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/
Addl8 (Aug. 5, 1990). See discussion in Cat Backer,supra note 1, at 43.
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will and its earthly constitution, for example, through ulema16 or magisterium. 16
The problem, then, is not one of correction, as Hirschl might suggest, but one of
displacement.'62 In the place of a set of related notions of constitutionalism, there
has arisen another constitutionalist system, incompatible with and competing
against that system for the allegiance of the community of nations.
As a consequence, much in Western constitutionalist discourse about theo-
cratic constitutionalism-the Islamization of law-actually seeks to undo or sub-
ordinate that Islamization in the service of contemporary systems.'63 The object is
to privilege global secular values-generated as meta-law by the community of
nations and central to the substantive element of transnational constitutional-
ism-over or through substantive constitutional values generated by Islam (or
Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, or others). 164 This takes a variety of forms.
One focuses on the project of judicial reconstruction of Islamist constitutional
provisions in the service of global secular norms. 16' 5 Another focuses on remaking
160. Ulema is the educated class of Muslim legal scholars as recognized within a particular terri-
tory. See generally Abdullah Saeed, The Official Ulema and Religious Legitimacy of the Modern
Nation State, in ISLAM AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 14,14 (Shahram Akbarzadeh & Abdullah Saeed
eds., 2003) ("Two types of ulema exist: the official ulema and the non-official (independent) ulema.
The official ulema are usually part of the state bureaucracy and are generally dependent on the
state. The non-official ulema are usually outside the state bureaucracy."). For a discussion of the
development of the ulema concept as critical to the construction of the Malay religious party, see
Noor,supra note 151.
161. See THE VATICAN, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 85 (2003) (explaining that "[t]he
task of giving an authentic interpretation of the Word of God, whether in its written form or in the
form of Tradition, has been entrusted to the living teaching office of the Church alone. Its author-
ity in this matter is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ").
162. This was, for example, well understood in the context of the Chechan wars against Russia.
After the war, radical Islamic groups began using religion as a basis for political
reforms in the republic. They promoted the idea that the "desecrated and aggres-
sive constitutionalism" of Russia and the West should be replaced by a constitu-
tional theocracy, often quoting Dudayev's phrase, "[t]he power of Shari'a law
should be absolute and unlimited."
VALERY TisHKov, CHECHNYA: LIFE IN A WAR-TORN SOCIETY 203 (2004).
163. In a sense, that appears to be a consequence of projects like that of Noah Feldman. See Feldman,
supra note 71;seealso Feldman & Martinez,supra note 148, at 885-90,918-19 (on the use ofoppositional
politics to craft a formally Islamic state that privileges traditional constitutionalist values).
164. Thus, for example, scholars tend to ask if theocratic constitutionalism can be used to vindicate
secular constitutionalist values. See, e.g., Jennifer F. Cohen, Islamic Law in Iran: Can It Protect the
International Legal Right of Freedom of Religion and Belie]?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 247, 266-73 (2008).
165. See generally Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Fundamentalism: Three Middle
Eastern Tales, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1819 (2004).
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the competing substantive framework-in the case of Islam by substituting a "soft
Islam" for homegrown varieties.'66 Yet another focuses on invoking international
communal standards to indict and delegitimize the substantive foundations of
theocratic constitutionalism.1'5  But in doing so, these arguments recognize the
incompatibility of such systems with contemporary transnational constitutionalist
systems. 168 But they do not examine that contrary constitutionalism on its own
terms.'69 That makes it harder to understand what is actually developing within
constitutional theocracy. And for those who seek to meet the challenge of this ris-
ing system, for ways to meet that challenge within territories in which both sys-
tems seek to serve as the legitimate (and sole) basis of constitutional ordering.
If this is the case, then what might be the critical features of transnational
theocratic constitutionalism? The Roman Catholic Pontiff, Benedict XVI, in a
166. Amitai Etzioni, Mosque and State in Iraq, PoL'Y REV., Oct./Nov. 2003, at 65, 68 ("Many have
attempted to outline the features of a soft Islam in recent years, resulting in several typologies of
liberal, modest, modern, and Euro-Islam that are contrasted with militant, virulent, and funda-
mentalist Islam.").
Such an Islam seeks to educate and encourage good conduct rather than coerce
it, is open to reinterpretation on all matters but its core, welcomes participation
by the members of the community rather than dictates from the mullahs, and
spreads spiritually rather than by the sword.... The most effective way to de-
velop such a conception is to embody it in new institutions for the whole world to
see. Moreover, as we remain knee-deep in rebuilding Iraq, concrete questions-
not just matters of theory-must be faced.
Id. at 70. See generally Larry Cati Backer, Of Political States and "Soft" Religion as the Basis for State
Organization, Law at the End of the Day, http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2007/07/of-political
-states-and-soft-religion.html (July 16, 2007; 13:52 EST); Larry Cati Backer, Religion in the Service
of the State: Schools of "Soft Islam" in Britain, Law at the End of the Day, http://lcbackerblog.
blogspot.com/2007/08/religion-in-service-of-state-schools-of.html (Aug. 22, 2007. 21:20 EST).
167. "Even before the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent declaration of a 'war on ter-
rorism,' articles on the relationship of 'Islam' to notions such as liberalism, democracy and pluralism
were ubiquitous in the scholarly academy, to say nothing of the popular press. Much of this work,
however, is either apologetic or polemical." Mohammad Fadel, The True, the Good and the Reason-
able: The Theological and Ethical Roots of Public Reason in Islamic Law, 21 CAN. J.L. & JURIs. 5, 5-6
(2008) (citing Ruud Peters, Islamic Law and Human Rights: A Contribution to an Ongoing Debate, 10
ISLAM & CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM REL. 5, 5 (1999) (noting that "[diuring recent decades a host of publica-
tions have seen the light with titles like: 'Islam and X' or 'X in Islam,' where X is typically a concept
with positive connotations, such as democracy, peace, social justice, or women's rights")).
168. Etzioni, supra note 166, at 73 ("It follows that by promoting soft Islam we get two for the
price of one: We promote a religion that is compatible with liberal democracy as well as one that
can serve as an effective antidote to the fundamentalists.").
169. There are exceptions, of course. But even these come from a framework in which the exam-
ined system is both alien and in need of softening or control.
THEOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM
recent address to the United Nations General Assembly, 7 ' brilliantly underscored
the congruence and competition inherent in the theocratic constitutionalist ele-
ment. Benedict XVI's analysis is based (necessarily from the perspective of his
own faith) in assumptions about the nature of the secular and the political that
provide an interesting point for interrogation. 7' In his own way, Benedict arrives
at an understanding of the relationship between the religious and the political
that in some ways mirrors that coming out of Qom.
Benedict starts the address with a bit of historical connection and first prin-
ciples. He suggests that his views are not individual but institutional; it is not the
man but the magisterium speaking. "As Pope John Paul II expressed it in 1995,
the Organization should be 'a moral centre where all the nations of the world feel
at home and develop a shared awareness of being, as it were, a "family of
nations.' ' ' ' .72 He noted that "[t]he founding principles of the Organization-the
desire for peace, the quest for justice, respect for the dignity of the person, hu-
manitarian cooperation and assistance-express the just aspirations of the human
spirit, and constitute the ideals which should underpin international relations."'73
But being a moral center does not mean, for Benedict, the same thing as
being the source of morality-even political morality. "Through the United Na-
tions, States have established universal objectives which, even if they do not coin-
cide with the total common good of the human family, undoubtedly represent a
fundamental part of that good."'74 Instead, Benedict suggests that the United Na-
tions serves as a means through which a higher morality is served. This is espe-
cially so since all states are bound by this common and superior morality, which
permits no unilateralism. These notions are expressed early in the address and in
170. His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI, Address of Benedict XVI to the Members of the United
Nations General Assembly (Apr. 18, 2008),available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/benedict_
xvi/speeches/2008/april/documents/hf ben-xvi-spe-20080418_un-visiten.html.
171. See His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter Spe Salvi of the Supreme Pontiff Bene-
dict XVI to the Bishops, Priests and Deaconsmen and Women Religious and All the Lay Faithful on
Christian Hope (Nov. 30, 2007), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/benedictxvi/
encyclicals/documents/hf ben-xvi enc_20071130_spe-salvien.html.
172. His Holiness Pope Benedict XVIsupra note 170, 1 (citing His Holiness Pope John Paul II,
Address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 50th Anniversary of its Foundation
(Oct. 5, 1995), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/speeches/1995/october/
documents/hf_jp-iispe_05101995_address-to-unoen.html).
173. His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI, supra note 170, 1.
174. Id. 2. "This intuition was expressed as early as the fifth century by Augustine of Hippo,
one of the masters of our intellectual heritage. He taught that the saying: Do not do to others what
you would not want done to you 'cannot in any way vary according to the different understandings
that have arisen in the world."' Id.
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a manner that gently rebukes the United States and other powers for pushing
their own political morality unilaterally over the higher morality articulated in
part by the United Nations to which they are bound.
The United Nations embodies the aspiration for a "greater degree of
international ordering,"... inspired and governed by the principle of
subsidiarity, and therefore capable of responding to the demands of
the human family through binding international rules and through
structures capable of harmonizing the day-to-day unfolding of the
lives of peoples. This is all the more necessary at a time when we ex-
perience the obvious paradox of a multilateral consensus that contin-
ues to be in crisis because it is still subordinated to the decisions of a
few, whereas the world's problems call for interventions in the form
of collective action by the international community.75
The higher morals to which the United Nations aspires, and which it can
only express in part, is meant to serve the human family. States, by necessity can
only reach that family partially. All states together, guided by the binding power
of higher morality, are obliged to act in concert for the benefit of the human fam-
ily. Politics, thus, serves morality. "Since rights and the resulting duties follow
naturally from human interaction, it is easy to forget that they are the fruit of a
commonly held sense of justice built primarily upon solidarity among the mem-
bers of society, and hence valid at all times and for all peoples."176
The only divisions that ought to matter, it seems, are religious.'77 For Bene-
dict, the road is clear-it is not the practice of the community of nations that cre-
175. Id. 2 (citing His Holiness Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis 43 (Dec. 30, 1987),
available at http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0223/-P7.HTM).
176. His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI,supra note 170, 8.
177. The gloss on this passage might be well provided from an interesting quarter-Benedict
XVI's address to Catholic educators the day before the United Nations speech:
The Church's mission, in fact, involves her in humanity's struggle to arrive at
truth. In articulating revealed truth she serves all members of society by purify-
ing reason, ensuring that it remains open to the consideration of ultimate truths.
Drawing upon divine wisdom, she sheds light on the foundation of human mo-
rality and ethics, and reminds all groups in society that it is not praxis that creates
truth but truth that should serve as the basis of praxis. Far from undermining
the tolerance of legitimate diversity, such a contribution illuminates the very
truth which makes consensus attainable, and helps to keep public debate ratio-
nal, honest and accountable.
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ates truth (for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a consensus
among states and their traditions), but instead it is universal truth that binds states
to an appropriate practice. Thus, Benedict XVI reasons "[t]ruth means more than
knowledge: knowing the truth leads us to discover the good. Truth speaks to the
individual in his or her entirety, inviting us to respond with our whole being."'
'17
Truth and its understanding of the absolute relation between good, evil, and ac-
tion are bound up in "the vision of the Logos, God's creative Reason, which in the
Incarnation, is revealed as Goodness itself. Far from being just a communication
of factual data-'informative'-the loving truth of the Gospel is creative and life-
changing-'performative' (cf. Spe Salvi, 2).'17 Legitimacy, faith, morals, and ac-
tion-there is little room for the truths of the community of nations expressed
merely in their actions-customary international law without morals is no law at
all. In this sense, Benedict XVI strikes hard at the core of the construction of the
global world order built from out of the ashes of the Second World War and en-
shrined in the secular internationalism of the United Nations.
In this context, as well, law assumes its principal role as instrument of moral
rather than as thing in itself. Speaking of the United Nations Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, Benedict XVI argues that "[w]hen presented purely in terms of
legality, rights risk becoming weak propositions divorced from the ethical and ratio-
nal dimension which is their foundation and their goal." ' Rule of law ought not to
infuse law with the power of Logos. For Benedict, the two are distinct, with law
clearly subordinate and passive. "Human rights, then, must be respected as an ex-
pression of justice, and not merely because they are enforceable through the will of
the legislators."'' There is no place in Benedict's world construct for a higher cus-
tomary law unless it be moral and universal and inspired by a faith tradition outside
of the human group that seeks thus to legitimate its community. 2
His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI, Address to Catholic Educators, 11 (Apr. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/benedict-xvi/speeches/2008/april/documents/hf-ben-xvi-
spe_20080417_cath-univ-washington-en.html. This mission ties faith, reason and community
within a tightly bound web. "Church's primary mission of evangelization, in which educational
institutions play a crucial role, is consonant with a nation's fundamental aspiration to develop a
society truly worthy of the human person's dignity." Id.
178. Id. 12.
179. Id.
180. His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI,supra note 170, 8.
181. Id.
182. See Larry Cati Backer, Reifying Law-Government, Law and the Rule of Law in Governance
Systems, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 521,552 n.156 (2008) (demonstrating how a growing number of
Americas are coming more to share Benedict's worldview as they shed themselves of their original
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Matters of morality, then, cannot be left to the expression of the political will of
states, even expressed democratically. 3 "Discernment, then, shows that entrusting
exclusively to individual States, with their laws and institutions, the final responsi-
bility to meet the aspirations of persons, communities and entire peoples, can some-
times have consequences that exclude the possibility of a social order respectful of
the dignity and rights of the person."'8 4 Benedict thus rejects the basic notion of the
sort of constitutionalism on which eighteenth and nineteenth century democratic
states were founded-the idea that the people are the source of rights and duties
and may bind themselves to those rights and duties, however discerned. But Bene-
dict has something else in mind. Speaking of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, he suggests that the norms described therein "are based on the natural law
inscribed on human hearts and present in different cultures and civilizations. Re-
moving human rights from this context would mean restricting their range and
yielding to a relativistic conception, according to which the meaning and interpreta-
tion of rights could vary and their universality would be denied in the name of dif-
ferent cultural, political, social and even religious outlooks." 5 For Benedict, then,
the proliferation of "viewpoints must not be allowed to obscure the fact that not only
rights are universal, but so too is the human person, the subject of those rights."'86
understanding of law as shared communal expression and move to a more imperial view of law as
sourced in a superior body).
183. See generally His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI,supra note 171, 42.
The atheism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is-in its origins and
aims-a type of moralism: a protest against the injustices of the world and of
world history. A world marked by so much injustice, innocent suffering, and
cynicism of power cannot be the work of a good God. A God with responsibility
for such a world would not be a just God, much less a good God. It is for the sake
of morality that this God has to be contested. Since there is no God to create
justice, it seems man himself is now called to establish justice. If in the face of this
world's suffering, protest against God is understandable, the claim that human-
ity can and must do what no God actually does or is able to do is both presump-
tuous and intrinsically false. It is no accident that this idea has led to the greatest
forms of cruelty and violations of justice; rather, it is grounded in the intrinsic
falsity of the claim.
Id.
184. His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI,supra note 170, 10.
185. Id. at 6. See generally His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI, supra note 171, 42 ("A world
which has to create its own justice is a world without hope. No one and nothing can answer for
centuries of suffering. No one and nothing can guarantee that the cynicism of power-whatever
beguiling ideological mask it adopts-will cease to dominate the world.").
186. Id.
THEOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM
And thus the place of religiously-derived morals should be at the pinnacle of
the construction of global political norms to which the laws of all states ought to be
subject: "Refusal to recognize the contribution to society that is rooted in the reli-
gious dimension and in the quest for the Absolute-by its nature, expressing com-
munion between persons-would effectively privilege an individualistic approach,
and would fragment the unity of the person." '187 This idea-that the expression of
the communal will and the search for the Absolute is both necessary and requires
the intervention of religious communities (and principally their governance and in-
terpretive institutions-their magisteria) in shaping the understanding of the nor-
mative dimensions of law, also requires a broadening of religious participation in
internal politics. In a manner sounding much like American supporters of soft Is-
lamic state constitutions in Iraq and Afghanistan (but presumably not in the United
States), Benedict proposes that "[t]he full guarantee of religious liberty cannot be
limited to the free exercise of worship, but instead it has to give due consideration to
the public dimension of religion, and hence to the possibility of believers playing
their part in building the social order."'88 Separation of Church and State is, for
Benedict, as false a construct as the separation of faith from reason.
There is no hidden meaning here. Benedict XVI invites a consideration of Spe
Salvi and its relation to the suggestions he makes to the assembled ministers at the
United Nations. He reminds the secular powers of their joined task of secular and
religious authority-that the task of every generation to "engag[e] anew in the ardu-
ous search for the right way to order human affairs.... That is why the Church is
happy to be associated with the activity of this distinguished Organization, charged
with the responsibility of promoting peace and good will throughout the earth."'89
For this joint task, Benedict would remind his audience of his view of evil-the con-
struction of interpretive norms beyond religion. "We have all witnessed the way in
which progress, in the wrong hands, can become and has indeed become a terrifying
progress in evil."'9 ° An outside hand is necessary-but that hand cannot be the com-
munity of nations, it must be the divine order administered through the instruments
of divine will, institutionally constructed, with an oversight power on earth.
And so we come to the great contribution of this speech, at least for the con-
struction of the parameters of a rule of law-based theocratic constitutionalism as a
187. His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI, supra note 170, 11.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 14.
190. His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI, supra note 171, 22. "If technical progress is not matched
by corresponding progress in man's ethical formation, in man's inner growth (cf. Eph 3:16; 2 Cor
4:16), then it is not progress at all, but a threat for man and for the world." Id.
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legitimate normative system. It seems that political legitimacy requires an adher-
ence to legitimate substantive norms, which may only be derived from those univer-
sal truths beyond the reach of individuals or even communities of the faithless. Only
faith communities can legitimately provide those norms-a notion echoed else-
where by the faith communities of Islam and institutionalized in constitutions from
that vary in form from that of Saudi Arabia to that of Iran. 9' But Benedict is sug-
gesting something more than the control of morals within states. He suggests, as a
matter of international relations, that institutionalized religion ought to serve as au-
tonomous participants along with states in the construction of those universal norms
that might legitimately bind states in their external as well as internal relations.
In a manner that is consistent with her contribution in the ethical
and moral sphere and the free activity of her faithful, the Church
also works for the realization of these goals through the interna-
tional activity of the Holy See. Indeed, the Holy See has always had
a place at the assemblies of the Nations, thereby manifesting its
specific character as a subject in the international domain. As the
United Nations recently confirmed, the Holy See thereby makes its
contribution according to the dispositions of international law,
helps to define that law, and makes appeal to it.'92
According to this wisdom, it is time now for institutionalized religion to meet
its obligations within the political sphere-and not just the Holy See. Faith com-
munities-Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Non-Catholic Christian and the like-
must also take their place as subjects of international law and participants therein.
In the absence of that ecumenism, the Logos might be distorted through the error
of individuals who do not represent the totality of faith on Earth. Benedict be-
lieves that "[d]iscernment, that is, the capacity to distinguish good from evil, be-
comes even more essential in the context of demands that concern the very lives
and conduct of persons, communities and peoples."'93 For that purpose, "a vision
of life firmly anchored in the religious dimension can help to achieve this, since
recognition of the transcendent value of every man and woman favours conver-
sion of heart, which then leads to a commitment to resist violence, terrorism and
war, and to promote justice and peace."'94
191. See Cati Backer, supra note 1.




Benedict XVI, of course, does not mean to lobby vigorously on behalf of other
faith communities-he is charged with the triumph of his own. But his ideas-as
Logos-might necessarily proceed beyond the mouth of the man who utters
them. Yet he does wind up suggesting a place for formally-constituted faith com-
munities at the political table as subjects of international law. Before dismissing
these ideas as unusual, consider how much closer the world order is becoming to
legitimate autonomous religious participation in political norm construction after
2001 than it was before then. It is not for nothing that the greatest source of politi-
cal vigor in this century has sought power in its connection with something out-
side of the community it seeks to bind. From Chinese scientific determinism to
Catholic Logos, Islamic Shar'ia, Jewish law, all may someday share a place at the
political table as critical actors in the construction of substantive higher law, and
all may invoke the protection of the communities of the faithful in the preserva-
tion of their communities and the territories served by them.
Is it possible to generalize the insights drawn from Benedict and the Islam-
ization of constitutional law into an understanding of constitutionalism that is
theocratic, and not merely an Islamic wrinkle on theories of constitutionalism? Is
it possible to suggest a form by which the basic values framework of theocracy can
be fused with the constitutionalist turn of this century? Theocratic constitution-
alism is a worldview positing the construction of states subject to law but grounded
in the values of a particular religious tradition.195 That tradition is both universal-
izing and supranational.'96 Conformity to the substantive norms of theocratic
195. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 123 (1973) (arguing that theo-
cratic constitutionalism represents the legalization of the anthropological perception that "the im-
portance of religion lies in its capacity to serve, for an individual or for a group, as a source of
general, yet distinctive, conceptions of the world, the self, and the relations between them, on the
one hand-its model of aspect-and of rooted, no less distinctive 'mental' dispositions-its model
for aspect-on the other").
196. JOHN L. EsPOSITO & JOHN 0. VOLL, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 23 (1996) ("Despite the great
dynamism and diversity among contemporary Muslims in terms of political views, there are core
concepts that are central to the political positions of virtually all Muslims. What varies is the defi-
nition of the concepts .... "). Like conventional constitutionalism,
[w]hat varies is the definition of the concepts-not recognition of the concepts
themselves. Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi, a significant Sunni Muslim thinker who
lived in British India and then independent Pakistan, and who established the
major South Asian Islamic revivalist organization, the Jamaat-i-Islami, stated
that the "political system of Islam has been based in three principles, viz: Ta-
wheed (Unity of God), Risalat (Prophethood) and Khilafat (Caliphate)."
Id. (citing SAYYID ABUL A'LA MAUDUDI, ISLAMIC WAY OF LIFE 40 (Khurshid Ahmad trans., 1967)).
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constitutionalism requires conformity to those religious norms with respect to
which the members of each state may participate but which no state controls. But
though it privileges the universal as framework, it also leaves room for context
and difference.'97 Still, as with secular constitutionalism, its ideals can sometimes
be used to mask illegitimate objectives. 198
It is within this values system that apostasy becomes plausible as a constitu-
197. See, e.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-political
Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 15 (1990) (compatibility of Islam
and secular global human rights regimes). As Carl Brown has recently noted:
The scholarly debate describing contemporary Muslim states and societies and
predicting future developments has produced a spectrum of options. At one end
are those insisting that Islam is the major factor explaining the situation of to-
day's Muslims. Islam has so thoroughly molded them that they must be analyzed
by different criteria. Islam is sui generis. At the other end of the spectrum are
found those maintaining that basic political, economic, and social factors-such
as are found in all societies- account for the problems and the prospects of to-
day's Muslim world. If the reality of daily life in these Muslim countries were
more sanguine and secure, the Islamists would have scarcely a following.
L. CARL BROWN, RELIGION AND STATE: THE MUSLIM APPROACH TO POLITICS 179 (2000); see also
Sally Engle Merry, Constructing a Global Law-Violence Against Women and the Human Rights
System, 28 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 941, 944-45 (2003) (exploring Palestinian women's gender rights
and Islam within the peculiar context of Gaza).
198. In the context of Islam that problematizes what is sometimes written about as the "Arabiza-
tion" of political discourse, especially in conjunction with the Islamization of politics. Arabization
is ethnocentric, racist, and assimilationist in ways that are not necessary to Islamization. See, e.g.,
Aihwa Ong, State Versus Islam: Malay Families, Women's Bodies, and the Body Politic in Malaysia, in
BEWITCHING WOMEN, PIous MEN: GENDER AND BODY POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 159, 167, 177
(Aihwa Ong & Michael G. Peletz eds., 1995) (Arabization of Malaysian family roles); NORMAN A.
STILLMAN, THE JEWS OF ARAB LANDS IN MODERN TIMES 173 (1991) (on Arabization and the effects
on religious minorities); Michael J. Kelly, The Tricky Nature of Proving Genocide Against Saddam
Hussein Before the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 983,989 (2005) (with respect to ethnic
cleansing in Iraq, "[i]n the north, the 'Arabization' of oil-producing areas meant eviction of Kurdish
farmers, who were replaced with Arab tribesmen."); William L. Saunders Jr. & Yuri G. Mantilla,
Human Dignity Denied: Slavery, Genocide, and Crimes Against Humanity in Sudan, 51 CATH. U. L.
REV. 715, 716 (2002) (forced Islamization in Darfur) (citing U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORTS FOR 1999-SUDAN, (2000), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-
rights/1999_hrp_ report/sudan.html); Sarah L. Dygert, Note, Eradicating Sudanese Slavery: The Su-
danese Government and the Abuse of Islam, 3 REGENT J. INT'L L. 143 (2005); Matthew J. Fery, Case
Note, Determining Better Standards for Firm Resettlement, Judicial Discretion, and Immigration Ad-
ministrative Practice-Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 E3d 687 (7th Cir. 2004), 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 505, 509
(2006) ("The governments of Mauritania and Senegal, as early as 1989, began a process of'Arabiza-
tion,' whereby the Mauritanian government would deport black citizens to Senegal." (citing HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1990-MAURITANIA, available at http://
www.hrw.org/reports/1990/WR90/AFRICA.BOU-06.htm#P339 74389)).
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tionalist tool. For systems in which political ordering is grounding in religious
frameworks, religious affiliation is expanded to become something more than a
religious affiliation-it serves also as a mark of political affiliation. And more
than that, religious affiliation becomes the marker for dull political citizenship. It
is in this context that Islamic theocracies-whether or not constitutionalist states
could view apostasy as a political act and not merely a change of conscience di-
rected by a divine power. 99 For a state founded on the belief in the eternal and
transcendent superiority of a set of religious imperatives, a community of believ-
ers is essential for the operation of the state under those divine principles. Conver-
sion or apostasy represents not merely a change of faith but also an affirmation of
a rejection of the substantive political values (divinely ordained to be sure) on
which the state is grounded. While religious minorities might be tolerated, they
are not permitted to grow nor to threaten the state.2"' For transnational constitu-
tionalism, such a conceptual framework is anathema."'
That worldview has an ordering element. It judges constitutions as legitimate
and illegitimate in accordance with their compliance with the basic precepts and
normative framework that is embraced as legitimate. It sees itself as the greatest
source of normative legitimacy and alternative perspectives as flawed. Like other
forms of constitutionalism, theocratic constitutionalism's taxonomy reinforces an
underlying normative structure. The normative element of theocratic constitu-
tionalism carries with it a certain authentic or legitimating meta-ideology. That
199. Even Islamic modernist scholars "read the normative texts that appear to contemplate execu-
tion of apostates as referring to acts of treason rather than a change in a person's conviction" and
thus see the connection between religion and politics, reading the connection through to the early
interpretative texts. Mohammad H. Fadel, Public Reason asa Strategy for Principled Reconciliation:
The Case of Islamic Law and International Human Rights Law, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 19 (2007).
200. See, e.g., Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Anor, [2007] 4 MLJ 585
(F.C.) (Malay.) [Lina Joy v. Federal Territory Islamic Council & Others, [2007] 4 MLJ 585 (F.C.)],
available at http://www.accin-badailies.org/Lina%20Joy.pdf. The case involved a woman, born of
Malay parents, who sought to change her name and religious affiliation on her national identity
card on her conversion to Christianity. The Malay constitution defines a Malay as a person of a
distinct ethnic parentage who is a Muslim (art. 160), but also appears to grant religious freedom to
all citizens (art. 11(1)). The argument centered around whether she could freely declare a change
of faith or whether she was bound by a determination of an Islamic religious court of her formal
religious membership (and thus her classification as a Malay). For a discussion in the context of
Malaysian constitutionalism, see infra text and notes 351-378. See also Nurjaanah Abdullah &
Chew Li Hua, Legislating Faith in Malaysia, 2007 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 264 (2007).
201. See generally Donna E. Arzt, Religious Human Rights in Muslim States of the Middle East and
North Africa, 10 E,4ORY INT'L L. REV. 139, 144-45,149-54 (1996). For an application in the context
of Indian constitutionalism, see Seval Yildirim, Expanding Secularism's Scope: An Indian Case
Study, 52 Am. J. ComP. L. 901 (2004).
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 16:1
meta-ideology is easy to find, though its implementation and contours are as dif-
ficult to discern as those of secular transnational constitutionalism. Religion pro-
vides the ideology that serves as the grounding for understanding and applying
notions of right and justice-of actions that may be taken and those which must
be forbidden and of the role of the state in furthering the obligations of commu-
nity and individuals. There is much similarity at its core between universalist
secular and theocratic constitutionalism, at least in its institutional distribution of
constitutive power above the state." 2
Lastly, theocratic constitutionalism has an implementation element derived
from its ideologically-constrained organizational basis. Rule of law is strong within
theocratic constitutionalism-avoidance of arbitrary action by the state or its ser-
vants, action in conformity with law, and most importantly, limits on lawmaking.
The state is not despotic; it must conform to law, and its servants may not exceed the
authority vested in it by the constitution as bounded in turn by the substantive
framework within which the constitution is cast. The focus has been on process and
substantive provisions. Here is where the theocracy part of constitutionalism comes
into prominence, for those limits are not ultimately in the control of the apparatus of
state but in those elites authentically vested with authority over the basic texts and
rule interpretation of the religion privileged through the constitution.
Accountability of state officials is guaranteed through the constitution; ac-
countability of those who hold the power to interpret and apply the basic princi-
ples of theocratic constitutions is left to the religious organization. That
organization is supranational in scope-faith communities and their institutional
structures have gone global. Its members belong to global communities of the
faithful constituted as autonomous groups. Though state-based institutions may
flourish, the obligation to avoid too great a deviation from the basic rules of the
global religious body keeps all the arbiters of rules and conduct in check. There is
thus both an element of contextualization-the ability of local religious elites to
naturalize the universal principles of normative religion within their territories-
and universalism, as the adherence to the framework structures of the substantive
system. Protection of the rights and dignity of individuals are preserved, but
within the framework of the understandings of those terms within religious
202. See, e.g., FULTON J. SHEEN, COMMUNISM AND THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WEST 76 (1948) (Com-
paring seemingly incompatible universalist visions of constitutionalism held by Christianity and
Marxism, Sheen argued that "[slo much is communism a secularization or dedivinization of
Christianity that it can be presented as an ersatz for Christian doctrines.").
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law.2"3 Membership in the polity is tied not to citizenship so much as to member-
ship in the constitutionalized religious community. For the others, citizenship
comes without a power to participate in the construction of meta-rules that define
the power relationships and behavior norms of the state.
III. BUT ARE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTIONS EVIDENCE OF A DISTINCTIVE
THEOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM?
AN APPLICATION OF THEORY TO REALITY
The fact that religion can claim pride of place within a constitutionalist enter-
prise does not mean that all constitutions with a reference to religion fall within the
emerging traditions of theocratic constitutionalism. Just as one can have constitu-
tions without constitutionalism, 2" one ought to be able to distinguish between con-
stitutions with theocratic elements and constitutions that are legitimately theocratic
constitutionalism. Those elements include an embrace of the fundamental ideal
that government ought to have limited power. Those limitations are structural and
political. Political limitations include popular sovereignty, political participation by
citizens, and accountability by agents of the state for their conduct. Structural limi-
tations are also grounded in rule of law assumptions. These include process limita-
tions to guard against arbitrary actions or other conduct that are not grounded in
law, and process for the legitimate exercise of state power. It also includes substantive
rules for the exercise of state power. These include respect for the rights of individu-
als and the institution of a moral or ethical basis for state behavior grounded in what
is right and just. The source of both process and substantive limits are not found in
local practice but in a set of universal values to which the state and its organs are
bound-the universal values and legal rules of religion.
203. Thus, for example, the concept of democracy might itself be given its "truer" meaning
within the Islamic normative framework like this:
The theocracy built up by Islam is not ruled by any particular religious class but
by the whole community of Muslims including the rank and file. The entire
Muslim population runs the state in accordance with the Book of God and the
practice of His Prophet. Ifl were permitted to coin a new term, I would describe
this system of government as "theo-democracy", that is to say a divine democratic
government, because under it the Muslims have been given a limited popular
sovereignty under the suzerainty of God.
EsposiTo & VOLL,supra note 196, at 24 (quoting and discussing SAYYID ABUL A'LA MAUDUDI, ISLAMIC
WAY OF LIFE 40 (Khurshid Ahmad trans., 1967)).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
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This Part presents a preliminary excursion into the constitution of theocratic
constitutionalism. It looks to two models at either end of the constitutionalist
spectrum. The first of these, Iran, presents a model of constitution making that is
legitimate within the context of theocratic constitutionalism. Along with Iran,
this part examines some issues in constitutional projects that fall imperfectly
within the model-for this purpose it looks to Afghanistan's post-conflict consti-
tution. So understood, that document does not present a legitimate foundation of
government under principles of universalist theocratic constitutionalism. The sec-
ond, the constitution of Saudi Arabia, evidences a theocratic constitution without
constitutionalism. It ends by considering whether religion-based constitutions can
fall into a constitutionalist limbo-neither secular nor theocratic constitutional-
ism. For that purpose, it looks to the constitutional projects of Pakistan and Egypt.
The focus of the analysis is on formal constitutions." 5 These constitutions suggest
the dangers of substantive values conflicts in the evolution of constitutionalist
states. The analysis also suggests the utility of the model of constitutionalism de-
veloped here. The problem with constitutionalist discourse in these states is that it
does not touch on adherence to the basic framework of legitimating constitution-
alism but on a contest for supremacy between competing value systems through
which Egyptian, Pakistani, and other constitutionalism might be expressed and
implemented. Lastly, the Part suggests the ways in which constitutionalism-based
analysis can be applied outside the context of Islamic theocratic constitutionalism
by looking briefly at the question of Buddhist theocracy in Sri Lanka.
A. Theocratic Constitutionalism-The Cases of Iran and Afghanistan
1. Iran
Iran presents an example of a well-developed system of theocratic constitu-
tionalism. If for no other reason this system presents the greatest challenge to the
values on which its competitor-secular transnational constitutionalism-is
205. 1 concede the importance of constitutional application. Constitutionalism, at least in its as-
pect as taxonomy, is concerned with the possibility of sham constitutions and the articulation of
constitutionalist values there is no intention to apply. See Larry Cati Backer, Democracy Part XII:
On Sham Democracies, Law at the End of the Day, http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2008/06/
democracy-part-xii-on-sham-democracies.html (June 27, 2008, 16:22 EST) (examining HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2008 (2008), available at http://hrw.org/
wr2k8/pdfs/wr2k8_web.pdf). These issues enrich but are not necessary for the object of this arti-
cle-to sketch out a working understanding of a legitimate formal constitutionalism grounded in
values other than those developed through secular pluralist international political activity, even
one skewed to the interests of the most powerful American and European states.
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based. Iran's theocratic government is not merely the imposition of a religious
state without limits, but instead suggests a principled basis of state organization
through law, the object of which is to secure the benefits of a specific (though per-
haps odious to nonbelievers) set of legitimate (to believers) normative values.
That political agenda can be simply stated: Islam provides a com-
prehensive sociopolitical system valid for all time and place. Thus,
God is the sole legislator. Government is mandated in order to im-
plement God's plan in this world. Individual believers are not per-
mitted simply to suffer unjust rule in silence. They must actively
work to realize God's plan in this world. The only acceptable form
of this Islamic government is that directed by the most religiously
learned. This is the guardianship of the faqih (velayat-e faqih)." 6
This is meant to be a rule of law ordering. °7 This ordering is well-represented
in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.
The government constituted pursuant to the Iranian Constitution is in some
great sense democratic.2"8 There is a significant element of separation of powers in
the construction of the state apparatus.2 °9 Second, the substantive elements of
modern constitutionalism are also observed. 2"0 Human rights are enshrined and
protected in the constitution. 2" The power to petition the government is pre-
served. 1 2 The Iranian Constitution creates a system of government grounded in
rules and separation of powers. The legislative power is vested in representatives
206. BRowN, supra note 197, at 172. The work also has an excellent discussion of the development
of what would become Khomeini's politico-religious philosophy, including its xenophobia and
anti-Jewish paranoia. See id. at 161-74.
207. "'Since Islamic government,' Khomeini asserted, 'is a government of law, those acquainted
with the law, or more precisely, with religion-i.e., thefuqaha-must supervise its functioning. It
is they who supervise all executive and administrative affairs of the country, together with all plan-
ning."' Id. at 172.
208. See Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'i Isla'mai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Iran] [1980] arts. 6-8 [hereinafter Iranian Constitution of 1979]. However, it is subject to the ulti-
mate limitations of the supreme religious leader. See id. art. 5.
209. See id. arts. 56-63. Again, this is in accordance with the limitations of Islam generally as
exercised through the religious leader pursuant to Article 5 and Articles 90-99.
210. See id. arts. 19-55.
211. See id. arts. 19-42.
212. See id. arts. 26-27. These articles are ambiguous regarding the extent of the protections of-
fered. Id.
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of the people," 3 whose actions are constrained within a system of institutionalized
and nominally democratic legislation adopted in accordance with constitutional
requirements." 4 Like modern constitutions it also imposes limits on power that
can be exercised by the state.215 But constitutionally granted authority may only be
exercised within the limits of the legal framework of Islam. Islam is not only nor-
matively foundational but also constituted as a foundational system of legal orga-
nization.2"6 It is not a supplement but a substitute for the constitutionalist values
represented by the international system and the values generated by the commu-
nity of states. Thus, for example
[d]uring a meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commit-
tee in 1982 investigating reports of state-sponsored murder and tor-
ture, the leader of the Iranian delegation was questioned about
Iran's view on the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Sayed Hadi Khosrow-Shahi, the leader of the delegation,
213. See id. art. 57 (stating that the powers of government are vested in the legislature, judiciary,
and executive); art 58 (stating that the legislative functions are to be exercised through the Islamic
Consultative Assembly).
214. The legislative power is then elaborated. See id. arts. 62-99.
215. The substantive limitations on state power are elaborated in Chapter III of the Constitution,
Articles 19-31. These mimic the standard description of basic rights in post-war constitutions. But
rather than being grounded in transnational constitutionalist principles, these rights are grounded
"in conformity with Islamic criteria." Id. art. 20 (equal protection of the laws); art. 21 (rights of
women); art. 24 (press freedom except when "detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam");
art. 27 (public gatherings, same as art. 24); art. 28 (right to choose occupation if "not contrary to
Islam or the public interest").
216. See e.g., id. art. 12 ("The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver Ja'fari school [in
usual al-Din and fiqh], and this principle will remain eternally immutable."). The legalist nature
of Islam within Iranian constitutionalism is further refined in Article 12: "Other Islamic schools,
including the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanbali, and Zaydi, are to be accorded full respect, and their
followers are free to act in accordance with their own jurisprudence in performing their religious
rites." Id. The authority of these legal schools are legitimized through the constitution as well.
These schools enjoy official status in matters pertaining to religious education,
affairs of personal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance, and wills) and related
litigation in courts of law. In regions of the country where Muslims following
any one of these schools of fiqh constitute the majority, local regulations, within
the bounds of the jurisdiction of local councils, are to be in accordance with the
respective school of fiqh, without infringing upon the rights of the followers of
other schools.
Id.; see also id. (sovereignty of Qur'onic justice); art. 2 (belief in "Divine revelation and its funda-
mental role in setting forth the laws"); art. 4 (need to base all laws and regulations on Islam). The
critical provision is Article 5, which vests ultimate authority on a religious leader.
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replied that Iran believed in the "'supremacy of Islamic laws, which
are universal"' and when a law, such as the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, comes in conflict with Islamic laws, Iran would
"'choose the divine laws."' 217
This constitution is not imposed from above but represents an act of will of the
people-a recognition, freely embraced-of the appropriate form of political organi-
zation.2"' The privileging of Islam in the political context is absolute. "This principle
applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all other
laws and regulations, and the fuqaha' of the Guardian Council are judges in this
matter."'219 For that purpose, the constitutional systems creates an institutional frame-
work for religious oversight of political activity,220 at the apex of which stands the
Guardian Council,22' "with a view to safeguard the Islamic ordinances and the Con-
stitution, [and] in order to examine the compatibility of the legislation passed by the
Islamic Consultative Assembly with Islam." '222 Indeed, the representative legislature
"does not hold any legal status if there is no Guardian Council in existence. 223
There is no popular right to interrogate and alter the formulation of the basic
substantive norms on which political governance is founded-unless one is part of
the instructional structure of the religion. Shi'a Islam, it seems, has its own magiste-
rium 224-but one that serves both a political and religious function. For all others,
there is obedience.225 Thus, for example, in the section of the Constitution elaborat-
217. Reimer, supra note 112, at 360.
218. See Iranian Constitution of 1979 art. 1. ("The form of government of Iran is that of an Is-
lamic Republic, endorsed by the people of Iran on the basis of their long-standing belief in the
sovereignty of truth and Qur'anic justice, in the referendum of... [March 29-30, 1979] through
the affirmative vote of a majority of 98.2% of eligible voters, held after the victorious Islamic
Revolution led by the eminent marji' al-taqlid, Ayatullah al-Uzma Imam Khumayni.").
219. Id. art. 4.
220. Said Saffari, The Legitimation of the Clergy's Right to Rule in the Iranian Constitution of 1979,
20 BRIT. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 64, 82 (1993).
221. Iranian Constitution of 1979 art. 91.
222. Id.
223. Id. art. 93.
224. See infra text accompanying note 264.
225. Republican principles are still consonant with this system-it is just that the interrogation of
basic norms found in Islam are now outside the bounds of political discourse, and with respect to
those, the citizen must yield to the authoritative spokesperson for the superior religious system.
"[T]he Islamic government is based on an ideology different from that of a democratic republic.
What . . . is indeed appropriate for a democratic republic ... fails to meet the requirements of
Islam." Saffari, supra note 220, at 65, 73 (on the religious basis of priestly government in Shi'a
Islam). See generally CatA Backer, supra note 40.
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ing the rights of national sovereignty, the Constitution starts with the declaration
that "absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God ..... The people
are to exercise this divine right in the manner specified in the following articles."226
But of course, the people, at least within Islam, do have a significant and complex
role in the elaboration and application of that system, both as applied to the constitu-
tion of the state and in its role as legal code governing every aspect of life.2
The Iranian theocratic constitution resembles modern constitutions and ad-
heres to the current pattern of modern constitutionalism in its form and objectives-
to formulate a system of governance based on legitimating principles and authoritative
values. It adheres to thick "rule of law" constitutionalism. The power of the state
and its governance organs are strictly limited. In this sense, the Iranian constitution
follows emerging models of transnational constitutionalism. The difference-and a
critical one to be sure-is the source of the norms constituting those boundaries of
governance and the mechanisms for engaging with those norms.
2. Afghanistan
The Afghani Constitution also provides an example of a constitutional settle-
ment that looks to principles of theocratic constitutionalism for its legitimacy.22
Its preamble suggests a certain internationalism in the values underlying the con-
stitutional project. 229 Yet, the lens through which such substantive protections are
226. Iranian Constitution of 1979 art. 56.
227. The concept and operation of the ummah is well-known within Islam. While its actual in-
vocation and effect are highly contested and fluid, it does provide at least in theory a vehicle
through which the people can, as a whole, directly intervene in the elaboration and application of
the unalterable divine command. In reality, of course, the ummah system is tempered by an an-
cient and complex system of elaboration by scholars and others, the size and power of whose fol-
lowing, may also be invested with a certain legitimacy and authority. See generally Christopher
Stuart, From "Mother of the World" to the "Third World" and Back Again: The Harmonization Cycle
Between Islam and the Global Economy, in HARMONIZING LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 279
(Larry CatA Backer ed., 2007) (discussing the commercial success of the Islamic world in relation
to its integration with the rest of the world).
228. Constitution of Afghanistan pmbl., available at http://www.junbish.org/constitution-of_
afghanistan-yea.htm.
229. Id. The Preamble appears to place Afghanistan strongly within the transnational constitu-
tionalist camp. It speaks to a grounding in global values constitutionalism, for example:
Observing the United Nations Charter and respecting the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, For consolidating national unity, safeguarding independence,
national sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the country, For establishing a
government based on people's will and democracy, For creation of a civil society
free of oppression, atrocity, discrimination, and violence and based on the rule of
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seen are not those of global constitutionalism but of eternal universalism of a rel-
gious foundation.23 Thus, "[tihe religion of the state of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan is the sacred religion of Islam."23' The Afghani Constitution builds
strong protections against derogation from its core substantive provisions. "The
provisions of adherence to the fundamentals of the sacred religion of Islam and
the regime of the Islamic Republic cannot be amended." '232 Islam does not so much
reject a fundamental rights value system as incorporate it within the normative
framework of Islam. Despite suggestions to the contrary, it inverts the hierarchy
of values-religion is not interpreted as an object of fundamental rights; instead,
fundamental rights are interpreted as an object of Islam.233 "In Afghanistan no
law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam." '234
For those from different religious traditions, there is conformity to an Islamic
worldview within which a certain measure of toleration is possible. This, of
course, parallels the limits to toleration within conventional transnational consti-
tutional systems of beliefs and practices, which might be deemed threatening to
the politico-legal order.235 "Followers of other religions are free to exercise their
faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of law." '236
But threats to the religious basis of the legal order-including efforts to pry Mus-
lims from their faith, are less tolerated.237 Indeed, the constitution imposes on the
law, social justice, protection of human rights, and dignity, and ensuring the
fundamental rights and freedoms of the people, For strengthening of political,
social, economic, and defensive institutions of the country, For ensuring a pros-
perous life, and sound environment for all those residing in this land.
Id.
230. The constitution is instituted "In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate." Id.
("We the people of Afghanistan: With firm faith in God Almighty and relying on His lawful
mercy, and Believing in the Sacred religion of Islam,.").
231. Id. ch. 1, art. 2.
232. Id. ch. 10, art. 1.
233. But see KHALED M. ABou EL FADL ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND ISLAM IN THE NEW CONSTITU-
TION OF AFGHANISTAN 2 (Cheryl Benard & Nina Hachigian eds., 2003) ("While references to Islam
are customary and appropriate, attention should be devoted to clauses that give some specificity to
Islam's official status. Islam must be enshrined in a way that it is expressed through normal demo-
cratic mechanisms, rather than supplanting them.").
234. Constitution of Afghanistan ch. 1, art. 3.
235. In the United States' context, the toleration of obscenity and indecent speech is a useful anal-
ogy. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
236. Constitution of Afghanistan ch. 1, art. 2.
237. See Larry Cati Backer, Constitution and Apostasy in Afghanistan, Law at the End of the
Day, http://cbackerblog.blogspot.com/2006/03/constitution-and-apostasy-in.html (Mar. 28, 2006,
21:46 EST).
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state a positive obligation to further the inculcation of Islam, Islamic religion and
values, on the population through education.238 Islamic values also shape the state's
responsibility to the family under the Afghani Constitution.239
The symbolic aspects of Afghani constitutionalism reinforces its theocratic
and constitutionalist focus-the lawful institution of religion as the basic frame-
work for political organization. All symbols of legitimacy are grounded not in
popular sovereignty but in the suzerainty of Islam. This includes the flag,24 ° the
national anthem,24' and the presidential oath of office.242 But legitimacy through
Islam also shapes the extent to which internal political action is treated as legiti-
mate. Thus, for example, the right to form political parties is guaranteed,243 as
long as the "program and charter of the party are not contrary to the principles of
sacred religion of Islam ... 244 The preservation and legitimating function of
these regulations of political life become clearer when these provisions are consid-
ered against the prohibition of factionalism within Islam in the form of political
parties. Thus, while a religious political party might be formed, as long as it is Is-
238. See Constitution of Afghanistan ch. 2, art. 23 ("The state shall devise and implement a uni-
fied educational curriculum based on the provisions of the sacred religion of Islam, national cul-
ture, and in accordance with academic principles, and develops the curriculum of religious subjects
on the basis of the Islamic sects existing in Afghanistan.").
239. See id. ch. 2, art. 32 ("The state adopts necessary measures to ensure ... upbringing of chil-
dren and the elimination of traditions contrary to the principles of sacred religion of Islam.").
240. Id. ch. 1, art. 19 provides that "[tihe national insignia of the state of Afghanistan is composed
of Mehrab and pulpit in white color.... In the upper-middle part of the insignia the sacred phrase
of'There is no God but Allah and Mohammad is his prophet, and Allah is Great' is placed, along
with a rising sun."
241. Id. ch. 1, art. 20 provides that "[t]he National Anthem of Afghanistan shall be in Pashtu and
mention 'Allahu Akbar' and the names of the ethnic groups of Afghanistan."
242. See id. ch. 3, art. 4 ("In the name Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate In the name God Al-
mighty, in the presence of you representatives of the nation of Afghanistan, I swear to obey and safe-
guard the provisions of the sacred religion of Islam,... ). Scholars have noted the way that theocratic
constitutionalism privileges members of a plural polity through the imposition of religious tests of a
variety of sorts-including the use of oaths. "[T]he constitutions of a number of predominantly Mus-
lim countries may restrict to Muslim citizens the right to serve in government positions, particularly to
hold executive power. This is achieved by requiring a specific Islamic oath or by stipulating that only
Muslims can hold a given position." Tad Stahnke & Robert C. Blitt, The Religion-State Relationship and
the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief- A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Pre-
dominantly Muslim Countries, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 947, 974 (2005). The constitutional traditions of sev-
eral Western states continue a similar practice-especially in Latin America. See, e.g., Constitution of
Argentina part I, ch. 1, § 2, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Argentina/
argen94_e.html ("The Federal Government supports the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion.").
243. Constitution of Afghanistan ch. 2, art 14.
244. Id.
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lamic, no such party can be formed under the Afghani Constitution if it is based
on an "Islamic School of thought.""24
The Afghani Constitution also incorporates theocratic elements within its
constitutionalist structure of the judiciary. The criteria for the selection of judges
are meant to emphasize the Islamic character of the legal basis of the state.246 The
Constitution enforces a rule of law regime on the judiciary, requiring judicial re-
view to be in "compliance with the Constitution of laws, legislative decrees, inter-
national treaties, and international conventions, and interpret them, in accordance
with the law," '247 but in critical respects that review function is grounded in prin-
ciples of Islamic law, which must be applied directly under certain circumstances,
even the context of constitutional review.24 Islam thus serves as the meta-constitu-
tional principles through which the constitution is interpreted and applied.249 In
Afghanistan, then, there is the possibility of building an Islamic state that is also
legitimately constitutionalist. That building serves to expose the despotically (and
illegitimately) theocratic dispositions of the Taliban and also suggests some of the
winners and losers within this constitutionalist matrix. Clearly, a system that is
grounded in one religion will tend to treat others as both potential rivals and com-
petitors. Though it may tolerate them, it will not treat them as equal members of
245. Id. ("Formation and functioning of a party based on ethnicity, language, Islamic school of
thought (mazhab-i fiqhi) and region is not permissible.").
246. See id. ch. 7, art. 3 (specifying the qualifications of Afghani Supreme Court justices as requiring
"a higher education in law or in Islamic jurisprudence"). Such judges "swear in the name of God
Almighty to support justice and righteousness in accord with the provisions of the sacred religion of
Islam and the provisions of this Constitution and other laws of Afghanistan." Id. ch. 7, art. 4.
247. Id. ch. 7, art. 6.
248. "When there is no provision in the Constitution or other laws regarding ruling on an issue,
the courts' decisions shall be within the limits of this Constitution in accord with the Hanafi juris-
prudence..." Id. ch. 7, art. 15. Special provision is made for the application of Shi'a law under
certain circumstances. Id. ch. 7, art. 16. "Ultimately, whenever the norms of international law are
taken to contradict Islamic principles, the Supreme Court may consider them unconstitutional.
Such an approach reflects the view of Muslim scholars that there is no other source of law, whether
domestic or international, than the divine will of God." Michael Schoiswohl, The New Afghanistan
Constitution and International Law: A Love-Hate Affair, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 664, 670 (2006).
249. But this Islamification is also highly contextualized within the history and culture of the
peoples of Afghanistan. For an excellent analysis, see Christina Jones-Pauly & Neamat Nojumi,
Balancing Relations Between Society and State: Legal Steps Toward National Reconciliation and Re-
construction of Afghanistan, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 825 (2004). See also Faiz Ahmed, Afghanistan's Re-
construction, Five Years Later: Narratives of Progress, Marginalized Realities, and the Politics of Law
in a Transitional Islamic Republic, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 269, 299 (2007) (suggesting the difficulty of
subconstitutional elaboration of the human rights protections described in the Afghani Constitu-
tion in light of the opposition of traditionalist Islamic law-grounded elites).
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the polity. All value systems are subordinated to the meta-norm, including those
of religion, which must be assimilated in order to survive.25 ° But the result is nei-
ther theocracy nor despotism, but instead it is a constitutionalist project with its
own internal logic, true to itself and grounded in theories of right and justice per-
mitting accountability and limiting discretion.
B. Theocratic Constitution Without Theocratic Constitutionalism-The Case of Saudi
Arabia
Saudi Arabia presents an example of a theocracy without theocratic constitutionalism.
The reform mission, upon which the saudi state was founded, rep-
resents the main core of the government. This mission is based on
the realization of islamic rules, implementation of islamic law
(shari'a), and enjoining good and forbidding evil, as well as to re-
form the islamic creed and purify it from heterodoxies. Therefore,
it adopts its doctrine from the true islamic principles that were pre-
vailing at the very beginning of islam.25'
The Constitution of Saudi Arabia is the Qur'an.252 The foundational roles of
Islam, ethnicity, and state are emphasized in the short section describing the rights
and duties of the state.25 The state has an overriding obligation for the care and
maintenance of the foundational religion on which its authority is based.254 The
250. As Justice Antonin Scalia noted in relation to the subordination inherent in nationalist con-
stitutionalist systems, like that of the United States:
Just as a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to the press by
the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively foster the dissemi-
nation of the printed word, so also a society that believes in the negative protec-
tion accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in
its legislation as well.... It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the
political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that
are not widely engaged in ..
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
251. The Basic System of Governance (Saudi Arabia) pmbl., available at http://www.mofa.gov.sa/
Detail.asp?InNewsltemlD =35297 [hereinafter Saudi Basic Law].
252. The Saudi "constitution is the holy qur'an and the prophet's (peace be upon him) sunnah
(traditions)." Id. art. 1.
253. See id. arts. 23-43.
254. See, e.g., id. art. 23 ("The state shall protect the islamic creed and shall apply islamic shari'ah.
The state shall enjoin good and forbid evil, and shall undertake the duties of the call to islam.");
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obligation extends beyond its borders-suggesting the inferior position of state to
ethnos and religious community.255 It extends to science and culture, bent to the
religious will. 56
The document in which the Qur'anic state is constituted is called the Basic Sys-
tem of Governance, or the Basic Law."7 That document is administrative rather than
constitutive in character-the divine having already constituted the state and decreed
its organization in accordance with its superior and transcendent will. The Basic
Law explicitly represents a subordinate articulation of the practices of government
and its relation to both individuals and institutions. It is promulgated in the style of
the old imperial constitutions of the German Reich. and Japan,' 9 by right of the
monarch on behalf of his people in the service of the greater system with respect to
which he has been vested with governance power in a representative capacity.26°
see also id. art. 24 (referencing protection and maintenance of holy sites and shrines).
255. See, e.g., id. art. 25 ("The state shall be keen to realize the aspirations of the arab and muslim
nations with regard to solidarity and unity while enhancing its relations with friendly states.").
256. See id. art. 29 ("It shall encourage scientific research, shall preserve Arab and Islamic heritage
and shall contribute to Arab, Islamic and human civilization"). There is a curious resonance here
with developments in Catholic thinking about faith and reason. See His Holiness Pope John Paul II,
Fides et Ratio (Sept. 14, 1998), available at http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0216/-INDEX.HTM
(suggesting a resonance with recent efforts to clarify the relationship between education and Catholic
beliefs within religious institutions of higher education); see also His Holiness Pope John Paul II,
Apostolic Constitution of The Supreme Pontiff John Paul 11 On Catholic Universities (Ex Corde
Ecclesiae) 13 (Aug. 15, 1990), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/apost-
constitutions/documents/hf jp-iiapc_15081990_ex-corde-ecclesiaeen.html ("Since the objective
of a Catholic University is to assure in an institutional manner a Christian presence in the university
world confronting the great problems of society and culture, every Catholic University, as Catholic,
must have the following essential characteristics: 1. a Christian inspiration not only of individuals but
of the university community as such; 2. a continuing reflection in the light of the Catholic faith upon
the growing treasury of human knowledge, to which it seeks to contribute by its own research; 3. fi-
delity to the Christian message as it comes to us through the Church; 4. an institutional commitment
to the service of the people of God and of the human family in their pilgrimage to the transcendent
goal which gives meaning to life."); Larry Cati Backer, Fides et Ratio: Religion and Law in Legal
Orders Suffused by Faith, Law at the End of the Day, http://Icbackerblog.blogspot.com/2007/07/
fides-et-ratio-religion-and-law-in.html (July 30, 2007, 15:52 EST).
257. Id.
258. See Constitution of the German Empire (1871), available at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/
Constitutionof theGermanEmpire.
259. See Meinji Kenpa(Japan), available at http://history.hanover.edu/texts/1889con.html.
260. Thus, the preamble of the Saudi Basic Law provides:
By the help of allah We, fahd bin abdul aziz, the king of the kingdom of saudi
arabia, consistent with the public interest, and in view with the development of
the state in different fields, in addition to our enthusiasm to achieve our pros-
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The Saudi state is constituted as "sovereign arab islamic state"26' for the preser-
vation of which its citizens are required to conform their behavior or be punished.262
Its symbols of state and its holidays are institutionalizations or expressions of the
supremacy of its faith community,2 63 as well as its national character as sovereign
and Arab.2" The government is constituted as a monarchy for which the male chil-
dren of the founder are eligible for kingship.2 6 However, there is a separation be-
tween government and power, with the implication that the king must serve
underlaw-that is, the rules of the Qur'anic constitution.2 66 Indeed, the Basic Law
explicitly states that "[t]he authority of the regime is derived from the holy Qur'an
and the prophet's sunnah which rule over this and all other state laws 2 67 and that
"[c]itizens shall pledge allegiance to the king on the basis of the holy qur'an and the
pected objectives, we ordered the following: First: issue the basic system of gov-
ernance according to the context herein below.
Saudi Basic Law, pmbl.
261. Id. art. 1.
262. See id. art. 12 ("Fostering national unity is a must, and the state shall forbid all that may lead
to disunity, sedition and division.").
263. Thus, for example, national holidays are essentially religious holidays. See id. art. 2 (stating
"eid al-fitr (a religious feast celebrated on the 1st of shawal, the 10th month of the islamic calendar),
and eid al-ad-ha (a religious feast celebrated on the 10th of dhul-hijjah, the 12th month of the is-
lamic calendar), and its calendar is the hijra (lunar)"). The nation's flag is a proclamation of faith.
See id. art. 3 ("An article written in the middle of the flag translated as 'there is no god but allah,
muhammad is allah's messenger' with a drawn sword underneath.").
264. See id. art. 4 ("The state's emblem consists of two intersecting swords with a date palm in the
upper space between them. Both the national anthem and the badges of honor shall be determined
by the law.").
265. Id. art. 5. For elaboration on the state apparatus, see id. arts. 44-71. The King is assisted by
the Majlis AI-Shoura consultative assembly, though its powers are limited and its existence subject
to the royal will. See id. art. 68 ("The King shall have the right to dissolve the Majlis AI-Shoura and
re-form it"). In addition, the King is free to constitute such other persons and bodies as he wishes.
See id. art. 69 ("The King may call the Council of Ministers and Majlis AI-Shoura to hold a joint
meeting to which he may invite whomsoever he wishes for a discussion of whatsoever issues he
may like to raise"). The object is conformity to the consultative (Shoura) system which was said to
exist before the formation of the Kingdom. See id. In that context, the Basic Law requires that the
"Majlis" of the King and the "Majlis" of the Crown Prince shall be open to all citizens and to any-
one who may have a complaint or a grievance. Id. art. 43.
266. See id. art. 5(b) ("The most eligible among them shall be recognized as king, to rule in ac-
cordance with the holy qur'an and the prophet's sunnah."). The obligation extends to the state
apparatus and the citizenry. See id. art. 33 ("The State shall build and equip the armed forces to
defend the Islamic faith, the Two Holy Mosques, the society and the homeland."); see also id. art.
34 ("Defending the Islamic faith, the society and the homeland shall be the duty of each and every
citizen. Rules of military service shall be spelled out by the law.").
267. Id. art. 7.
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prophet's sunnah."'26 While the monarch may legislate in accordance with the sys-
tem implemented through the Basic Law,2" Qu'ran and Shari'a occupy a superior
place within the hierarchy of law. 70 Shari'a is directly applicable both to the consti-
tution of government and to the obligations of individuals.27" '
All relationships between the state and individuals are subordinated to the sub-
stantive and formal rules of religion. Legislation is essentially administrative in
character. Law is finite, limited, and immutable-the divine legislature has deliv-
ered the eternal code-it remains for the Saudi monarchy to administer its patri-
mony in stewardship for a higher authority, to which all individuals might contribute
in accordance with their role in the community.272 Furthermore, the monarch is
given authority to implement judicial rulings and to issue decrees that could affect
the method and rules by which courts base their decisions, so long as the decrees do
not contradict the Koran or Sunnah.273 The monarch also "carries out the policy of
the nation ... oversees the implementation of the Islamic Shari'ah, the system of
government, the state's general policies.. .and the protection and defense of the
country."274 In that context, the state recognizes a limitation on the power of the
state as against individuals, but only to the extent such is permitted by higher law.
"The state shall protect human rights in accordance with islamic shari'ah." '275 In-
268. Id. art. 6.
269. The Basic Law recognizes the power of the monarchical apparatus to issue law. See, e.g., id.
art. 3 (national holidays); art. 4 (the national flag), art. 15 (exploitation of natural resources), art. 20
(taxation), art. 35 (Saudi nationality), art. 38 (criminal law), art. 52 (appointment of judges), art. 59
(regulation of civil service), art. 74 (sale of state property). However, such law making remains
subordinate to both Qur'an and Shari'ah. Id. art. 8 ("The system of governance in the kingdom of
saudi arabia is based on justice, consultation 'shoura' and equality according to the islamic shari'ah
(the law of islam).").
270. See id. arts. 7-8.
271. "The saudi society shall cling to the god's shari'ah." Id. art. 11.
272. There is an irony here-the conservative Islamist theocracy mimics, in last respect, the original
and Jewish prototype-the Kingdom of Israel as constituted before the Roman expulsion in the first
century of the common era. See Suzanne Last Stone, Religion and State: Models of Separation From
Within Jewish Law, 6 INT'L J. CONsT. L. 631, 635-39 (2008) ("We can quibble the use of the term the-
ocracy, rather than "divine nomocracy" or even "sacred anarchy." Still, the impression left from read-
ing the Hebrew Bible is that the religion is the political order. Thus, the biblical metaphors of intentional
disobedience to that law revolve around treason and betrayal no less than sin." Id. at 635).
273. Saudi Basic Law arts. 48, 50.
274. Id. art. 55.
275. Id. art. 26. It is in that context that the foundational human rights protections offered through
the Basic Law can be understood. See, e.g., id. art. 36 ("No individual shall be detained, imprisoned
or have his actions restricted except under the provisions of the law."); see also id. art. 37 ("Houses
are inviolable. They shall not be entered without the permission of their owners, nor shall they be
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deed, the Basic Law confirms the role of Saudi society as grounded in the obligation
to live according to and to propagate Islam.276 "The goal of education is to instill the
islamic creed." '277 That educational goal is shared by the Saudi media.278
There is thus religion aplenty in the constitution of the Saudi Arabian state,
but very little constitutionalism. It is clear that the organization of the Saudi state
and its religious foundation is inconsistent, in significant respects, from consensus
notions of nationalist or transnational constitutionalism.27 9 But it is also clear that
the Saudi organizational form does not conform to incipient notions of theocratic
constitutionalism. It is, as one commentator recently suggested, a sort of orna-
mental constitutionalism; the Saudi Basic Law
is unabashedly honest, promulgating no rights that will not be pro-
tected, promising no elections, and not conceding the principle of
accountable governance in any direct way. Indeed, the Saudi Basic
Law signifies, if anything, a qualified rejection of many of the stan-
dard notions of constitutionalism in terms of rights and freedoms,
while ratifying a powerful executive circumscribed only by histori-
cal practices and Islamic ideas of governance.2"'
searched except in cases specified by the law."); id. art. 38 ("No crime shall be established as such
and no punishment shall be imposed except under a judicial or law provision."); id. art. 40 ("All
forms of correspondence, whether conveyed by telegraph, post or any other means of communica-
tion shall be considered sacrosanct. They may not be confiscated, delayed or read, and telephones
may not be tapped except as laid down in the law.").
276. Thus the Basic Law imposes on the Saudi family the obligation to conform to Islam, to cultivate
nationalist feeling, and to obey state authorities. See id. art. 9 ("[M]embers shall be raised and adhere
to the islamic creed which calls for obedience to god, his messenger and those of the nation who are
charged with authority; for the respect and enforcement of law and order; and for love of the mother-
land and taking pride in its glorious history."). The state is charged with ensuring that Saudi families
develop their ties to Islam and Arab ethnic identity. See id. art. 10 ("The state shall put great attention
to strengthen the bonds which hold the family together and to preserve its arab and islamic values.").
277. Id. art. 13. In addition, such educated citizens have an obligation of utility "to impart them
with knowledge and skills so that they become useful members in building their society, who love
their homeland and be proud of its history." Id.
278. See id. art. 39 ("They shall play their part in educating the masses and boosting national
unity.").
279. For an official analysis that is critical of the Saudi state, see, for example, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
SAUDI ARABIA COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2003 (2003), available at http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27937.htm.
280. Abdulaziz H. AI-Fahad, Ornamental Constitutionalism: The Saudi Basic Law of Governance,
30 YALE J. INT'L L. 375, 376 (2005).
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There are no rule of law limits on the state-indeed there is no state, except in
the relationships between Saudis and foreigners.2 8' Internally, the Saudi nation is con-
stituted differently-as a theocracy in which the executive branch, so to speak, is
constituted as the monarchy, and the legislative and judicial branches are constituted
as a blend of administrative officials and the traditional Islamic governance struc-
tures."' 2 Thus, it is clear that the constitution of the Saudi state is rich in substantive
values, the fifth element of my working definition of constitutionalism.283 Such values
are privileged over international norms and are used to interpret and implement
those norms within the Kingdom.284 But much of the rest of the presumptions of
constitutionalism are missing or weak, or an expression of a desire to obtain a mea-
sure of legitimacy within a more dominant foreign community of states.285 Or they
are a cloak to justify the institutionalization of family or clan power.286
281. See id. at 381 ("With respect to modern methods and structures of governance, and until the
reforms of the 1990s, the pressures faced by the Saudi state derived from its external relations
rather than from domestic demands.").
282. See id. at 378 ("Traditional norms of governance, which put a premium on consensus, pre-
vailed throughout this time. Such norms were strongly influenced by the classical Islamic notions
of rule, according to which, inter alia, the religiously trained scholars and jurists (the ulama) play
a major role as grantors of legitimacy and act as a constraint against despotism.").
283. "To the disappointment of the many Saudi subjects who hoped for reforms that would impose
real constraints on monarchical absolutism, the Basic Law turned out to offer Saudi subjects no
means for holding their rulers accountable or for restraining monarchical discretion. That is, it was
far from according with the principles of modern constitutionalism." Mayer, supra note 33, at 94.
284. See, e.g., Elizabeth Peiffer, The Death Penalty in Traditional Islamic Law and as Interpreted in
Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 507, 520 (2005).
285. This is nicely, though subtly, drawn out by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im in Globalization
and Jurisprudence: An Islamic Law Perspective, 54 EMORY L.J. 25, 48-49 (2005), who with a bit of
perhaps unintended irony noted that,
By retaining this specific form of political and social organization after indepen-
dence from colonial rule, Islamic societies have freely chosen to be bound by a
minimum set of national and international obligations of membership in a world
community of nation states. While there are clear differences in the level of their
social development and political stability, all Islamic societies today live under na-
tional constitutional regimes-including countries that have no written constitu-
tion such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states-and legal systems that require
respect for certain minimum rights of equality and nondiscrimination for all citi-
zens. Even where national constitutions and legal systems fail to expressly acknowl-
edge and effectively provide for these obligations, a minimum degree of practical
compliance is ensured by the present realities of international relations.
Id.
286. See Mayer, supra note 33, at 84 (suggesting that Saudi and Moroccan "versions of Islamic
constitutionalism do not flow from a common theory of Islamic government, but from strategies
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C. Neither Here Nor There-Pakistan and Egypt
Is it possible to have it both ways-to develop principles of theocratic constitu-
tionalism while retaining an adherence to the normative structure of transnational
constitutionalism, and especially those parts of transnational constitutionalism fo-
cused on human rights developed through and under the authority of non-religious
bodies? We have seen how Afghanistan does not present a true picture of a form of
constitutionalism straddling the religious and the secular for the basis of its legal
and interpretive authority. Is it possible to blend a foundational basis for constitu-
tional substance within the structures of a religion and still preserve the privilege of
the normative values of the community of nations understood as constitutionalism;
might Iraq, Pakistan, Egypt or Nigeria provide a better model?
Constitutionalism theories ought to suggest that the answer to these ques-
tions is no.287 Such a constitutional stance, like that of the antebellum United
States, presents a state in a dynamic stage of its development. Even in a state
grounded in rule of law process and values constitutionalism, a constitutional
structure grounded in two or more inconsistent foundational values systems pres-
ents a contradiction that eventually requires resolution. In the United States a
choice was made and equilibrium was reached through war.2"' It is not clear how
the dynamic state of constitutionalism-poised between the transnational and
the theocratic-will resolve itself in these states.
1. Pakistan
of individual regimes for ratifying their hold on power").
287. But others suggest that the answer might be maybe. For a perceptive analysis in that direction,
see Lama Abu-Odeh, The Politics of (Mis)recognition: Islamic Law Pedagogy in American Academia,
52 AM. J. CoMP. L. 789 (2004). The argument is that the "combination of presence (of Islamic law)
and absence (of legal transplant) in the course materials assigned to by Islamic law instructors, the
scholarship of law in the Islamic world by Islamic law scholars as well as by Comparativists, betrays
an ideological project." Id. at 792. Instead, "[g]iving Islamic law an overarching status analytically in
our approach to law in the Islamic world, distorts our understanding of legal phenomena in these
countries. Islamic law should be approached as one, but only one, of the constitutive elements of law
that has not only been de-centered by the transplant but also transformed." Id. at 823.
288. The American context was the contradiction of slavery in a federation grounded on values
of freedom and human dignity as those ideas were understood at the time. Quoting scripture,
Abraham Lincoln understood this even as he prepared for a martial resolution of the contradic-
tions of American constitutional values. "'A house divided against itself cannot stand.' I believe
this government cannot endure, permanently, half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to
be dissolved - I do not expect the house to fall - but I do expect it will cease to be divided."
Abraham Lincoln, A House Divided (June 16, 1858) (quoting Matthew 12:25), available at http://
en.wikisource.org/wiki/A-housedivided.
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Pakistan is a state that has yet to find itself-at least from a constitutionalist per-
spective. As recent scholarship has suggested, reflecting a common understanding,
Pakistan stands between constitutionalist rule structures, each of which has been
naturalized within powerful national elites, which use and discard them to suit their
objects of political supremacy.5 9 Its constitution has increasingly moved from a secu-
larist internationalist orientation to one grounded in religion, a move that has pitted
the executive against the judiciary.9  Others see the move toward institutionalized
Islam as a means of staving off something worse.291 But is it a theocratic constitution-
alist project? This question requires a look at the document itself.
Pakistan is currently constituted as an Islamic Republic, in which Islam is the
289. See, e.g., Robert A. Scalapino, Introduction, in ASIAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION 1, 15
(Robert A. Scalapino et al. eds., 1986) (noting that by the 1980s it had become clear that "in the judi-
ciary system, three traditions compete: the British legal tradition, the autocratic military tradition, and
the Islamic legal tradition. And the government, as in Bangladesh, betrays its concern over legitimacy
by promising constitutionalism and the restoration of some form ofparliamentarism."; also stating that
"[i]n recent times, the Pakistan military led by Zia ul-Haq have sought legitimacy through a measure
of Islamization, but this goal too is challenged, principally by the Westernized middle class").
290. This understanding was well put recently:
What used to be the preamble to previous constitutions is now an operative part
of the current Constitution as Article 2-A, and very much defines its ethos as a
non-secular one. Yet, recent Pakistani judgments have put a halt to the discussion
regarding whether Article 2-A can trump other constitutional provisions-thus
acting as a sort of grundnorm-and have declared instead that it stands on an
equal footing with other provisions of the Constitution, no more and no less.
Indeed, these judgments have firmly precluded and strongly warned against an
interpretation of Article 2-A which would raise it to the point of being a litmus
test for gauging, evaluating, and potentially justifying the judiciary to strike
down any other constitutional provisions.
Osama Siddique & Zahra Hayat, Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan-
Controversial Origins, Design Defects, and Free Speech Implications, 17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 303, 368
(2008) ("While acknowledging that various such provisions may be inconsistent with Article 2-A,
the courts clearly warned that such an interpretive approach would undermine the entire Consti-
tution"). Id.; see also Kamal Azfar, Constitutional Dilemmas in Pakistan, in PAKISTAN UNDER THE
MILITARY: ELEVEN YEARS OF ZIA UL-HAQ 49-86 (Shahid Javed Burki et al. eds., 1991). For infor-
mation on Islamification, see id. at 78-79.
291. See, e.g., Azfar, supra note 290, at 78 ("By imposing Islamic laws from above, Zia may have
saved Pakistan from a fundamentalist revolution from below like the one that took place early in
his tenure in neighboring Iran .... Internally Zia's most lasting contribution could be resolving the
issue of the role of Islam in the state. Nonetheless, the question is not dead; several of the parties
supporting Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif wish to enact legislation incorporating the key elements
of Zia's Shariat Ordinance.").
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state religion. 92 Within that context, the former preamble to the Constitution,2 93
modified in one critical respect,294 and inserted in an appendix, is made a part of the
Constitution.' Among the provisions of this former preamble are a number that
touch on the religious constitution of the state, as well as its adherence to fundamen-
tal rights obligations not necessarily tied to religion. 6 The Constitution also lists a
number of policy principles made applicable to all state organs. 9 While most guar-
antee fundamental process and substance rights, they do so without reference to reli-
gion.2 98 Islam, to the extent it is incorporated, is limited in its application to Muslims.2 99
The state, thus, appears empowered to legislate specifically for Muslims, but in a way
292. Constitution of Pakistan art. 2, available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/
partl.html [hereafter Pakistan Constitution]. The term "Muslim" is also defined for purposes of
the constitution. See id. art. 260(3) (a) ("Muslim" means a person who believes in the unity and
oneness of Almighty Allah, in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Mu-
hammad (peace be upon him), the last of the prophets, and does not believe in, or recognize as a
prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet, in any sense of
the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (peace be upon him)."). Ironically,
the definition of non-Muslim is notable for its selective omission of Jews. See id. art. 260(3) (b).
Lastly, though there is no explicit prohibition of non-Muslims attaining high office, the constitu-
tionally prescribed oaths of office do not contemplate non-Muslim office holders. See id. arts. 42,
91(4), 92(2), 53(2), 61, 65, 102,131(4), 132(2), 127, 168(2), 178, 194, 2 03(c) (7), 214, 244.
293. Id. pmbl.
294. See id. art. 2(A), app. (stating the obligation to make "adequate provision ... for the minori-
ties to profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures," was modified to eliminate
the word "freely" from before the word "profess" so that the obligation is no longer to ensure that
minorities can freely profess; that obligation is now reduced to mere profession).
295. Id.
296. See id. (including the following: the full observation of "the principles of democracy, free-
dom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam;" the obligation to enable Mus-
lims "to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings
and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah;" the protection of "fun-
damental rights including equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social, economic and
political justice, and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject
to law and public morality;" safeguarding the "legitimate interests of minorities and backward
and depressed classes;" and securing the independence of the judiciary).
297. Id. arts. 29-40.
298. See, e.g., id. art. 33 (elimination of prejudice); art. 34 (empowerment of women); art. 35 (pro-
tection of family); art. 36 (protection of "legitimate rights" of minorities); art. 37 (promotion of
social justice); art. 38 (promotion of social and economic well being).
299. Id. art. 31 ("(1) Steps shall be taken to enable the Muslims of Pakistan, individually and col-
lectively, to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of
Islam and to provide facilities whereby they may be enabled to understand the meaning of life ac-
cording to the Holy Quran and Sunnah. (2) The state shall endeavor, as respects the Muslims of
Pakistan: (a) to make the teaching of the Holy Quran and Islamiat compulsory, to encourage and
facilitate the learning of arabic language and to secure correct and exact printing and publishing
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that cannot infringe on the rights of minorities. °0 It appears susceptible to other con-
straints as well, including Article 2(A) and the Principles. In addition, the solidarity
clause supports both secular and political aims."' But this balance appears to be upset
by the Islamicizing provisions of Part IX, the Islamic Provisions.0 2 The relationship
of minority faith communities to Islam is thus based on a toleration of practice within
an overall pattern of subordination and conformity to the religio-political normative
system of Islam-an assimilation of other faiths into the weltanschauung of Islam
and their reconstruction of "soft Christianity" and others." 3
In other respects, though, the government, as constituted, presents the usual
picture of conventional separation of powers, with a president,0 4 a legislature,3 5
and a judiciary.30 6 The superior courts have jurisdiction to hear claims of viola-
tions of the rights of individuals.0 7 But, again, the vectors of constitutionalism
turn in on themselves. In addition to the secular courts, the Constitution directs
of the Holy Quran; (b) to promote unity and the observance of the Islamic moral standards; and
(c) to secure the proper organisation of Zakat, (usher) auqaf and mosques.").
300. See id. art. 203C(2) (illustrating this point within the black letter of the Constitution itself
through, for example, the creation of a Federal Shariat Court, whose membership is limited to
Muslims).
301. Id. art. 40 ("The State shall endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among
Muslim countries based on Islamic unity, support the common interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa
and Latin America, promote international peace and security, foster goodwill and friendly relations
among all nations and encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.").
302. Id. arts. 227-31. The basic provision is set forth at id. art. 227(1) ("All existing laws shall be
brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, in
this Part referred to as the Injunctions of Islam, and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such
Injunctions."). An Islamic Council is established to implement the provisions of Article 227 of the
Pakistan Constitution, as well as to advise Parliament with respect to Islamization. See id. arts. 228-30;
see also id. art. 231 (noting this is to be done in accordance with rules to be established by the Council
and approved by the President); id. art. 227(3) (providing an exemption for non-Muslims citizens).
303. Compare to the treatment of minority faiths in Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq, and contrast to
the treatment of the same in Saudi theocracy. In a sense, these systems formalize the project of
cooptation of a threatening system being attempted in an informal way by conventional constitu-
tionalism. See, e.g., CatA Backer, Of Political States, supra note 166.
304. Pakistan Constitution arts. 41-49.
305. Id. arts. 50-89; see also id. arts. 62(d)-(e) (stating membership in Parliament is limited to
Muslims in good standing, though this provision is suspended for non-Muslims, who need only
demonstrate a "good moral reputation").
306. Id. pt. VII, chs. 1-4.
307. See id. arts. 184(3) ("ITihe Supreme Court shall, if it considers that a question of public impor-
tance with reference to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter I of
Part II is involved have the power to make an order of the nature mentioned in the said Article.");see
also id. art. 199(c) ("Subject to the Constitution, the right to move a High Court for the enforcement
of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter I of Part II shall not be abridged.").
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the creation of a Federal Shariat Court.0 8 The jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat
Court appears to upend the secular focus of the judicial structure of the state.3 9
Where the Shariat Court determines that a law or provision is repugnant to Islam,
"such law or provision shall, to the extent to which it is held to be so repugnant,
cease to have effect on the day on which the decision of the Court takes effect."3 '
Decisions of the Federal Shariat Court are binding on all courts save the Federal
Supreme Court.3 ' With respect to such cases, the appellate jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court is limited, and its constitution is reordered-stripping all non-Mus-
lims from any participation rights in those decisions."2 Literally construed, these
provisions could effectively strip the Federal Supreme Court of its jurisdiction and
create a hierarchy of constitutional values in which Islam trumps all, in a way
preserved by a guardianship of Muslim members of the polity. But there is suffi-
cient ambiguity to make this issue subject to interpretation." 3
Taken together, the provisions of the Pakistan Constitution suggest an inte-
grated, legitimate theocratic constitutionalist system. The Constitution limits the
power of the state. Arbitrary actions by individuals holding state power govern-
mental are avoided. Rule of law provisions apply both to the protection of the
rights of individuals and the exercise of power by the state. There is a scrupulous
attention to separation of powers and the suggestion of popular participation
(though the deficiencies of Pakistani democracy are well known). But the protec-
tion of substantive rights-the normative limits on constitutional power appear
founded on Islam. Both the courts and the legislature are made subject to the
structures of Islam and the institutions of the state are bent to be those of an Isla-
mist state. Of course, the consequences, in terms of human rights and the rights of
308. Id. pt. VII, ch. 3A.
309. See id. art. 203(D) (1) (noting the Constitution vests the Shariat Court with a broad jurisdic-
tion). "The Court may, (either of its own motion or) on the petition of a citizen of Pakistan or the
Federal Government or a Provincial Government, examine and decide the question whether or
not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, as laid down in the Holy
Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet, hereinafter referred to as the Injunctions of Islam." Id.
310. Id. art. 203D(3) (b). In addition, "(a) the President in the case of a law with respect to a matter
in the Federal Legislative List or the Concurrent Legislative List, or the Governor in the case of a law
with respect to a matter not enumerated in either of those Lists, shall take steps to amend the law so
as to bring such law or provision into conformity with the Injunctions of Islam." Id. art. 203D(3) (a).
311. Id. art. 2030G.
312. Id. art. 203F.
313. Recall that Articles 184(3) and 199(c) of the Pakistan Constitution confer broad jurisdiction
on the secular courts to hear complaints of violation of fundamental rights. How one reads the
hierarchy of rights (Part I versus Part IX) and hierarchy of jurisdiction (Shariat system versus
secular system) is not clear. See id. pts. I, IX.
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non-Muslim citizens of Pakistan will be different under this regime than under
one grounded in the conventional normative structure of secular transnational
constitutionalism. But even so, for the full members of the polity (Pakistani Mus-
lims), a deep rule of law regime has been established.
But in the case of Pakistan, one may well have a case of sham or partial theo-
cratic constitutionalism. Fully evolved on paper, its reality is clouded by the great
struggles among those who have not acceded to the power or principle of the con-
striction of the state on these theocratic grounds. As applied, Pakistan suggests a
polity at war with itself over the meaning and application of its constitutional
settlement. Just as the foundation of the federal republic became a critical source
of contention among the elites of the antebellum United States, Pakistani elites
are currently struggling for control of the character of Pakistani constitutionalism
as grounded in secular or religious principles. The institutional center of that
struggle is the judiciary.314 For the moment, the Pakistani secular courts have in-
terpreted narrowly the jurisdiction of the Shariat courts, asserted their power as
final arbiter of constitutional interpretation, and narrowed the meaning of un-
Islamic.3 5
2. Egypt
Egypt presents a variation on the Pakistani situation. Contemporary Western
scholars have noted the difficulties of Egyptian governance.
The Egyptian experience has witnessed radical, violent revolutionary
Islamic activism and the institutionalization of Islam socially and po-
litically; diverse state policies toward Islam in the struggle of gover-
314. See Jeffrey A. Redding, Constitutionalizing Islam: Theory and Pakistan, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 759,
764-65 (2004); see also Tina R. Karkera, Current Event: The Gang-Rape of Mukhtar Mai and Paki-
stan's Opportunity to Regain Its Lost Honor, 14 AM. U.J. GENDER Soc. PoA' & L. 163, 169 (2006)
(referencing a notorious case involving the rape of a woman: "Fearing a continued struggle be-
tween the competing jurisdictions of the High Court and the Shariat Court, the Supreme Court
of Pakistan took over the case, ordering all files in the case to be sent to the Supreme Court."
315. Redding, supra note 314, at 7 7 3 - 8 07 ;see also Ali Adnan Ibrahim, The Rise of Customary Busi-
nesses in International Financial Markets: An Introduction to Islamic Finance and the Challenges of Inter-
national Integration, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 661, 695 (2008) (quoting United Bank Ltd. v. M/S
Farooq Bros., P.L.D. 2002 S.C. 800 (Pak.), P 18, June 24,2002,available at http://www.supremecourt.
gov.pk//sublHinks/judgements/JUDGMENT%20N%20RIBA%20CASE.zip) (noting the Paki-
stani Supreme Court remanded a decision of the Shariat Court outlawing interest (riba) in all forms
on the grounds that "in order for the Federal Shariat Court to conduct 'thorough and elaborate re-
search.. of financial systems.., prevalent in the contemporary Muslim countries."').
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ment and ruling elites to maintain their legitimacy and their world,
with its lifestyle, power, and privileges; the growing polarization (as
in many Muslim societies) between Islamists and secularists and gov-
ernment officials; advocacy of, and then reneging on, the govern-
ment's official commitment to democratization, justified by the charge
that "fundamentalists" are out to "hijack" democracy; and, finally, the
widening of a confrontation between state security forces and Muslim
extremists to include moderate as well as violent revolutionaries." 6
The Constitution identifies the State as being an Arab Republic with Islam as
its official religion."' Egypt is a rule of law state in which the "[s]overeignty of the
law shall be the basis of rule in the State." '318 To the end of constructing a rule of law
state, process constitutionalism is established. The Constitution institutes a govern-
ment marked by a separation of powers," 9 though one tilted in favor of executive
authority,32 ° and a limitation of government action except in accordance with legally
legitimate procedure. Moreover, constitutional amendment, though a power ulti-
mately vested in the people,32' is to some extent also controlled by a distinct body, the
Shura Council.322 That institutionalization of formal procedural protections extends
316. EsPosITo & VOLL, supra note 196, at 173.
317. Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt pt. 1, arts. 1, 2, available at http://constitution
.sis.gov.eg/en/2.htm [hereinafter Egyptian Constitution].
318. Id. art. 64. That sovereignty has two aspects-the "state is subject to law" and the "indepen-
dence and immunity of the judiciary are two basic guarantees to safeguard rights and freedoms."
Id. art. 65. For that purpose, the "State shall guarantee accessibility of judicature for litigants, and
rapid decision on cases. Any provision in the law stipulating immunity of any act or administrative
decision from the control of the judicature is prohibited." Id. at art. 68;see also id. art. 166 ("Judges
shall be independent, subject to no other authority but the law.").
319. The constitution recognizes a traditional separation of powers of a parliamentary republic
among an executive consisting of the President of the Republic (id. arts. 73-85, 137-52) and the
"government" (id. arts. 153-63); the legislature (id. arts. 86-136), a judiciary (id. arts. 164-73) and
a constitutional court (id. arts. 174-78).
320. See, e.g., id. art. 144 (power to issue regulations), art. 147 (power to issue decrees with force of
law), art. 152 (power to call for popular referenda). As one analyst concluded, "the Egyptian legislature
has little power relative to the executive. Egyptian law gives the executive power over the legislature in
many areas." DAVID S. SORENSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 242 (2008).
32 1. See Egyptian Constitution art. 189 (amendment proposed by Presdent or National Assembly
and then subject to approval by popular vote).
322. See id. arts. 194-205. The Shura Council has similar powers with respect to treaties (id., art.
194(3)), and must be consulted with respect to a number of legislative matters. Id. art. 195. The
Shura Council is to some extent a direct proxy for the people, including its lowest socio-economic
classes, and to some extent a reflection of the privileged power position of the President. "Two
thirds of the members shall be elected by direct secret public balloting, half of whom at least must
be workers and farmers. The President of the Republic shall appoint the other third." Id. art. 196.
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to both actions of the state and its institutions, and actions against individuals.323 For
all that, there are some problematic provisions under principles of transnational
constitutionalism-among them the so-called anti-terrorism provisions of the Con-
stitution324 and the authority of the President over the police.325
Substantive constitutionalism is also privileged within the formal structure of
the Egyptian Constitution. The language is that of modern transnational constitu-
tionalism. The family is protected. 26 It is true that religion is privileged as a general
matter within the constitutional framework. For example, religious instruction is
imposed as a state and family obligation.3 27 However, the constitution itself does not
privilege a single religion in that context. This contrasts with the Iranian and Saudi
Constitutions, both of which privilege Islam in the black letter of the constitution
itself. And, indeed, according to one Western analyst, the purpose seems to be to
323. Thus, for example, with respect to criminal actions against individuals, there "shall be no
crime or penalty except by virtue of the law" and penalties "shall be inflicted only for acts commit-
ted subsequent to the promulgation of the law prescribing it" (id. art. 66), "right to litigation is
inalienable and guaranteed for all, and every citizen has the right to have access to his natural
judge" (id. art. 68), criminal actions shall not "be made except under an order from a judiciary
body, save for cases defined by the law" (id. art. 70), and "should be informed forthwith of the
reasons for his arrest or detention .... have the right to communicate, with whoever he deems fit
to inform, and ask for his help in the manner regulated by the law.... [and] shall be promptly
faced with the charges levelled against him. Any person may lodge an appeal to the courts against
any measure taken to restrict his individual freedom." Id. art. 71.
324. See id. art. 174 ("The State shall seek to safeguard public security to counter dangers of terror.
The law shall, under the supervision of the judiciary, regulate special provisions related to evidence
and investigation procedures required to counter those dangers. The procedure stipulated in para-
graph 1 of Articles 41 and 44 and paragraph 2 of Article 45 of the Constitution shall in no way preclude
such counter-terror action."). These provisions constitutionalize emergency legislation in place for
some time. They remain controversial. See, e.g., Divisive Egypt Reforms Approved, BBC NEWS ONLINE,
Mar. 27, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/6498573.stm. ("The President may
refer any terror crime to any judiciary body stipulated in the Constitution or the law.").
325. See id. art. 184 ("Police Authority shall be a statutory civil body. Its Supreme Chief shall be
the President of the Republic. The Police Authority shall perform its duty in service of the people,
maintain peace and security for citizens, maintain order, public security and morality, and under-
take the implementation of the duties imposed upon it by laws and regulations, in the manner
prescribed by the law."). It might be possible to see in these provisions a privileging of process over
substantive protections by vesting the President with large police powers that might be exercised
as long as all legal formalities are observed, especially when the police powers are read together
with the anti terror provisions of the constitutions. See id. art. 174.
326. Id. art. 9 ("The family is the basis of the society and is founded on religion, morality and
patriotism. The State is keen to preserve the genuine character of the Egyptian family-together
with the values and traditions it embodies-while affirming and developing this character in the
relations within the Egyptian society.").
327. See id. art. 9. In addition, article 19 provides that "Religious education shall be a principal
topic of general education curricula." Id. art. 19.
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privilege nationalism over religion in the hierarchy of values that are captured and
directed by the state. 28 The Constitution recognizes the equality of all citizens
under the law.329 The economic structure of the state is organized as a socialist de-
mocracy whose means of production are owned by the people.3 ' The constitution
also recognizes a values-based limitation on the power of the state with respect to
the individual. For example, the constitution covers rights and protections from il-
legal searches and seizures,33" ' freedom of religious belief,32 freedom of the press,3 3
and freedom of assembly. 34 Last, the constitution forbids political parties formed on
the basis of religion.3
But though the language of the constitution appears to embrace the core of
the substantive values framework transnational constitutionalism, there are a
number of provisions that suggest an alternative framework of substantive consti-
tutionalism. First, the constitution points to a nationalist values basis for law: "So-
ciety shall be committed to safeguarding and protecting morals, promoting
genuine Egyptian traditions. It shall give due consideration, within the limits of
law, to high standards of religious education, moral and national values, historical
heritage of the people, scientific facts and public morality." '336 And the constitution
imposes a positive obligation on the state to abide by and promote these princi-
ples."3 Second, one religion is privileged among others: "Islam is the religion of
328. See Johanna Pink, Religion and Democracy: An Exchange of Experiences Between East and
West (Center for Religious Studies and Research Conference, 2003), available at http://www.cesnur
.org/2003/vil2003_pink.htm.
329. Id. art. 40.
330. Id. arts. 4, 24.
331. Id. art. 44.
332. Id. art. 40 ("They have equal public rights and duties without discrimination on grounds of
race, ethnic origin, language, religion or creed."); art. 46 ("The State shall guarantee the freedom
of belief and the freedom of practice of religious rites.").
333. Id. art. 48. The Constitution describers the press as "a popular, independent authority exercis-
ing its mission in accordance with the stipulations of the Constitution and the law." Id. art. 206. But
the press is also limited in the manner of its expression and the scope of its actions. It is required to
behave in accordance with a constitutionally mandated mission: "It shall thus express trends of public
opinion, while contributing to its formation and orientation within the framework of the basic com-
ponents of society, the safeguard of the liberties, rights and public duties and respect of the sanctity
of the private lives of citizens, as stipulated in the Constitution and defined by law." Id. art. 207.
334. Id. art. 54.
335. See id. art. 5 ("Citizens have the right to establish political parties according to the law and
no political activity shall be exercised nor political parties established on a religious referential
authority, on a religious basis or on discrimination on grounds of gender or origin.").
336. Id. art. 12.
337. Id.
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the state and Arabic its official language. Principles of Islamic law (Shari'a) are
the principal source of legislation."3 8 That constitutional privileging appears to
incorporate the legal structures of Islam into the substantive and procedural
framework of Egyptian constitutionalism. But the language is ambiguous. It is
not clear, for example, what "principal source" means. The ambiguity extends to
the judicial role in the incorporation of Islamist values. On the one hand, the sec-
ularization of the judicial function suggests a move away from theocratic values.3 39
On the other hand, that secularization placed control of religious matters of the
minority community in the hands of a secular court system subject to the over-
arching obligation to adopt a greater sensitivity to Sharia in its decisions. 34 ° Yet,
there is a sense of the centrality of Islam in at least area of constitutional limitation
on state legislative power-the rights of women.34 ' And there is an indication of a
hierarchy of religious tolerance, whose limits have recently been tested.342
Egypt represents that peculiar case of the state that occupies a space between
the secular and the religious forms of transnational constitutionalism. It is a com-
promise state, a state that seeks a reconciliation of the irreconcilable. That makes for
a certain level of volatility. It is a state at war with itself over its understanding of its
fundamental character. What some see as the ability of one segment of the state ap-
338. Id. art. 2.
339. Egypt was among a group of Muslim majority states that abolished its religious courts-Is-
lamic, Christian and Jewish-and folded their jurisdiction into the secular court system. SOREN-
SON, supra note 320, at 242.
340. Egyptian Constitution art. 2. "There is also evidence that judges are increasingly relying on
Sharia as a legal basis for their decisions." SORENSON, supra note 320, at 242. Thus, in effect, the
judiciary has been secularized as a formal matter, but to assert control the judiciary then deploys
the religious laws over which it has sought a measure of control. The state apparatus becomes
theocratic, but rather than under the guidance of imams, it internalizes the power of religious in-
terpretation ads a matter of public and constitutional law.
341. See Egyptian Constitution art. 11 ("The State shall guarantee harmonization between the
duties of woman towards the family and her work in the society, ensuring her equality status with
man in fields of political, social, cultural and economic life without violation of the rules of Islamic
jurisprudence.").
342. Thus, for example, the Egyptian government had traditionally limited recognition to three
religions-Islam, Christianity and Judaism-forcing adherents of other religions to greater diffi-
culties in vindicating even the right to obtain identity papers. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch,
Egypt: Court Prohibits Withholding Documents from Baha'is, Jan. 29, 2008, available at http://www.
hrw.org/en/news/2008/01/29/egypt-court-prohibits-withholding-documents-baha ("The Cairo Court
of Administrative Justice granted the request of Baha'i Egyptians to obtain birth certificates and
identity cards without indicating any religious affiliation. The decision overturned the govern-
ment's policy of forcing Baha'i Egyptians to choose one of the three state-recognized religions of
Islam, Christianity and Judaism as a prerequisite for obtaining identification documents.").
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paratus (the courts) to slow the move toward a particular view of the black letter of
its constitution,3 43 others might see as evidence of future civil strife-much like that
which boiled over in the United States in 1861.114 Egyptian constitutionalism repre-
sents an attempt to secularize Islam or to engineer an Islamist values constitutional-
ism in which the state is both bound by, but directs, the religious establishment to
which it is subject. In that sense, Egyptian constitutionalism offers an inversion of
the Iranian model and a variation from the Afghani model.34 The Egyptian Su-
preme Court's assertion of authority to declare the meaning of Shari'a and its will-
ingness to mold that interpretive authority flexibly appears to permit a blending of
secularist and religious universalism by providing a point from which convergence
of substantive results is possible, even if the process to get to this result is different. 46
"In fact, the Court established its own interpretation of ijtihad irrespective of the
343. See, e.g., Hirschl, supra note 165, at 1822 (on the efforts of the Egyptian Supreme Court to
recast Egyptian constitutionalism through the construction of a constitutionalist jurisprudence).
344. One can argue that, like the Egyptian Supreme Court today, the U.S. Supreme Court in the
early Republic also took a principled, interpretive stance, but one that was hardly reflective of a
political consensus on the nature of the federation and the power of the general government of the
union. It took a civil war and substantial constitutional revision for such a position to ultimately be
vindicated. See Larry Catd Backer, The Extra-National State: American Confederate Federalism and
the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 173, 179-93 (2001).
345. As one commentator noted: "In Saudi Arabia and Iran, supreme religious councils dictate how
Islamic law is applied and, to a large extent, have veto power over legislation. In mixed religious-
secular systems, such as in Egypt, sharia personal law courts are integrated into a Western-based legal
system, and a secular supreme court has the final say," Sharon Otterman, Islam: Governing Under
Sharia, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., Mar. 14, 2005, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/8034/
(referencing statements of Nathan Brown of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
346. Thus, for example, Ran Hirschl noted that in its role as arbiter of Shari'a compliance, the
Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, like its Pakistani counterpart,
has departed from the ancient traditions of the fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence or the
cumulative knowledge and science of studying the Shari'a) schools and has de-
veloped a new framework for interpreting the Shari'a. Specifically, the Court has
developed a flexible, modernist approach to interpreting the Shari'a that distin-
guishes between "unalterable and universally binding principles, and malleable
application of those principles."
Hirschl, supra note 165, at 1824; see also Clark B. Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions Re-
quiring Adherence to Sharia Threaten Human Rights?, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 379 (2006) (using the
example of Egypt's judicial engagement with Sharia to suggest the possibility of an Islamist jurispru-
dence that can produce results similar to those expected under a secular transnational constitutionalist
legal regime). Yet that balancing appears to favor Islam over other minority positions. See, e.g., Islamic
Judges Strip Christian Mothers of Children Muslim Fathers, Courts Fear Youth May Switch Religions, Eat
Banned Foods, 'Go to Church' , WORLDNET DAILY, Nov. 21, 2008, available at http://www.worldn
etdaily.com/index.php?fa= PAGE.view&pageld= 81963 ("Egyptian human rights workers are seeking
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contradictory opinions in Islamic jurisprudence, the fiqh, and its traditional meth-
ods. The SCC [Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court] thereby positioned itself as
a de facto interpreter of religious norms." '347 But it may not make for a model of ei-
ther theocratic constitutionalism or its secular nationalist or transnationalist coun-
terparts. This is a state that fails in both respects.
Yet this failure may be necessary for the survival of the Egyptian state appara-
tus as currently constituted. As a transnational constitutionalist state, the construc-
tion of the state apparatus suffers some potentially severe de-legitimating features-
including the weakness of separation of powers, the anti-terrorism powers of the
police and courts, the internal authority of the military, and restrictions on the pow-
ers of the press. Moreover, its privileging of Islam is also problematic. On the other
hand, as a theocratic constitutionalist state it also fails because it has not ceded au-
thority to the religious establishment in matters of Sharia interpretation. That func-
tion remains with the state courts, most of whose judges are unlikely to be recognized
as legitimated invested Islamic scholars or jurists. Nor is there a requirement for
such qualification in the Constitution. It might well be that the dynamism of strad-
dling transnational and theocratic constitutionalism serves the state well for the
moment-allowing it to retain for itself substantial power while taking advantage
of the popular notions of incorporating religious law principles in secular law. It
thus asserts theocratic constitutionalism as a defense against its transnationalist con-
stitutionalist critics and asserts transnational constitutionalist principles against
theocratic and theocratic constitutionalist critics; a delicate balancing act indeed !348
D. Constitutions With Theocratic Elements: Malaysia and Sri Lanka
Is it possible to enshrine religion within a constitutional framework and not
further theocratic constitutionalist aims? The project of categorizing constitu-
support from the international community to stop Muslim judges from using Shariah law to under-
mine custody rights of Christian mothers.").
347. Hirschl,supra note 165, at 1827.
348. As one commentator noted in assessing the failure of American style civil society-based liti-
gation related challenges to the Egyptian regime. "The ultimate collapse of the human rights
movement, the continued weakness of opposition parties ... demonstrate how litigation alone,
without support from broad sectors of society, was insufficient to protect the SCC [Supreme Con-
stitutional Court]-civil society coalition from collapse." Tamir Mustafa, Got Rights? Public Interest
Litigation and the Egyptian Human Rights Movement, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ARAB WORLD 152,
173 (Anthony Chase & Amr Hamzawy eds., 2006). For another perspective of this balancing be-
tween two values systems, see Neil Hicks, Transnational Human Rights Networks and Human
Rights in Egypt, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ARAB WORLD, supra, 64-88.
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tions is harder than it might appear at first blush. This project poses difficult
questions of interpretation, especially with respect to constitutions that seem
poised between the two systems. For purposes of this article, I look to two exam-
ples, the first Islamic and the second Buddhist.
1. Malaysia
Malaysia provides an example of a conflation of religion and ethnicity similar
to that of Saudi Arabia, but implemented within a vastly different context for a
different purpose. Where the Saudis meant to constitutionalize the Muslim and
Arab character of the state, the Malays sought to construct that singular character
in a context in which native Malays feared being reduced to minority status in the
lands that would become Malaysia.349 The ascendancy of the Malays was ex-
pressed in the construction of the state: "Malay replaced English as the language
of administration and education (except at the primary level where Chinese and
Tamil continued to be used). Malay culture was given increased prominence in
official ceremonies and television programs, and Islam became more fully identi-
fied with the state."35 Malaysia represents a community that has conflated reli-
gion with ethnicity in the construction of what its proponents suggest is a
legitimate basis of ethno-religious chauvinism."'i In an interesting twist, at least
one of its defenders suggests that ethno-religious chauvinism can be supported as
a principled rejection of conventional constitutionalist notions of equal treatment
because, in plural societies, even conventional constitutionalists differ on the ef-
fectiveness of a color-blind approach to constitutionalism.352 The effect is that rec-
349. H.P. Lee, Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law in Malaysia, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE
OF LAW: THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE
AND THE U.S. 225, 233 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004) ("The state of constitutionalism in Malay-
sia is influenced by a number of factors. The rejection by the largest racial group, the Malays, of the
Malayan Union was the result of a feeling of insecurity arising from the proposed creation of a
common citizenship .... The fear was that Malay power would be diluted by a swelling in the
number of citizens of other races, particularly the Chinese and Indians.").
350. HAROLD CROUCH, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY IN MALAYSIA 239 (1996).
351. See C.L. Lim, Race, Multi-Cultural Accommodation and the Constitutions of Singapore and
Malaysia, 2004 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 117, 117 (suggesting "a difference between constitutional and
unconstitutional forms ofethno-racial essentialism"). Lim writes, "It is not difficult to understand,
after all, where the Framers of the Malaysian Constitution were coming from. There is an abun-
dance of empirical and historical evidence of the importance of just such group-membership crite-
ria, or 'gateway principles' in respect of membership of the Malay race." Id. at 123. For a strong
criticism of this argument, see Chandra Muzaffar, Universalism in Islam, in LIBERAL ISLAM 155
(Charles Kurzman ed., 1998).
352. Lim,supra note 351, at 126-33.
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ognized difference can be legitimately hard wired and ethno-religious federation
serve as a legitimate basis for a constitutionalist settlement.353
As constituted, Malaysia incorporates Islamic elements within a structure
that is also constitutionalist, in the sense of limiting and organizing power along
principled grounds and subject to an ideology that protects against arbitrary or
despotic assertions of power.354 But does it constitute theocratic constitutionalism
in practice? Article 3 of the Malaysian Constitution declares Islam the official re-
ligion of the Federation. 355 Islam has a privileged position within the polity.356 The
state is required under Article 11(4) to protect Islam from competition from other
faiths.357 That positive obligation is not solely based on the protection of religion
per se, but in the case of Malaysia serves to protect what is viewed as an essential
characteristic of Malay ethnicity-its religion.358 Still, the religious practices of
other faith communities are protected, at least to the extent they are practiced in
353. See, e.g., Constitution of Malaysia (1957) art. 8 ("Except as expressly authorized by this Con-
stitution, there shall be no discrimination against citizens on the ground only of religion, race,
descent or place of birth in any law relating to the acquisition, holding or disposition of property
or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, vocation or employment.")
[hereinafter Malaysia Constitution]. Commentators have noted that "[t]oday, the suggestion that
the Constitution should be colour-blind would also (unfortunately) amount to sedition under Ma-
laysian law insofar as that should question the Malay language provision in Article 152 .... or the
special position of the Malays under Article 153, or the position of the Rulers under Article 181."
Lim,supra note 351, at 128. But see Andrew Harding, The Keris, the Crescent and the Blind Goddess:
The State, Islam and the Constitution in Malaysia, 6 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 154, 164 (2002) ("Thus
the most important function of constitutional law, apart from the function of making general
provision for governance, is to ensure that the potentially fragile social fabric is kept intact. There
is therefore already a tension between the principle of constitutionalism as such and a perceived
need to maintain a religiously tolerant but politically authoritarian executive and a strong state.").
354. The federation is organized along parliamentary democratic lines, with separation of powers,
strict procedures for lawful enactment of legislation, separation of powers, and the social rights prin-
ciples of conventional constitutionalism. Also in line with conventional constitutionalist principles,
the constitution serves as the supreme law of the land. See Malaysian Constitution art. 4; see also
MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, ISLAMIc LAW IN MALAYSIA: ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS 28-58 (2000).
355. Malaysian Constitution art. 3(1) ("Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions
may be practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation.").
356. See, e.g., Ahmad Ibrahim, The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia, in THE CONSTi-
TUTION OF MALAYSIA: ITS DEVELOPMENT: 1957-I977, at 41 (Tun Mohamed Suffian et al. eds., 1978).
357. Malaysian Constitution art. 11(4) ("State law and in respect of the Federal Territories of
Kuala Lumpur and Labuan, federal law may control or restrict the propagation of any religious
doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam.").
358. Article 160(2) creates a legal definition of Malay ethnicity as grounded in language, religion,
culture and place of birth. See id. art. 160(2) ("Malay means a person who professes the religion of
Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom.").
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peace and harmony.359 Thus an element of toleration within a system of privilege
(of Islam) and subordination (of all others) is made necessary by the construction
of state organization on the basis of a dominant race religious construct-the Ma-
lay.361 Yet, Islam's privilege is constrained by the Constitution itself.3 6' And a sys-
tem of conventionally described fundamental rights is specified.3 62 Moreover, the
courts have resisted a constitutional interpretation that would use Article 3 as the
engine through which Islamist constitutionalism could be imported. 363 "Thus pri-
macy is given by the Constitution to religious rights even where the security of the
state itself is at risk."'364 Moreover, critical actors within Malay political culture
have stressed the ambiguities of the Malay religious constitutional settlement.365
That ambiguity is emphasized by the nature of federalist devolution within
Malaysia.366 The judicial power reflects this bifurcation. The Constitution creates
a federal court system367 consisting of a set of High Courts368 with a Supreme
359. Id. art. 3 (declaring that, although Islam is the official religion of the Federation, "other reli-
gions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation"); id. art. 11 (asserting
that "[e]very person has the right to profess and practise his religion"); id. art. 153(1) (obligating gov-
ernment to preserve "the legitimate interests of other communities in accordance with the provisions
of this Article."). In addition, Article 12 prohibits discrimination on religious grounds in the admin-
istration of public education and scholarships. Id. art. 12 (1). This Article also permits religious instruc-
tion and the maintenance of an autonomous institutional life in any protected faith. Id. art. 12(2).
360. Interestingly, at least one commentator has noted that even this expression of toleration
might be un-Islamic. See Harding, supra note 353, at 158 n.9 ("A leading Muslim lawyer told the
author that the word 'but' in Article 3 is insulting to Islam and should read 'and therefore."').
361. See Malaysian Constitution art. 3(4) ("Nothing in this Article derogates from any other pro-
vision of this Constitution.").
362. See id. arts. 5-13 ("Fundamental Rights").
363. Harding related that "[t]here is also no provision for the syariah to be a source, or the basic
source, of legislation. The matter was in fact tested in the 1988 case of Che Omar v Public Prosecutor,
in which it was argued that the enactment of a mandatory death penalty was contrary to Islam and
therefore unconstitutional. The Supreme Court (now Federal Court) rejected this argument, holding
that Article 3 was not a clog or fetter on the legislative power." Harding, supra note 353, at 166-67
364. Id. at 168. Harding continues, "[t]his primacy has in effect been endorsed by the Supreme
Court inJamaluddin Othman, a habeas corpus case in which freedom of religion under Article 11
was held to override even the power of preventive detention under the Internal Security Act. The
detainee, a Malay/Muslim who had converted to Christianity, was granted habeas corpus to secure
his release from detention, which had been effected on the grounds that his alleged attempts to
convert Muslims was a threat to national security." Id. at 168-69.
365. See, e.g., ANWAR IBRAHIM, THE ASIAN RENAISSANCE (1996). But see HUSSIN MUTALIB, ISLAM
IN MALAYSIA: FROM REVIVALISM TO ISLAMIC STATE? (1993).
366. See ANDREW J. HARDING, LAW, GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION IN MALAYSIA (1996).
367. Malaysian Constitution arts. 121-131A.
368. Id. art. 121(1).
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Court at its head,369 along with syariah (shari'a) courts, which are creatures of
state law.37 The jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited, and "shall have no
jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah
courts."37' But the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is broadly stated.372 The federal
judicial establishment thus sits atop a governance system in which states have
some authority to implement religious governmental systems and religious courts
can serve to amplify this project.373 Malaysia thus offers a hybrid system, or per-
369. Id. art. 122.
370. See id. art 122(IA), sched. 9, list II.
371. Id. art. 121(IB).
372. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction extends to
(a) any question whether a law made by Parliament or by the Legislature of a
State is invalid on the ground that it makes provision with respect to a matter to
which Parliament or, as the case may be, the Legislature of the State has no
power to make laws; and (b) disputes on any other question between States or
between the Federation and any State.
Id. art. 128(1).
373. See Government of Malaysia, Constitution, http://www.gov.my/MyGov/Bl/Directory/
Government/AboutMsianGov/GovConstitution (last visited Dec. 28, 2008) ("The Federal Constitu-
tion of Malaysia is the supreme law of the nation that distributes the power of governance in accor-
dance with the practice of Parliamentary Democracy. The Constitution may be amended by a
two-third majority in Parliament."). Article 74 of the Constitution divides power between the federal
and state levels. The enumeration is contained in a Federal and a State List. Such a division of author-
ity is subject to conditions and restrictions otherwise set forth in the federal constitution itself. See
Malaysian Constitution, art. 74(3); see also id. art. 74(4) ("Where general as well as specific expressions
are used in describing any of the matters enumerated in the Lists set out in the Ninth Schedule the
generality of the former shall not be taken to be limited by the latter."). The Federal list exempts federal
legislation of "Islamic personal law relating to marriage, divorce, guardianship, maintenance, adop-
tion, legitimacy, family law, gifts or succession, testate and intestate," id. sched. 9, list I, § 4(e)(ii), but it
includes power to legislate over the machinery of government (subject to exempted powers devolved to
the states) including the "[a]scertainment of Islamic law and other personal laws for purposes of fed-
eral law," id. art. 4(k), and "[g]overnment and administration of the Federal Territories of Kuala
Lumpur and Labuan including Islamic law therein to the same extent as provided in item I in the
State List." Id. art. 6(e). State legislative power includes a limited authority to impose Islamic law and
legal structure. See id. sched. 9, list 11 (1). That provision permits state adoption of "Islamic law and
personal and family law of persons professing the religion of Islam, including the Islamic law relating
to succession, testate and intestate, betrothal, marriage, divorce, dower, maintenance, adoption, legiti-
macy guardianship, gifts, partitions and non-charitable trusts." Id. It also permits such regulation with
respect to "Wakafs and the definition and regulation of charitable and religious endowments, institu-
tions, trusts, charities and charitable institutions operating wholly within the State." Id. Most interest-
ingly, it permits state Islamism with respect to the "creation and punishment of offences." But this
power is limited to "persons professing the religion of Islam against precepts of that religion," and is
further narrowed to cover only those offenses "in regard to matters included in the Federal List." Id.
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haps better put, a system in which two forms of constitutionalism are meant to
coexist. Coexistence, however does not suggest convergence so much as compro-
mise and separation within a system in which one of the two forms of approaches
to constitutionalism-the conventional transnational variety-is privileged
within the political system, but not entirely. 74 The tensions that result seem to
parallel the ethno-religious tensions of the multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-
religious divisions within the state.375 The consequence will likely be continued
dynamism as all groups compete for greater dominance over the evolution of the
constitutional order until one or another constitutionalist system becomes clearly
dominant or the nation fractures.376
2. Sri Lanka
While the focus has been on Islamic constitutions and the problems of theo-
cratic constitutionalism within Muslim majority states, similar problems exist in
non-Muslim states. One example is Sri Lanka, whose constitution on the one
hand privileges Buddhism and on the other appears to adhere to the principles of
transnational constitutionalism, provides a similar example of the difficulties.
Under the current Constitution of 1978,' 77 Sri Lanka is established as a "free,
Sovereign, Independent and Democratic Socialist Republic and shall be known as
the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.378 State policy is constitutionally
binding on the government apparatus and includes the positive obligation to "es-
tablish in Sri Lanka a democratic socialist society,"3 79 the objectives of which are
set forth in the Constitution. None of the objectives refer to the state's religious
character. Indeed, a careful reading of Article 27 suggests just the opposite-that
374. Thus, one commentator described Islamization in terms of domesticating and harnessing
Islam for purely state power purposes during the Mahatir period. "The attempt to gain control of
the flow of Islam in politics first led to an intricate policy of managing Islamist groups, and then
to the Islamization initiative. The government devised a multipronged approach to containing and
managing Islamism and curbing its extremism. It sought to co-opt moderate Islamist forces, mar-
ginalize and silence the extremists, and generally regulate all Islamic activity." SEYYED VALI REZA
NASR, ISLAMIC LEVIATHAN: ISLAM AND THE MAKING OF STATE POWER 113 (2001).
375. See Larry Cat6 Backer, Abdullah Badawi, Anwar Ibrahim and the Politics of Race, Ethnicity
and Affirmative Action in Malaysia, Law at the End of the Day, http://lcbackerblog.blogspot
.com/2008/03/abdullah-badawi-anwar-ibrahim-and.html (Mar. 9,2008,15:26 EST).
376. See MUTALIB,supra note 365; Jomo K. Sundaram & Ahmad S. Cheek, The Politics of Malay-
sia's Islamic Resurgence, 10 THIRD WORLD Q. 843 (1988).
377. Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, available at http://www.priu
.gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/introduction.htm [hereinafter Sri Lanka Constitution].
378. Id. ch. 1, art. 1.
379. Id. ch. 6, art. 27(2).
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the state has been established as supremely secular and bound by the limits of
post-1945 secular transnational constitutionalism based on the protection of fun-
damental rights and the assurance of human dignity and progressive economic
policies.38 The appendage and contestable position of Article 9 in that context is
magnified. Indeed, the "State shall ensure equality of opportunity to citizens, so
that no citizen shall suffer any disability on the ground of race, religion, language,
caste, sex, political opinion or occupation." 8 '
In the absence of a king, "sovereignty is in the people and is inalienable. Sov-
ereignty includes the powers of government, fundamental rights and the
franchise." '382 Within this plausibly secular context, Buddhism is given a special
place. The "Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and
accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha
Sasana, while assuring to all religions the rights granted by Articles 10 and 14(1)
(e)." '383 Those assurances in Article 9 first protect freedom of conscience. "Every
person is entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 384 In addition, every
citizen is entitled to "the freedom, either by himself or in association with others,
and either in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, ob-
servance, practice or teaching."'385 Such rights can only be defeated on potentially
narrow grounds, where the "interests of national security, public order and the
protection of public health or morality, or for the purpose of securing due recog-
nition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others" are at issue.386
No one is compelled to be a Buddhist. The Constitution merely requires one
to live in a Buddhist state. And in the interests of such a state, but with due regard
to the sensitivities of others, that state must protect and foster the Buddha Sasana,
387
even where such fostering might otherwise impede the rights of others other than
the right to believe and to manifest that religious belief in worship, observance,
practice or teaching. In a Buddhist state in which the state itself must start from
the assumption that the Buddhist view must prevail, the best protection afforded
others is essentially the right to practice other religious beliefs unmolested. But
380. See id.
381. Id. ch. 6, art. 27(6).
382. Id. ch. 1, art. 3.
383. Id. ch. 2, art. 9.
384. Id. ch. 3, art. 10.
385. Id. ch. 3, art. 14(1) (e).
386. Id. ch. 3, art. 15(7).
387. On the nature of the concept, see Wijeyeratne, supra note 33, at 156.
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the price is that, though unmolested, they are cut off from the practices and un-
derstanding of the rest of society-for whose benefit the State must act under
Article 9. However, the State also is obligated to "strengthen national unity by
promoting co-operation and mutual confidence among all sections of the People
of Sri Lanka, including the racial, religious, linguistic and other groups, and shall,
take effective steps in the fields of teaching, education and information in order to
eliminate discrimination and prejudice." '388 Within these provisions, then, are ele-
ments of both substantive allocations of constitutional value to Buddhism and a
positive obligation on the part of the state to foster those principles. That fostering
is done through law, institutionalized in a constitution that also protects the indi-
vidual rights of people even as it shapes the foundations of social organization
around them in a way that might be inconsistent with their individual beliefs.
Sri Lanka thus presents an interesting wrinkle on the problem of classifica-
tion within theocratic constitutionalism. The Constitution, as it has evolved, is at
war with itself-is it the source of religious values constitutionalism, or does the
reference to the religion of the majority serve merely to contextualize the transna-
tional substantive values constitutionalism otherwise enshrined in the Sri Lankan
constitution? The question revolves around the character of Article 9 in the con-
text of other constitutional provisions. If Article 9 assumes a position of superior-
ity in a hierarchy of constitutional values to be advanced, then Sri Lanka can
move more confidently toward theocratic constitutionalization grounded in Bud-
dhism. If it does not, then the 1978 Constitution is of a different order and the
import of Article 9 becomes highly contestable, especially by the Tamil minority.
Evidence of intent might be found in the way the power of the judiciary to
interpret the 1978 Constitution is framed. If the judiciary must interpret the 1978
Constitution in light of the principles of Buddhism, that would certainly push the
characterization much closer to not only theocracy, but also closer to a constitu-
tional theocracy of a kind similar to that imposed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
judicial power is set forth in Chapters 15 and 16 of the 1978 Constitution.389
This leads to a curious result. First, the broad principles of state policy in
which the state is founded articulated in Article 27 are not justiciable. "The provi-
sions of this Chapter do not confer or impose legal rights or obligations, and are
not enforceable in any court or tribunal. No question of inconsistency with such
provisions shall be raised in any court or tribunal.""39 The Supreme Court "shall
388. Sri Lanka Constitution ch. 6, art. 27(5).
389. Id. chs. 15, 16.
390. Id. ch. 6, art. 29.
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have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any question relating to
the interpretation of the Constitution"39 ' It is granted broad constitutional review
powers other than with respect to matters related to popular revisions of the con-
stitution itself.392 But the Constitution itself does not bind the court to a particular
form of constitutional interpretation. On the one hand that might suggest that the
1978 Constitution is not theocratic. But we must still deal with Article 9. It would
be possible, consistent with the other provisions of the Constitution, to create a
hierarchy of constitutional values in which Article 9 serves as the supreme princi-
ple of constitutional jurisprudence-the animating force of substantive values in-
herent in the Constitution. That certainly would be consistent with the
socio-cultural religious views of the majority Sinhalese as so well described by
Roshan de Silva Wijeyeratne.3 93 It would, as well, comport with the form of a
reading of constitutional norms as suggesting a hierarchy of norms developed
well by the German Constitutional Court since the 1950s.3 94
Thus reconstructed, Article 9 could serve as the foundation through which all
fundamental rights are read and all protections to non-Buddhist others are under-
stood. This would be consistent with the construction of a theocratic constitutional-
ist state, producing applications that might be substantially different from those that
might be produced through an interpretative framework grounded in secular trans-
national norms identified through customary and conventional international law.
But there is no clear answer. There has been a temptation to theocratic constitu-
tionalism to which the Sri Lankan legislature has come close to succumbing. In
2005, for example, "Sri Lanka's parliament [discussed] the 'Bill on the Prohibition
of Forcible Conversions,' which had been proposed in 2007 by the Buddhist Jathika
Hela Urumaya (JHU) party.""5 But both government and Supreme Court did little
to further the effort.396 Sri Lanka has put itself in a position of what may be termed
soft theocratic constitutionalism. Theocracy remains a potent but contested poten-
tial substantive basis for the generation of constitutional values. Until there is a bit
391. Id. ch. 16, art. 125.
392. Id. ch. 16, arts. 120-23, 126-31.
393. See de Silva Wijeyeratne, supra note 33.
394. See Larry Cat6 Backer, Cosmopolitan Ideals, the European Union and its Judiciary, Law at
the End of the Day, http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2006/09/cosmopolitan-ideals-european-
union-and.html (Sept. 22, 2006, 22:59 EST).
395. Marta Allevato, Sri Lanka's Anti-Conversion Bill a "Worry" Even for Benedict XVI, ASIA
NEWS, May 5, 2005, http://www.asianews.it/view.php?I=en&art=3219.
396. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2005 (2005), available
at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51622.htm.
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more clarity, Sri Lanka will continue to reap the worst of both worlds-as a failed
theocratic and a failed secular transnational constitution. It neither applies the sub-
stantive values of its Buddhist norm framework, nor does it adhere completely to the
global secular system of human rights and rule of law norms.
CONCLUSION
Constitutionalism remains a messy business. In a sense, we live in a time of
constitutionalist anarchy. This anarchy might well mirror the anarchy in interna-
tional relations as any number of states-and the values they represent-vie for
authority and a place within the hierarchy of nations. The object of this article has
been to suggest that the project of building constitutionalism-a particular world-
view and ideology for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate expres-
sions of popular will in the form of domestic constitutions-has given rise to
transnational as well as nationalist versions of this project. Both seek to legitimate
by positing "good" constitutional arrangements as those that prohibit arbitrary
expressions of power and which limit that power in accordance with a system of
norms that reflect the "good" or right and justice.3 97 The "good" or right and jus-
tice, can itself, if left solely to the will of majorities, produce tyranny. Thus, a great
object of constitutionalism has been the embrace of normative systems against
which the actions of a sovereign will can be measured and limited. Transnational
constitutionalism suggests that the articulation of those substantive limits on ex-
pressions of domestic power and governance are best when they are removed from
the discretion of any single polity and situated within the community of nations--
no one state can control it, but all states can contribute to its expression, and every
state can incorporate its directives in a context-specific way. In its nationalist ver-
sion, substantive norms can be found within articulated communal values or uni-
versal principles of right and justice found within natural law or in notions of
civilized behavior or by reference to universal nonpolitical principles-for exam-
ple the economic determinism of the failed Marxist universalist project.
It also suggests that there is no consensus on any set of global bases for deter-
mining a norm structure limiting domestic constitution making and binding all
states. However incompatible it might seem to dominant values in other parts of the
world and among other significant segments of the global community, there has
risen a new expression of principled constitutionalism-constructed on the founda-
397 See Larry CatiA Backer, The Mechanics of Perfection: Philosophy, Theology and the Perfection of
American Law, in ON PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW (Francis J. Mootz, Jr. ed., 2009).
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tion of institutionalized religion. This principled constitutionalism inverts the con-
ventional form of constitutionalist organization, which privileges the values and
norms of the community of nations (contextualized within a polity), by privileging
the universal and eternal values derived from religion as a basis for interpreting and
elaborating systems of governance and law. Yet, at the same time, it provides a basis
for constructing states that avoid both arbitrary expressions of power and the use of
power unlawfully, constraining its deployment and expression by means of princi-
ples and institutional frameworks beyond the power of individuals to subvert. What
makes these systems so threatening to those constructing secular transnational or
nationalist constitutionalism are their similarities to the forms of legitimating con-
stitutionalism (and thus its potential authenticity) and their potential for reaching
conclusions about the nature of the good and the right and just incompatibly differ-
ent from that nurtured under other systems. Theocratic constitutionalism includes
and excludes privileges and subordinates individuals in ways that can be very differ-
ent from the ordering of power hierarchies in the West. It rests on inclusiveness and
a notion of difference significantly different from that developed among the com-
munity of nations after 1945 and expressed in a variety of international law instru-
ments. It would undo or redo the emerging system of supranational human rights
institutions in its own image. But within its own contextual universe, it can provide
as sound a basis for ordered and rule of law government as that offered by transna-
tional constitutionalism.
There is now a market for constitutionalism. Each of these constitutionalisms
are authentic and serve to legitimate the organization of states within frameworks
that promote rule of law and the institutionalization of process and values. Each
posits a distinction between a principled and an unprincipled organization of gov-
ernment, its operation, functioning, organization, objectives, limits, and relation-
ship with critical stakeholders.39 Within that market at least three major products
are offered, each with a large number of variations. These three-nationalist consti-
tutionalism, transnational constitutionalism and theocratic constitutionalism-have
produced a rich literature. Each claims to be the only legitimate basis for conceptu-
alizing the legitimate constitution of states. Each imposes a hierarchy of values in
which the universal provides a framework within which some variation is possible,
398. The legitimization aspect provides a powerful impetus to adhere to the form of constitution-
alism and gives rise to the need to police against imposters-either as sham democracies under
secular constitutionalism or as constitutional theocracies under theocratic constitutionalism. For a
discussion on sham constitutional theocracy and a move towards theocracy in Pakistan as a legiti-
mating move, see Siddique & Hayat, supra note 290, at 316-22.
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but only to the extent that it is compatible with a consensus reading of the frame-
work norms. Each reflects a series of values and assumptions that make accommo-
dation with other worldviews difficult at a fundamental level.3 9 For all that,
compatibility, as applied, might be possible.4"' That compatibility might well be nec-
essary in a world in which the sources of constitutionalist legitimacy will remain
highly contested. But it also suggests that in the absence of equilibrium through the
singular domination of a particular constitutionalist worldview, legitimating consti-
tutionalism-as doctrine and political project-will remain in a highly dynamic
state. For those championing one or another version and seeking to convince the
polities of particular states to join one or another camp, it behooves the players to
better understand competing systems to meet them on their own terms, and to bet-
ter structure arguments suggesting principled reasons for abandoning one in favor
of another. Alternatively, as is increasingly evident today, each group will seek, by
appearing to seek convergence, to move the other system closer to its own. In any
case, religion will be in the thick of it, from all sides of engagement. 1
399. This is the way Eric Heinze, for example, largely understood the reaction of the Chairman of the
Nigerian Islamic Human Rights Council to the Nigerian fornication case. See Eric Heinze, Even
Handedness and the Politics of Human Rights, 21 HARV. HuM. RTs. J. 7 (2008). Reacting to the view that
Shadjareh claimed that "Hudood punishments under the banner of shariah in a
secular state are unacceptable and cannot be the starting point for the implemen-
tation of shariah." He narrowed that view, however, in stating, "[a] woman who
is not married at the time of accusation of fornication does not deserve capital
punishment." The IHRC further states the view of the "majority" of schools of
thought, according to which the appropriate punishment would have been "a
certain number of lashings."
Id. at 23. Heinze stated, "[t]hat view, which the IHRC at no point challenges, cannot be called a
compromise position or a reconciliation of Islam with international human rights law. It is a cate-
gorical rejection of core human rights; namely, against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (if
not torture), as well as, arguably, privacy or freedom of conscience or religion." Id.
400. For an argument to that effect, see Fadel, supra note 167.
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